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This work analyzes the political incorporation of Mexican immigrants into both 
their home and host countries through the examination of the origins, dynamics and 
patterns of action of first-generation Mexican-American organizations in four American 
cities: Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas. Political incorporation has 
traditionally implied that immigrants abandon their political interests in their country of 
origin. Because immigrant political incorporation is often tightly linked to and influenced 
by incorporation or reincorporation into the homeland, these two processes should be 
studied together. The work presented is based on a large and unique data set based on 
extensive fieldwork and numerous interviews in the four cities.  Among the major 
findings are: (1) Mexican organizations in the four cities were created from the 1990s 
onwards in reaction to conditions and incentives in both the United States and Mexico, 
casting doubt on transnational approaches that attribute the emergence of these 
organizations to technological developments and other similar factors; (2) convergence in 
the types of organizations Mexicans have established is explained by explicit home 
 viii
country policies oriented towards mobilizing and organizing them, while variations are 
explained by immigrants’ interactions with the structures of opportunity they have 
encountered in the cities where they have settled; and (3) mobilization towards Mexico 
has had a positive effect on domestic mobilization as well, challenging the view that 
reestablishing ties to their homeland diminishes immigrant’s interest in their host country. 
However, homeland mobilization may have the negative effect of dividing immigrants 
along Mexican party lines. 
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1.1 The Political Incorporation of Mexican Immigrants in the United States and 
Mexico 
Because of their large and growing numbers, the political behavior of Mexican 
migrants is of mounting importance to the future of both the American and Mexican 
political systems. Mexicans are the largest immigrant group in the United States.  
According to the US Census, in 2004 the Hispanic population in the United States was 
40.4 million (14% of the U.S. population). Of those, 26.6 million (9.2% of the U.S. 
population) were of Mexican origin and approximately 10.6 million were born in Mexico 
(Census 2005).  The Mexican immigrant population in the United States has grown so 
fast in the last 20 years that it accounts for 37.8% of the total increase in the number of 
immigrants living in the Unites States (ICEMC 2001).   
 Mexicans in the United States can potentially affect local and national electoral 
processes, particularly taking into account that their naturalization rates have been on the 
rise (Johnston 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005). Data presented by the National Council 
of La Raza (Raza 2002) suggest that between 1990 and 2000 the number of states in 
which Hispanics made up 5% or more of voting citizens increased from 15 to 23 
(Guzmán 2001). In addition, states in which the Mexican immigrant population 
represents the largest immigrant group (California) or states that have seen a triple digit 
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increase within the same period (Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, New York) also 
account for the most electoral votes (more than 20 each).  
Mexicans have been at the center of immigration debates in the United States in 
the last two decades.  Some commentators claim, for example, that Mexican immigration 
reduces wages for the poorest American workers without generating significant benefits 
to the United States economy1. Others have argued that Mexican immigration departs 
from traditional patterns of integration into American society, directly raising “basic 
questions about issues of cultural coherence and attachment in American politics” 
(Renshon 2001, p. 36; Huntington 2004b; Huntington 2004a). While these claims are 
debatable, the reality is that many political commentators and analysts who shape 
American public opinion consider the social and political incorporation of Mexican 
immigrants a serious issue that is up for grabs.   
The political behavior of Mexican immigrants is important not only for the United 
States, however. Mexico itself is undergoing a process of democratic consolidation with 
the end of a long period of one-party dominance. This fact, along with Mexico's recent 
decision to cultivate its relationship with its emigrants in the United States, the 1996 dual 
nationality law, and the 2005 law that allows expatriates to vote in presidential elections, 
has not only expanded the opportunities for Mexicans living abroad to participate in 
Mexican politics but has legitimized their participation. The impact of expatriates on 
Mexico’s politics is growing because of simple demographics. Data presented by the 
Mexican government shows that of the 2,443 municipalities in Mexico only 93 are not 
producing emigrants to the United States2. This means that emigrant political influence 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Borjas(2001) and Camarota (2001) 
2 Source: Consejo Nacional de Población (Gómez Guzmán 2003) 
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will spread not only in states that have traditionally produced emigration, but in other 
regions as well. 
In the last two decades émigrés have started to play an increasingly significant 
role in Mexico’s political and economic life. They not only helped determine electoral 
outcomes at the local and state levels by influencing the decisions of voters from their 
communities of origin, but they also became one of the prime sources of foreign income 
for the Mexican economy through the remittances they send back. Today, however, they 
may also be in the position of deciding the election of Mexico’s future presidents because 
even if they end up not voting in large numbers electoral processes in Mexico have 
become so volatile and competitive among the three largest parties that a relative small 
number of votes coming from abroad may determine the outcome3.  For these reasons, 
they have become an important political constituency in their homeland, one that political 
parties are starting to cultivate assiduously. As they become more organized and 
mobilized, their influence and political leverage over the home country will certainly 
augment.  
1.2 The Problem 
This study explores the processes of political incorporation of Mexican 
immigrants into both the United States and Mexico.  Political incorporation traditionally 
is taken to mean the process by which migrants and their children settle and are absorbed 
into the polities of their host societies4. Never a good description of reality, it is even less 
                                                 
3 For example, in the 2006 Presidential elections the total number of votes from abroad was 33,111 (32,620 
counted).  This is apparently as a low number.  However, the potential impact of this new electorate can be 
seen when considering that the difference between the top two candidates Felipe Calderón from the PAN 
and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador from the PRD was only 243,934 votes. 
4 The notion of political incorporation used in this work is different from the wider notion of incorporation 
or assimilation into the host society.  The notion of political incorporation does not have any cultural, 
ideological, economic, or social connotations.  While it is expected that immigrants should be absorbed into 
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so today. Contemporary migration is not always permanent and given prevailing 
technology and communications may become less so. This is especially true with 
Mexican immigrants to the United States both because Mexico is contiguous and because 
such a great proportion of Mexican immigrants are undocumented, a status that hinders 
their chances of being fully absorbed into the host polity. Nonetheless, the traditional 
ways of studying incorporation are still useful. We need to know when and how migrants 
turn their attention to the United States political system, acquire legal or permanent 
status, naturalize and begin to participate.  Rather than involving only absorption, 
however, the process of incorporation should be understood as a constant negotiation 
between newcomers and their hosts, which involves potentially major changes in the 
political system of the receiving country and thus the opening up of new spaces for 
immigrant political participation.   
This study also explores the incorporation of the emigrant population into the 
Mexican political system.  Many Mexican migrants can hardly be said to have been 
incorporated into that system before departing for the United States, particularly 
considering that the majority were drawn from poorly educated and politically and 
socially marginal sectors of Mexican society.  Others were full citizens but may have 
drifted away; and still others remain deeply identified with Mexico but have not been free 
                                                                                                                                                 
their host polity, this absorption does not imply major identity changes or the abandoning of their ties with 
their places and countries of origin.  Full absorption here only implies full representation in the political 
and policy processes of the receiving country.  In operational terms, political incorporation includes 
indicators such as immigrant regularization, naturalization, voter registration, voting, joining political 
organizations, developing partisan affiliations, participating in political campaigns, running for office, 
developing political advocacy skills and similar ones.  Although all this information is relevant for my 
work, I do not systematically collect all this evidence at the individual level, because as I will explain latter, 
this work studies the process of incorporation through the dynamics and interactions of immigrant 




to participate from abroad in the past.  Accordingly, some emigrants are incorporating for 
the first time, others are reincorporating, and still others are now in a position to exercise 
rights more fully.  
The outcome of the process of political incorporation into the receiving polity can 
take various forms. A full process of incorporation ideally supposes that immigrants have 
a substantive influence or control over the policy process on those issues that are 
particularly relevant for them (Browning, et al. 1990b). Nonetheless, most forms of 
incorporation are partial, can vary across states and cities, and do not always imply the 
need of having citizenship rights in the host society, although their possession increases 
the prospects for immigrants to have meaningful influence. Undocumented immigrants, 
for example, can participate in rallies and demonstrations to demand better working 
conditions and legal status. In contrast, those migrants who are citizens do not necessarily 
vote but still have influence because the host country political parties either want or fear 
that they will register to do so.  
Following the work of Browning, Marshall, et al. (1990b) on minority 
incorporation in American cities, it is possible to identify two roads that immigrants can 
follow towards incorporation: electoral and interest group. These roads are not 
necessarily alternatives but can rather be used simultaneously, although the electoral 
strategy requires access to citizenship rights. An electoral strategy seeks to influence the 
political system from the inside. It requires immigrants to register to vote. Voting alone, 
however, would not be enough. They will also need to have members of their group 
achieve political and administrative positions. Also, it is essential for them to establish 
alliances with other ethnic groups, as well as with groups within the mainstream society, 
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and to play “an equal or leading role in a dominant coalition strongly committed to 
minority interests” (Browning, et al. 1990b, p. 9).  The interest group strategy seeks to 
influence the political system from the outside. This requires immigrants to produce 
substantial demands and protest to generate a reaction from the dominant coalition in 
government. If there is not at least a partial incorporation of immigrants into their 
receiving country, they will remain an unprotected group, potentially the source of social 
and political conflict.      
The political incorporation of emigrants into their homeland is much less obvious 
and poses theoretical and empirical questions about nation, state, and democracy. Ideally, 
full incorporation implies that emigrants have a substantive influence or control over the 
policy process on those issues relevant to them. However, most forms of incorporation 
are partial, do not necessarily imply access to full citizenship rights (specifically political 
rights), and can vary across different states and localities within the homeland. The first 
step towards incorporation would require recognition by the sending society that 
expatriates are legitimate actors who can positively affect economic, social and political 
development. Emigrants then can influence their polity of origin following the same two 
roads adumbrated above. An electoral strategy requires the granting of full citizenship 
rights by their homeland, including the right to vote and/or be elected to political office 
from abroad. Rights will be realized only through mobilization and action. Expatriates 
will need for some of their members to obtain elected or appointive offices and build 
alliances with other groups in their sending country. When they have not been granted 
political rights in their homeland, emigrants have attempted to impact the electoral 
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process by influencing the votes of their family members they left behind, but this is 
obviously a less potent tactic.  
Emigrants can also incorporate into their homeland polity by following an 
interest-group strategy. It is important to clarify that emigrants rarely mobilize en masse, 
although political events with great significance such as regime changes might spark such 
responses5. Also, emigrants can be mobilized by homeland governments that facilitate 
their organization. Once they are mobilized towards their homeland, the home country 
confronts some risks if it does not at least partially incorporate emigrants into the polity. 
When emigrants are a large group, their lack of incorporation can become a source of 
social and political conflict for the homeland.  This scenario, however, is uncommon 
because it requires collective action on the part of emigrants that is difficult to achieve.  
One important resource emigrants control is the flow of remittances, which might be 
withheld if emigrants become alienated from the homeland.        
In the last few decades, incorporation into both host and home polity has become 
more feasible than ever as many sending countries now promote dual citizenship or dual 
nationality policies and receiving countries have been relaxing their citizenship and 
naturalization requirements at the same time that they have become more tolerant of dual 
citizenship or multiple nationality practices. This contrasts with the traditional view that 
                                                 
5 It is also not clear the extent to which they mobilize to vote in their homeland elections once they have 
that right. The evidence suggests that only a few emigrants that have been allowed to vote in their country 
of origin actually vote. Colombia, for example, has allowed its citizens to vote from abroad since 1962. The 
percentages of those voting, however, are small. For example, of an estimated population of three million 
people residing abroad in 1998 fewer than 200,000 registered to vote in the presidential elections of that 
year and only 44 thousand actually voted in the first round of the elections. For the second round fewer 
than 30,000 voted. In the Mexican case, a study prior to the approval of the right to vote by mail from 
abroad in presidential elections suggested that only a small percentage of expatriates would vote (Cornelius 
and A. 2003). This was confirmed by the 2006 presidential election data where of an estimated universe of 
4 million potential voters, only 56,749 registered to vote, of those 81% ended up participating.  
Nonetheless, since this was the first time Mexicans residing abroad were eligible to vote, it is difficult to 
know if this low level of participation will continue. 
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sees incorporation as a zero-sum situation in which the immigrant has to choose between 
his adopted polity and his country of origin. In a world in which more people have 
acquired rights to exercise influence in two polities simultaneously, this zero sum 
dilemma seems no longer applicable.    
This study traces the incorporation of Mexican migrants into the United States 
and Mexico through an examination of the policies of the two national states and of the 
behavior of immigrant political associations. After tracing the evolution of the US and 
Mexican government policies vis-à-vis the Mexican diaspora, I turn to the political 
activities of the diaspora itself. I explore the origins and dynamics of organizations for 
first-generation Mexican immigrants that have emerged in the last two decades in four 
American cities with large Mexican populations: Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles and New 
York.  I argue that these organizations are at once a forum for the mobilization and 
socialization of recent immigrants and potential lobbies vis-à-vis both Mexico and the 
United States.   
As Rosenhek (1999) has suggested, migrant organizations and associations are 
pivotal actors in the process of political incorporation in the host country. Although the 
majority of migrants are not likely to participate extensively in any of these organizations 
(Desipio, et al. 2003), they “can function as a major institutional resource, allowing 
migrants to engage in a politics of claims-making aimed at the improvement of their 
legal, political and socioeconomic status”(Rosenhek 1999, p. 575). These associations 
augment the social capital of newcomers, which in turn increases their levels of political 
trust and participation both through formal and informal means (Jacobs and Tillie 2004).   
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A number of recent studies analyze the role and activities of immigrant 
associations in shaping the patterns of incorporation of specific immigrant groups 
(Ireland 1994; Feldblum 1999; Rosenhek 1999; Bousetta 2000; Ireland 2000; Koopmans 
and Statham 2000a; Ireland 2003; Ogelman 2003; Berger, et al. 2004; Fennema 2004; 
Jacobs, et al. 2004; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Koopmans 2004; Odmalm 2004; Tillie 2004; 
Togeby 2004). Most of these studies offer an instrumental explanation and present 
immigrant mobilization as driven by structural disadvantage and political opportunities 
and constraints. They thus generally use a neo-institutional explanatory framework 
derived from political sociology to evaluate the degree to which different host state 
institutions (e.g. citizenship regimes, national integration policies, party and electoral 
systems, framing discourses about who belongs to the nation, welfare and sub-national 
institutions) affect immigrant mobilization, association and incorporation (Ireland 1994; 
Freeman and Ogelman 1998; Ireland 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000b; Ireland 2003; 
Koopmans 2004). In some cases they combine this type of explanation with one focused 
on the adaptation side and assess the level of social capital created by these organizations 
and its effects on the levels of political trust and, thus, of participation and incorporation 
of newcomers into their host polity (Jacobs, et al. 2004). Finally some of these studies 
focus predominantly on adaptation (Tillie 2004).     
I follow an institutional approach although I also pay attention to adaptation by 
evaluating the strength of first-generation immigrant organizations and their capacity to 
influence political developments in their home and host countries.  Consistent with the 
authors who have emphasized opportunity structures, I focus on host state institutions and 
institutional practices, but I also keep in mind those of the home state. Together they 
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create a structure of opportunities and constraints that affects the chances of immigrant 
associations being established and the modes of political action that they pursue. Also, 
these institutions and institutional practices play a fundamental role in determining the 
extent and the manner in which migrants will incorporate into the polities of their home 
and host states.  
The effect of these institutional practices, however, is not as straightforward as it 
may at first seem. Greater engagement by homeland governments in affecting immigrant 
organizational practices does not necessarily predict that immigrants incorporate more in 
their home country than in their host society. Depending on the institutional context of 
the host country, the mobilization of immigrants by home countries may also motivate 
them to incorporate in their host country. This contradicts widely held assumptions that 
greater interest in the homeland diminishes immigrants’ desire to incorporate into the 
host country6. For instance, a recent survey (Desipio, et al. 2003) demonstrates that those 
individuals who tend to be engaged in some way or another in their homeland politics are 
also more likely to be engaged in their host country politics. This, however, depends on 
the structures of opportunity and constraint created by the policies of both sending and 
receiving countries towards migrants.  
1.3 The Role of Host State Institutions 
 Dismissing class and ethnic models to explain immigrant political activities, 
Ireland (1994; 2000; 2003) develops an institutional channeling framework. He argues 
that host society institutional structures determine the ways in which immigrant claims 
will be organized. Ireland highlights immigration, citizenship, and naturalization laws, as 
                                                 
6 Although the involvement of expatriates on their homeland’s politics might diminish their capacity to 
create a cohesive front towards the host country (Ogelman 2003) 
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well as interactions between immigrants and institutional gatekeepers who control access 
to political participation. These institutional gatekeepers include political parties, trade 
unions, and religious and humanitarian non-profit associations “that can weaken or 
strengthen the effects of differences in resources” (Ireland 2000, p. 36) for immigrants. In 
addition, specific policies affect the political participation of immigrants, including 
education, housing, social assistance, and labor market policies.  All these host country 
institutions and practices strengthen or weaken the racial, ethnic and class identities of 
immigrants. Institutions are not neutral, but help determine whether immigrants’ 
participation will take on a class or ethnic orientation. 
From this point of view, class or ethnic forms of political participation become 
dependent variables that are clearly affected by the institutional practices of the host 
society. The evidence I present supports this view. In particular, the data I gathered show 
that not all Mexican immigrants organize in the same ways. Different cities produce 
different patterns of organization and even similar forms of organization of first-
generation Mexican immigrants exhibit different dynamics and agendas that cannot be 
explained by class or ethnic factors alone.    
Ireland’s analysis also suggests that the institutional channels opened by the host 
state will affect immigrants’ organizational ties to their homeland. For example, in his 
1994 study, which compared immigrant political participation in two cities in France and 
two cities in Switzerland, Ireland showed that in La Corneuve, one of the French cities, 
the local communist authorities strengthened a class-based and a homeland-oriented form 
of immigrants’ participation. They emphasized the internationalist and worldwide class 
unity of immigrants and advocated full social and trade union rights. They did not, 
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however, favor granting voting rights at the local level because doing so might affect 
their “right to be different” and to exercise their civic rights in their homelands (Ireland 
1994, p.110). In addition, the local authorities in that city stifled opposition to those 
homeland governments that were unfriendly to the French Communist Party. 
In his more recent work, Ireland (2003) identifies the welfare state as a key 
variable affecting the form of immigrant political participation. He suggests that some 
institutional practices, specifically those that involve social policy retrenchment, have 
intensified ethnic conflicts and ethnic identities in Western societies and have increased 
the “homeland hangover” of some immigrant groups.  “As an incarnation and guarantor 
of social citizenship,” welfare state institutions “have had a powerful say in whether the 
forces of exclusion or inclusion prevail” (Ireland 2003, p. 9).  For years, social policies, 
even in liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, helped to attenuate the inequalities created by the 
market and to ensure the integration of all segments of the population, including 
immigrants. Decentralization, privatization and delegation of social assistance to non-
profit organizations, nonetheless, have stimulated ethnic-identity cleavages and motivated 
greater mobilization towards the homeland. No matter how you look at the data, “the 
association between disadvantage and minority status has hardened” in Europe and the 
United States: 
In its at-risk neighborhoods, Europe has at-risk population groups. Those of 
immigrant origin belong to them disproportionately, promoting fears that ethnicity 
has become a major axis of social exclusion (Ireland 2003, p. 8).       
I follow Ireland in stressing the relevance of host institutions and institutional 
practices to the emergence, dynamics, and orientation of immigrant organizations. 
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Ireland’s work suggests that if the channels for political participation are more open to 
immigrants in their host country at the national and local level, and if they have more 
chances to obtain socioeconomic status equal to that of the mainstream society, thanks in 
part to effective social assistance policies, they will have fewer incentives to link their 
political agendas to their homelands. However, this situation can be altered under two 
conditions: (1) if they have little encouragement or access to participate in the host 
society political and economic life and (2) if they are mobilized by political events back 
home or by policies implemented by homeland governments that attempt to influence 
their political attitudes. This means that homeland states play an active part in increasing 
or decreasing immigrants’ interest in their country of origin.  For this reason, I investigate 
the role played by policies of the sending as well as the host country.  
My research produces extensive evidence that changes in naturalization and 
citizenship laws in the United States, together with a new policy of rapprochement with 
migrants implemented by the Mexican government in the last two decades, have 
stimulated the flourishing of organizations for first-generation immigrants in the four 
cities I studied.  The research also shows that the limited channels for political 
participation in the United States, in conjunction with the opportunities that have opened 
for them in the political and economic lives of their communities and country of origin, 
have impelled immigrant associations to articulate a political agenda more tied to the 
homeland than to that of the host. Despite that, Mexico’s institutional practices towards 
its émigrés have also facilitated more sophisticated forms of organization of first- 
generation immigrants in the United States than those that had previously been 
developed. The immigrant turn towards the homeland has opened new channels of 
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participation in their host country because this mobilization has given them a political 
consciousness they did not have before and helped them develop a complex 
organizational network that they are starting to use to advance their interests in the United 
States. Nonetheless, the strong influence that Mexico’s politics have had on Mexican 
organizations in the United States has also created divisions within the first-generation 
Mexican community that may limit their chances of creating a coherent political front in 
the United States.   
Ireland argues that variations in the political forms of participation of immigrants 
in different national and local settings are determined by the political opportunities and 
constraints created by institutional practices of the host state. My study does not compare 
the political participation of Mexicans in different national settings, because it is limited 
to the United States. However, in a country like the United States, where local 
governments control many aspects of public policy, the four cities I study should provide 
sufficient variation to test differences across institutional settings. With this caveat, I 
hypothesize that immigrants’ interactions with host institutions determine their various 
organizational dynamics and patterns of political incorporation in their host country. 
However, these organizational dynamics and patterns are also affected by the links 
immigrants establish with institutions in their homeland.  I suggest that, controlling for 
class and ethnic factors, the differences in the organizational strategies that Mexican 
immigrants have adopted in the four cities are determined by the specific interactions 
immigrants have with the institutional setting of those cities as well as by their 
interactions with various homeland institutional actors, including local consulates, the 
governments of the states and communities of origin, the national Congress, the political 
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parties and the executive branch. In addition, I suggest that a convergence is emerging in 
the type of organizations Mexicans have been developing in the United States and in their 
general stance towards their host and home countries that is explained in great part by the 
explicit policies and mobilization efforts of the Mexican state in the last couple of 
decades.  
From my point of view, the current process of political incorporation of Mexicans 
in the United States has been clearly intertwined with their process of incorporation and 
re-incorporation in Mexico. American amnesty policies such as the 1986 IRCA radically 
changed the identification of many Mexicans from sojourners to immigrants7 (Fuchs 
1990). For the first time a huge sector of the first-generation Mexican population in the 
United States had access to citizenship, and could become full members of the American 
polity. Recent immigration and naturalization policies implemented by the United States 
were almost coincidental with radical changes in Mexico’s attitude and policies towards 
its emigrants which culminated in the 2005 law that enfranchised Mexican expatriates.     
For these reasons I maintain that we need to study the process of incorporation of 
the Mexican diaspora into the United States and the Mexican polity simultaneously. It is 
almost impossible to thoroughly understand one of them without understanding the other.  
1.4 Incorporating in the Home Country 
The incorporation of emigrants into their homeland politics has been much less 
studied than their incorporation into the host country.  In a recent study Morawska (2001) 
demonstrates that since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sending countries 
have actively mobilized, organized, and incorporated emigrants into their nation-building 
                                                 
7 The 1965 Immigration Act, which established family reunification as a major immigration policy and 
thereby allowed legal Mexican immigrants to bring their family members also facilitated the settlement 
process.      
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processes and in some cases tried to repress political activities deemed subversive. 
Eastern and southern European countries such as Poland and Italy attempted to influence 
their emigrants in the United States. Emigrants played an active role in preserving 
homeland ties by attempting to keep informed about and influence political developments 
there. Morawska’s literature review, however, shows that these phenomena produced 
only scattered studies that have been for the most part forgotten. 
The more recent literature on transnationalism has helped fill this gap. As Glick 
Schiller (1999) points out, transnational studies, particularly those that focus on 
international migration, seek to identify the political, economic, social and cultural ties 
that migrants maintain and construct beyond the borders of a particular state. These 
studies, therefore, extensively document the social and political connections that 
emigrants have nurtured of late with their homelands and particularly with their local 
communities of origin (Goldring; Smith 1997a; Goldring 1998b; Goldring 1998a; Smith 
and Guarnizo 1998b; Smith 1998a; Smith 1998b; Itzigsohn, et al. 1999; Landolt, et al. 
1999; Moctezuma Longoria 1999; Smith 1999b; Itzigsohn 2000; Unger 2000; Portes, et 
al. 2002; Moctezuma Longoria 2003; Smith 2003). Scholars of this school argue that 
even though previous generations of immigrants often maintained close ties to their 
homeland, new developments in technology and communications, as well as increasing 
economic and political interdependence, facilitate and encourage migrants’ transnational 
activities.    
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Most of this literature, however, focuses exclusively on individual-level variables8 
(Portes, et al. 1999) and thus misses or diminishes the key role sending and receiving 
states have been playing in shaping the transnational activities of migrants. One reason is 
that in some of the predominant transnational literature, particularly that derived from 
cultural studies, the state is thought of as disappearing or becoming irrelevant (Appadurai 
1990; Bhabha 1990; Basch, et al. 1994; Clifford 1994; Appadurai 1996). Other studies 
coming from sociology and anthropology are less conclusive in their assessments of the 
fate of the state, but treat it, nonetheless, as peripheral. More recent attempts to address 
this limitation aim to specify the role that sending states play in structuring immigrant 
organizations (Guarnizo 1998; Smith 1998a; Itzigsohn, et al. 1999; Smith 1999b; 
Itzigsohn 2000; Guarnizo 2001; Goldring 2002; Smith 2003). 
Itzigsohn’s (2000) work is particularly pertinent. First, it refers to the sending 
state as a key actor in determining immigrant activities directed at their homeland. 
Second, along with others (De la Garza 1997; Smith 1998a; Calderon Chelius and 
Martinez Saldaña 2002), it links two homeland institutions to the activities of immigrant 
organizations in the receiving countries: the administrative apparatus of the state and the 
party system. Itzigsohn argues that certain home state policies aimed at engaging 
emigrants, along with a competitive party system, open opportunities for emigrants to 
participate in their motherland political process. Sending states have a strong interest in 
guaranteeing the continuous flow of remittances and involving emigrants in the economic 
development of their country of origin. For this reason they have opened up new avenues 
                                                 
8 Transnational studies in the last decade represent a reaction to structural theories in international 
migration that were not able to explain why immigrants who appear to be the victims of overwhelming 
structural forces have been able to develop special links with their communities of origin that liberate them 
from their condition of subordination. For this reason, they argue that individuals (migrants) construct their 
own destiny (Smith and Guarnizo 1998b; Roberts 1999).   
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for emigrant participation in the economic and political life of their homeland. The 
effectiveness of this involvement, however, is shaped by the strength of migrant 
organizations in host societies: the greater their strength, the larger the influence they will 
have in their homeland, thus creating a distinctive transnational political space. This 
transnational space can emerge when there is a disjuncture between politics and territory, 
that is, when there is an expansion of the geographical scope of action of sending states, 
and when there are strong immigrant associations that can take advantage of the political 
opportunities created by the transnational activities of sending states targeted to their 
populations abroad.  Among other things, migrant organizations may demand a wider 
voice in the political and policy processes of their country of origin. This may then be 
translated into increasing demands for citizenship rights in the country of origin that are 
not linked to territory and residency 
Along with Itzigsohn, I stress the relevance of the regime type and the dynamics 
of the party system of the homeland as affecting emigrant organization and mobilization 
towards their country of origin.  Authoritarian, totalitarian or sultanistic regimes (Linz 
and Stepan 1996) would certainly offer fewer incentives for emigrants to organize and 
mobilize towards their homeland9. Emigrants, nonetheless, may organize autonomously 
to oppose the political regime of their homeland in the way that Cubans in the United 
States have opposed Fidel Castro’s authoritarian regime. Countries that actively engage 
emigrants and facilitate at least their partial incorporation through dual nationality or dual 
citizenship policies tend to be going through democratization, or already have a 
democratic regime. The dynamics of the party system also affect emigrant incorporation. 
                                                 
9 Some authoritarian countries, however, that favor primordial identities or agendas have, nonetheless, 
attempted to mobilize their diasporas (Brubaker 1996; Bauböck 2005b). 
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Party systems in which unstable political alignments prevail are more likely to facilitate 
the incorporation of emigrants since political parties are obviously trying to expand their 
constituencies to win elections. Unless emigrants’ agendas can become part of a broader 
political discourse their interests will have limited chances of being represented in their 
country of origin. Despite his important contributions, Itzigsohn’s analysis of the role of 
the administrative apparatus does not explain how different institutional dynamics within 
that apparatus affect the ways in which emigrants will be incorporated in their country of 
origin.  
  Goldring (2002) and Smith (2003) consider how sub-national institutions and 
institutional reform affect emigrants’ organization and incorporation into their homeland 
political and policy processes. Goldring, for example, evaluates the effects of 
decentralization and devolution of power to state and local authorities in Mexico on the 
incorporation of emigrants. She shows that results of these policies have been uneven, 
and that some states have been more effective in institutionalizing their relationships with 
their expatriate populations than others.  Goldring also explains how recent reforms of the 
state apparatus have determined the forms of political membership offered by sending 
states. In the Mexican case, the attempt by the state to withdraw from the developmental 
field and implement a neo-liberal project in which individuals obtain goods and services 
through the market has been critical. State policies thus “emphasize local cost-sharing 
and responsibility and claim to reverse state paternalism.” (Goldring 2002, p. 69).  In this 
context emigrants have become active in the economic and social development of their 
regions of origin. In exchange, the Mexican state offered in the 1990s a limited form of 
membership in the polity, which Goldring calls a “marketized-membership.” This 
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membership depends on migrants’ “affective ties and nationalist sentiments to mobilize 
and maintain financial contributions and remittances, but it provides no formal 
mechanisms for political participation.”  (Goldring 2002, p. 69).  Emigrants, nonetheless, 
have been able to renegotiate the terms of this membership by using their increased 
political leverage to exert pressure over local and national institutions to open up new 
spaces for their political participation. Goldring’s analysis was prior to the approval of 
the right to vote by mail from abroad in Mexico’s presidential elections. Her analysis, 
therefore, does not explain this event. Following her line of argument one would assume 
that the most relevant factor in facilitating the opening of new mechanisms for the formal 
participation of emigrants was the pressure they exercised over the political system.  
However, from her analysis it is not possible to derive the political conditions and 
arrangements that increase the likelihood of success.   
Like Goldring, Smith (2003) criticizes standard transnational approaches for 
dealing only with how politics take place across borders, but not with how migration and 
migrant involvement in the political life of their homeland “changes the institutions of the 
polity and its conception of membership” (Smith 2003, p. 302).  He shows that the 
political incorporation of emigrants in Mexico has not been uniform: different 
relationships to the state and labor markets in Mexico and the United States yield 
different forms of membership in the polity. Those migrant organizations, particularly 
from Zacatecas, that have exploited the political opportunity structures opened up for 
them by their intensified relationship with their state of origin have gotten stronger forms 
of membership. In contrast, those migrant organizations, specifically those from Oaxaca, 
that have relied on international human rights organizations to advance their interest in 
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their region of origin have gotten weaker forms of membership. In both cases, however, 
these organizations have been able to exercise some pressure on their states of origin and 
thus advance their specific interests. 
1.5 A Political Opportunity Structure Approach 
I propose a political opportunity structure approach that can accommodate the 
dual process of political incorporation into both home and host polities. Political 
opportunity structure theory (POS) posits that the success or failure of an excluded group 
to mobilize, organize and advance its collective interests depends directly on the 
receptivity of the political process and the institutional spaces available. When the 
government consistently represses a social group or guarantees that it remains in a 
marginal status, the chances for this group to mobilize and act on its behalf are limited if 
not nil. For an excluded group to have at least some political success, the government 
must be willing to tolerate its emergence as a social movement, which means that it must 
allow it “to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance its collective interests 
through non-institutionalized means” (Costain 1994, p. 12).   In most instances, social 
movements and groups that have been able to advance their political aspirations have 
received at least some explicit support from the government (Costain 1994; McAdam 
1999). Political institutions and processes, therefore, are clearly determinants of the 
timing and success of these movements. 
 The political opportunity structure approach emerged from resource mobilization 
theory (RM) that was originally developed to study the social movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Until then, theories of social movements argued that they resulted from the 
relative deprivation of individuals that were alienated from the means of production and 
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mobilized to disrupt and change the social order. In contrast, RM theory suggested that 
social movements arose when a  “requisite level of resources was brought together to 
push for change” (Costain 1994, p. 7).  These included material resources as well as an 
entrepreneurial leadership, a communications network and the capacity to attract new 
adherents and allies to their cause. Once the movement emerged, its success would be 
determined by its ability to gain more external resources and allies and by being able to 
present its demands in non-threatening incremental ways, thus reducing the political costs 
for the government and their allies in accepting their demands. 
 New research on social movements has stressed that although the availability of 
outside resources had an impact on the level of activity of specific movements, there was 
not enough data to demonstrate that access to resources was the main factor in 
determining the origins and development of these movements. Furthermore, it was not 
possible to demonstrate that by pursuing an incremental approach, social movements 
would accomplish their goals more effectively. In contrast, this research showed that the 
level of receptiveness of the political process and institutions was decisive in facilitating 
the emergence and success of these movements10.  As Tarrow lucidly posed it: “If 
collective action is a form of politics, then as in conventional politics, there must be a set 
of constraints and opportunities that encourage or discourage it and lead it towards 
certain forms rather than others” (Tarrow 1988, p. 429).  Different institutions and 
institutional practices within the state generated this set of constraints and opportunities.  
 In this regard, POS theory shares with RM an interest in studying groups’ 
strategies to mobilize different political resources and it also argues that these groups can 
modify the opportunities available to them once they have emerged as social movements. 
                                                 
10 For a review of this research see Tarrow (1988; 1994) and Costain (1994). 
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However, it also stresses the need to identify the institutional barriers and opportunities 
that facilitate the initiation of collective action and affect its success.  
While there was already some research on constraints prior to the emergence of 
the policy process approach--particularly to explain the obstacles that limited the 
collective action of the poor--the identification of those opportunities that incite 
collective action has been a more difficult task. What is clear is that opportunities 
originate from major institutional changes or from unstable balances of power that open 
the doors to the inclusion of new actors. Changes in the main conceptions about who 
belongs to the polis or the existence of unstable political alignments, for example, clearly 
facilitate the entrance of newcomers.  In addition, the success of social movements is 
dependent on the balance of power between weakened governmental institutions and a 
newly empowered group (Costain 1994).   
  In adopting this approach, Koopmans and Statham (2000b) link political 
institutions of the host country with public discourses about integration/incorporation and 
with the level of actual interaction among immigrant organizations and other actors, 
including not only national and sub-national actors but also other ethnic and non-profit 
organizations. The authors attempt to go beyond standard neo-institutional analyses by 
avoiding a vague use of the notion of institutions and specifying “much more clearly 
what these consist of, which dimensions can be distinguished and what indicators might 
be used in empirical investigation” (Koopmans and Statham 2000b, p. 31). They propose 
four major categories of analysis: national cleavage structures, institutional actors and 
legal arrangements, prevailing elite strategies, and contingencies of time and place. I 
intend to extend this model to cover the incorporation of emigrants in their homeland and 
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to evaluate whether the increased interactions of emigrants with their homeland affect the 
ways they incorporate into host countries.  
1.5.1 National Cleavage Structures 
National cleavage structures define the political space available for newcomers11 
to introduce claims into the polity. They include debates over who belongs to the nation 
and who does not and how access to political membership is constructed.  I track the 
meaning of the nation in both Mexico and the United States and the avenues of access to 
citizenship in both countries.  I situate discussion of nation and citizenship within wider 
political debates.   
With respect to the United States, I will show that immigrants have always been 
participants in the national discourse, as one of the founding ideas of the American 
national project is that the United States is a country of immigrants. However, this 
inclusiveness has been selective as some national groups have been readily accepted into 
the polity while others have not.  Mexican immigrants for a long time were identified as 
sojourners and thus had almost no chance of being incorporated. This has to do with the 
fact that Mexican immigration to the United States has always been informal with a large 
portion of it outside the law and this had a negative effect on the tendency to accept 
Mexicans as permanent members of the polity. In addition, I show that inclusiveness has 
been contested in different periods of American history by political coalitions opposing 
open immigration.   
With respect to Mexico, I explore how the goal of consolidation led the Mexican 
state to develop inward- looking nationalist policies such that those who left the country 
                                                 
11 Newcomers are here understood as immigrants with respect to their country of residence and emigrants 
with respect to their country of origin.   
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were identified in the national imaginary as traitorous. Therefore, although there were 
some emigrant demands for political rights, particularly in the late 1920s, they were not 
realized because the national discourse excluded those who did not reside inside the 
physical territory of the state. Six decades later, the government of Ernesto Zedillo 
recognized emigrants as part of the nation. President Vicente Fox took this a step further 
by calling them “national heroes.” I evaluate why these changes took place and why 
emigrants became a constituency to be cultivated. In addition, I explore the guiding 
principles of Mexican citizenship law and investigate how Mexico’s recent adoption of 
dual nationality policy came about. 
1.5.2 Institutional Actors and Legal Arrangements 
Institutions and legal arrangements determine the channels of access for 
newcomers and they can be more open or closed. These include integration policies in the 
host country such as citizenship and immigration laws. Lack of access to full citizenship 
rights denies immigrants, in most cases, an electoral strategy even when their numbers 
may make them a potentially significant constituency for political parties. In the same 
vein, access to full political rights determines the extent to which emigrants will influence 
the electoral process of their country of origin. 
 With respect to the United States I explore how immigration and settlement 
policies as well as citizenship laws have constrained in some cases and opened in others 
political opportunities for Mexicans. I show, for example, that the 1986 amnesty that 
granted legal status to millions of undocumented Mexicans facilitated their gradual 
incorporation by fundamentally changing the nature of Mexican migration from a 
traditionally circular process to one that is now predominantly permanent. This law also 
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contributed to the improvement of the socioeconomic status of some Mexicans in the 
United States as their newly won status allowed them to compete more effectively in the 
labor market.  
  I also study the role of settlement policies in facilitating the adaptation of 
newcomers in the host country and consider the role of administrative and political 
institutions and non-state institutions such as unions and not-for profit organizations in 
shaping the incorporation of Mexicans in the United States. 
 My analysis will be centered on debates between the states and the Federal 
government in the United States. Local governments have had major responsibility for 
integrating newcomers. This has politicized immigration as newcomers have been held 
responsible for budgetary pressures in states and localities. Finally, I look at the role of 
local and national electoral systems as well as the institutional configurations of different 
branches of government.     
With reference to Mexico, I discuss how centralism and federalism affects the 
incorporation of emigrants. I explore how political parties have attempted to engage 
emigrants in recent years and convert them into a political constituency. This contrasts 
with a long Mexican tradition to discourage politicians from campaigning outside of the 
national territory because it was seen as allowing foreign intervention into domestic 
politics. The structure of the electoral system allows certain forms of incorporation, as 
some emigrants have been integrated into the lists that parties construct to elect their 
candidates for Congress without submitting them to the voters12. Emigrants have thereby 
                                                 
12 In Mexico part of the lower House and the Senate is selected by direct vote and part through a 
distribution of seats according to the percentages of votes each party received. 
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had the chance to be represented in that branch of government even before they were 
allowed to vote in presidential elections.  
 1.5.3 Prevailing Elite Strategies / Political Culture and Idioms. 
 As Koopmans and Statham put it, this category refers “to the rules and procedures 
that have historically emerged within a polity for managing and resolving conflicts and 
for dealing with political challengers” (2000b, p. 34). In the United States, for example, 
immigrants have been included in the political system through a series of policies that 
determine access to economic and political resources depending on the national or ethnic 
classification of the group. Although ethnicity is a major issue in politics and determines 
many of the political alliances and coalitions that form, there are no political parties that 
represent any specific group as there are in other countries. Therefore, in order to voice 
their demands immigrant groups need to appeal to other mainstream groups. They need to 
join coalitions at the local, sub-national, and national levels. Their potential to become an 
important political constituency or a source of major social conflict will determine the 
extent to which dominant elites pay attention to their demands. 
 The Mexican political system was long closed to those sectors that could not 
participate in the modernization process. These included people in the countryside who 
ended up migrating to the cities and, in many cases, to the United States. Exclusion from 
politics at home was at first compounded by exclusion abroad. This situation changed 
after Mexico confronted a series of new challenges related to economic reform that 
required the inclusion, if only partially, of new actors. Mexican authorities first tried to 
involve emigrants in economic and political development by granting them limited 
citizenship rights (that is, civil and social but not political rights). It was not a seamless 
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process, however.  For example, in the 1990s consular officials and state governors loyal 
to the PRI made some attempts to include emigrants as a new corporative sector within 
the state. More recently, emigrants increased their autonomy and demanded a more 
democratic form of incorporation. By 2005, they were finally granted the right to vote in 
Mexico’s presidential elections.      
1.5.4 Contingencies of Time and Place 
 A large part of the incorporation process is determined by specific balances of 
power and the alliance structure at a given time and place. The composition of the party 
system, the relative strength of the political parties, and divisions within the elite at a 
given moment open up opportunities for newcomers that otherwise would be unavailable. 
I explore how characteristics of the American political system at the national level, and in 
the cities in which I conduct fieldwork, shape political opportunities for Mexicans. Also I 
investigate how specific struggles within Mexican politics between the states and the 
central government, and between the legislature and the executive have unexpectedly 
created channels for emigrant influence.      
In this analysis the state is the central frame of reference in determining the forms 
of political participation of migrants and their political agendas and goals. States are also 
major actors in determining the ways and the extent to which migrants will be 
incorporated into the polities of both their places of origin and residence. States have 
considerable capacity to regulate migration and to define who belongs to the nation and 
who does not. As Geddes (1994) has pointed out, state actions can clearly increase the 
political power of some actors previously unorganized or loosely organized and diminish 
the power of other groups considered highly influential until then. Policies increasing the 
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power of emigrants vis-à-vis the Mexican state implemented since the early 1990s are an 
excellent example. Without state intervention, migrants would have had more difficulty 
organizing. These Mexican state activities have also allowed Mexicans in the United 
States to apply their newly acquired political strength towards a more active political and 
social agenda in their country of residence. Among the signs of Mexicans starting to 
mobilize vis-à-vis their host society are the attempt of Mexican organizations to influence 
the Department of Treasury’s decision about the validity of the matrícula consular to be 
used as an identification card in the United States, their opposition in California to 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s campaign for governor and proposition 5413 in 2004, and their 
participation in 2006 in major rallies, in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Denver, 
Phoenix, Milwaukee and many other cities against a House bill that proposed to 
criminalize illegal migration, impose sanctions on people who help the undocumented, 
and deny accelerated paths towards legalization (Bernstein 2006).  
1.6 Adaptation  
Turning specifically to the process by which Mexican migrants undertake 
collective action, I carry out extensive research on the formal organizations for first-
generation Mexicans.  First, I identify why and how Mexican migrants have organized in 
the United States and the extent to which their organization has been influenced by 
different institutions and institutional practices in both Mexico and the United States. 
Second, I examine organizational agendas: the ways they identify and distinguish the 
causes of the problems they confront, present solutions to them, and mobilize the 
community to take advantage of the opportunities opened up for them by institutional 
                                                 
13 This Proposition bars the state of California from collecting ethnic data. This would affect the collection 
of medical and other records useful to implement policies focused on the specific needs and problems of 
different ethnic groups.  
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practices of both their home and host countries. What is their predominant orientation, 
the homeland or the host society?  Third, I consider the process of leadership formation. I 
identify organizational leaders and trace their activities. I consider if they reinforce a 
primordial Mexican identity or a more pragmatic one that facilitates adaptation to the 
host country.  Also, I consider the extent to which the leadership reproduces democratic 
values acquired in their host society or more authoritarian ones inherited from their 
political experience in Mexico.  Fourth, I focus on the extent of institutionalization, that 
is, the likely continuation of organizational influence in the wider Mexican community 
living in the United States. Lastly, the source of their finances is particularly relevant 
because organizations that have established a stable financial base have greater 
possibilities of surviving than those that have not. 
To conclude, I deal with the extent to which the organizations have developed 
political leverage towards home and host countries. I identify the number and kind of 
relationships they have established with different institutions and actors in both countries. 
I also evaluate whether they have participated in political activities in either country and 
the extent to which these activities have brought specific benefits to them. I argue that the 
greater their access to different institutional settings in the home and host countries, the 
greater their political leverage and the greater the chances for incorporation. Evidently, 
the organizations’ political leverage and their hopes of facilitating the process of 
incorporation depend on the quality of access to institutions and political actors and on 
their capability of influencing political decisions. 
The attention I pay to the study of first-generation Mexican associations is 
supported by recent research conducted by European scholars on the levels of political 
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participation of different ethnic groups in their host societies (Bousetta 2000; Berger, et 
al. 2004; Fennema 2004; Jacobs, et al. 2004; Koopmans 2004; Odmalm 2004; Tillie 
2004; Togeby 2004). One of their major findings is that immigrant associations increase 
the levels of political participation of newcomers, because they create civic engagement 
and political trust among their members. The larger the number of ethnic associations and 
the denser the networks they establish, the greater the level of participation they promote. 
These findings are also dependent on the type and quality of the organizations and other 
factors such as the social capital of each specific group, and the “kinds of networks in 
which associations are potentially embedded” (Jacobs, et al. 2004, p. 422).    
To corroborate their argument, these scholars have conducted tests at the 
individual level to measure participation based on membership in ethnic organizations in 
various European countries. The data demonstrate that there is a correlation between 
membership in ethnic associations and levels of political participation of newcomers. 
Although I do not present similar data, information I collected seems to corroborate their 
view. Interviews with the leaders and members of the organizations, as well as direct 
observation through participation in some of their events, identified people interested in 
participating in the political life of their home country but also that of their host, even in 
cases where the original orientation of their organizations was towards their sending 
country. Although most of the organizations I studied did not engage actively in politics 
in the United States at least prior to the approval of the Sensenbrenner bill in December 
2005, it is clear that they motivated discussions about major topics of political relevance, 
including immigration and local and national elections. 
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1.7 Research Strategy and Methodological Considerations  
I study 32 organizations in four cities: Dallas, Chicago, Los Angeles and New 
York. These cities have large Mexican immigrant communities and represent different 
patterns and timing of migration flows and diverse political and socio-economic settings. 
The organizations were identified through conversations with Mexican consular officials, 
with political activists, and with the leaders of some of the organizations themselves who 
referred me to others. In addition, I reviewed newspapers in Mexico and the United States 
and did a follow up monitoring of internet email groups focused on Mexicans living 
abroad.  
I selected three types of organizations that have been established by Mexican 
immigrants in the last two decades:  
1. Organizations focused on the communities and states of origin including 
home town associations (HTAs) and state federations (SFs);  
2. Political organizations; and  
3. Service organizations.      
HTAs have as their main purpose collecting funds to foster development in 
communities of origin.  Through this activity they also help immigrants maintain ties 
with their culture, costumes, language and traditions. On some occasions, HTAs integrate 
into umbrella organizations called SFs. This is particularly likely when there are a 
number of HTAs from the same state of origin in one place, or there is prodding by state 
governors and/or consular officials from Mexico. Although both HTAs and SFs were 
nonsectarian voluntary organizations when first established, more recently they have 
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played active political roles and have turned their attention to the host country and joined 
pro-immigrant initiatives.  
Unlike HTAs, political organizations are not set up according to state of origin; 
instead, they are national interest groups that lobby the Mexican government as well as 
push agenda items in the United States. These organizations have explicit political goals, 
most of them related to Mexico. In particular, they have actively sought the right to vote 
from abroad in Mexican elections and, when that goal was achieved, focused on 
motivating emigrants to participate in Mexico’s 2006 election. Their main agenda in the 
United States supports immigrant rights as well as a regularization program for 
undocumented Mexicans. 
Service organizations have as their main purpose the provision of services such as 
legal advice and skill development and training programs for immigrants to facilitate 
their adaptation.  Although non-political in nature, they tend to participate in campaigns 
to defend immigrant rights and support amnesty for undocumented immigrants. They also 
tend to work closely with grassroots organizations in the United States. They have 
focused on political issues in Mexico and were advocates of the right to vote from 
abroad.  
To understand the origins, dynamics, and patterns of action of these organizations, 
I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with their leadership, following a structured 
questionnaire (see Appendix A). These interviews took place during multiple visits to the 
cities and in follow-up phone conversations between 2001 and 2004 and a few more in 
2006. On occasion, I also attended meetings, including observing the selection of new 
leadership and visits by Mexican officials. I collected magazines and pamphlets 
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published by these organizations and followed their activities in Spanish-language and 
mainstream newspapers published in the four cities. I also consulted Mexican newspapers 
that usually publish news about emigrants, including La Jornada, Reforma, and La 
Imágen from Zacatecas. In addition, I regularly followed at least six internet discussion 
groups created by Mexicans abroad. To develop an understanding of the policies of 
Mexico and the United States towards migrants I carried out interviews with national 
officials in both countries. 
1.8 Organizations of the Dissertation 
The next chapter presents a historical analysis of the politics of immigration, 
settlement, and citizenship policies in the United States. It evaluates how the national 
cleavage structures, institutional actors and legal arrangements, prevailing elite strategies 
and contingencies of time and place have broadly determined the patterns of 
incorporation of Mexicans.  
 Chapter three traces the politics of emigrant engagement followed by the Mexican 
state at different periods. Using the same four analytical frameworks, it evaluates how 
they have generated specific relationships between the Mexican state and Mexicans 
living abroad. Among other things, I focus on the policy of acercamiento, or 
rapprochement, that the Mexican state has followed in the last two decades and the 
effects of this policy on the forms of organization of Mexican emigrants and the ways 
they have articulated their demands towards the Mexican state.    
Chapter four presents a general overview of the organizations that Mexicans in 
the United States have established in the last two decades and shows their general 
characteristics and resource mobilization capacities--including leadership structure, 
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degree of institutionalization, and ability to collect funds. I evaluate the extent to which 
they contribute to the incorporation process of first-generation immigrants into both 
Mexico and the United States. 
  Chapters five and six look at the process of political incorporation of Mexicans in 
the four urban centers where I carried out case studies. I present a review of the political 
opportunity structure of each city as well as the history of the Mexican communities in 
those places. This review shows that although Mexicans confront similar obstacles in all 
the cities distinctive opportunity structures have produced different paths towards 
incorporation in their adopted country.  
Chapter seven presents the general conclusions, evaluates the patterns of 
incorporation of Mexican migrants in both Mexico and the United States and discusses 





FROM SOJOURNERS TO CITIZENS: THE INCORPORATION OF 
MEXICANS INTO THE UNITED STATES POLITY14 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 For a long time, Mexicans were not regarded as potential members of the 
American polity, even though they were a constant presence in the United States. This 
situation made their immigration experience unique. Mexicans were a source of low-
wage labor that could be used when the need arose. When barriers to formal immigration 
were enforced after the First World War to limit European immigration, and when 
virtually all Asian migrants were banned, Mexican laborers were recruited to work in 
states bordering Mexico, particularly, in Texas and California. Spokesmen for 
agricultural interests testifying before Congressional committees dealing with 
immigration argued that Mexicans came to the United States to work temporarily and, 
thus, “they were endowed with a ‘homing pigeon instinct’ that drove them to return” 
(Zolberg 1999, p. 77). This instinct and the fact that they were considered “half-breeds” 
by powerful nativist politicians dramatically narrowed the chances of Mexican 
                                                 
14 This chapter will study the incorporation of Mexicans into the United States polity not as a minority, but 
as an immigrant group. As Jones-Correa has pointed out, “The study of Hispanic politics so far has been in 
the context of Latinos as a minority, nor in the context of Latinos as immigrants.” This situation has had the 
problem that immigrants and non-immigrants are treated “unproblematically as members of a single 
minority group” (Jones-Correa 1998a, p. 3) sharing similar interests and concerns. In fact, and as this 
dissertation will demonstrate when presenting the empirical data, they often disagree in their agendas and 
their goals, and not always identify with each other event though they have similar origins. This is 
particularly clear between first generation Mexicans, and Mexican-Americans.  
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immigrants incorporating into the United States political system. As Zolberg has pointed 
out, the objective of the regulatory system that emerged in the United States in the 1920s, 
which combined drastic barriers to formal immigration with laissez-faire policies 
regarding the movement of labor across the southern border, makes sense only “if the 
objective was to deter, not the physical entry of Mexicans into the United States, but 
rather their social and political entry into American society” (Zolberg 1999, p. 77).  
The Civil Rights movement and the legislative and judicial changes it brought 
about in the mid-1960s and 1970s finally opened doors for Mexicans to incorporate more 
effectively. The movement led to the questioning of the legitimacy of guest worker 
programs —the last of which ended in 1964— and made clear that, despite their national 
or racial origin, those who were invited to work in the United States and settled should be 
allowed to participate in the political community.  
Nevertheless, the incorporation of Mexican immigrants into the United States 
political system has proceeded steadily since IRCA, at least if one considers behavioral 
data such as naturalization rates (see Figure 2.1).  Even though the rate of naturalization 
has increased, the total number of Mexicans naturalized annually has fallen (see Figure 
2.2) since most of the Mexicans eligible to naturalize under IRCA have already exercised 
this option.  Even if Mexicans are naturalizing and voting at considerably smaller rates 
than other immigrant groups such as Asians (see Figure 2.1), their large number and 
presence across the United States has given them the capacity, if still not fully exercised, 
of deciding close elections in key cities and states. Republican and Democratic politicians 
have attempted to reach them by embracing issues salient to their concerns.   
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Figure 2.1: Percent naturalized among legal immigrants eligible to naturalize (Fix, 




























































These are evidently great advances for Mexicans but they have a long way to go 
in the incorporation process.   At the local level, for example, they have had little 
influence in the decision making process of city councils, school districts, and the police, 
even though in some localities they constitute a substantial percentage of the population. 
At the state and national levels, they have barely had some bearing on decisions 
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regarding major issues that affect their daily lives such as welfare, health, and 
immigration policies. Considering that Latinos, the majority of whom are Mexicans or 
people of Mexican descent, are now the largest minority in the United States, it is striking 
that few have been elected to political office15. In addition, there is still the large pool of 
undocumented immigrants that do not have any clear prospects of having access to 
citizenship status, a plight that considerably limits their prospects of incorporating into 
the polity. 
Various obstacles have affected the incorporation of Mexicans into the American 
political system. Some of these can be attributed to their specific characteristics as a 
group, including their undocumented status, low levels of educational attainment, and 
low incomes compared to the American average and those of other immigrant groups. 
Furthermore, the proximity of their homeland has inhibited formal settlement in the US. 
Other obstacles, however, are external to the group and have to do with institutional 
barriers that have consistently limited their chances to organize and mobilize. 
This chapter traces the evolution of US policy toward the incorporation of 
Mexican immigrants into the political system.  I use a political opportunity structure 
approach to describe how different institutions and institutional practices have at some 
times constrained and at others opened up opportunities for Mexicans to incorporate. I 
argue that the structure of opportunity and constraint Mexican immigrants confront in the 
United States has been a major factor shaping their aspirations and political behavior.  
                                                 
15 At the national level, Latinos represent about 5% of the US House of Representatives.  In the case of the 
Senate only in the 2004 election did Latinos gain some representation by electing one Cuban-American 
from Florida and one Mexican-American from Colorado.  At the subnational level, the data is more mixed.  
In some states they have gained more representation. For example in New Mexico, Latinos represent 43% 
of the State’s House of Representatives.  In Illinois, whose Latino population in the 2000 census was 
12.3%, Latinos held only 6% of the seats in the House.   
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Although all immigrant groups confront an institutional setting to which they will 
have to adapt and by which they will be integrated (Soysal 1994), each of them, 
nonetheless, confronts specific structures of opportunity and constraints that affect their 
specific collective action (Rosenhek 1999).  National groups that have a warmer welcome 
mobilize and organize differently than groups that face, from the beginning, a scenario 
that excludes them from the polity.16 In the case of Mexican immigrants, the consistent 
system of exclusion they confronted in the United States at least until the mid-1980s, 
limited their collective action and restricted their capacity to incorporate. That is why 
prior to the 1980s it is difficult to identify first-generation Mexican organizations except 
for a few isolated hometown associations. The recent proliferation of Mexican 
organizations in the United States is thus linked to the fact that a large number of 
immigrants finally have access to legal status and thus to membership in the polity. 
Thanks to this legal change they were able to develop the necessary resources, including 
an entrepreneurial leadership, regardless of the orientation of their political agenda either 
towards their home or host countries.  
Nevertheless, we must ask why they embraced a political agenda that is more 
oriented to the homeland than to the United States. I argue that this is related to two facts: 
first, political actors in the US have made little effort to mobilize Mexican immigrants; 
and second, there have been limited opportunities for first generation Mexicans to 
advance their interests through the institutions and political processes of their host 
country. In contrast, they have confronted a more positive scenario vis-à-vis their home 
                                                 
16 It is true that some groups that receive a positive welcoming in their host country may have an agenda 
that is highly focused on their home country as well. This is the case of people from Cuba that arrived in 
the United States after the 1959 Revolution in that country. However, since they have access to the system 
of opportunities of their host society, they usually try to advance their political agenda towards their 
homeland through the institutions and political processes of their receiving country.   
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country since the 1990s when the Mexican government radically changed its policies 
towards the Mexican diaspora (See Chapter 3). 
 The structure of opportunities and constraints Mexican immigrants have 
confronted in the United States can be classified in four interlinked categories originally 
proposed by Koopmans and Statham (2000b): national cleavage structures, institutional 
actors and legal arrangements, prevailing elite strategies, and contingencies of time and 
place.  
2.2 National Cleavage Structures 
American institutions and politicians have constantly portrayed the United States 
as a country of immigrants. This view has been popularized and romanticized in literary 
products and Hollywood movies, which have shown the country as a promised land for 
those suffering economic adversity or religious and political intolerance in other parts of 
the world. Many Americans and many potential immigrants believe the US is open to all 
those who want to come and share in the values of freedom, democracy and equal 
opportunity embodied in the American constitution. This image of universal openness, 
however, conflicts with historical evidence. As many studies have demonstrated, the 
inclusiveness of American institutions and political discourse has been in reality 
selective, as some national groups have been more easily accepted into the polity than 
others (Hingham 1966; Fuchs 1990; Perea 1996; Smith 1997b; Tichenor 2002). As Smith 
points out, “for over 80 percent of U.S. history, American laws declared most people in 
the world ineligible to become full U.S. citizens solely because of their race, original 
nationality, or gender” (Smith 1997b, p. 15). 
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There are at least two approaches to understanding the prevailing notions about 
membership in the American polity: “Triumphant Liberalism” and “multiple traditions”. 
The first derives from Myrdal (1964) and Almond and Verba (1980).  In the immigration 
field it is associated with the work of Lawrence Fuchs (1990), and with the positions 
taken by both the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the 1980s, 
and the United States Commission on Immigration Reform17 of the 1990s. The second 
approach is well-illustrated in the work of Smith (1997b) and Tichenor  (2002)18.  Fuchs 
(1990) argues that even though there have been some exclusionary periods in American 
history that have limited the acceptance of specific national groups, there is, ultimately, a 
prevailing and consistent set of national values –a “civic culture”—that celebrates ethnic 
and racial diversity and at the same time unifies American society. This “civic culture”, 
which includes values such as freedom of speech, equal opportunity, and democracy, has 
gradually become universalized. It has helped protect ethnic and religious diversity in the 
United States and has inhibited and ameliorated racial, ethnic and religious conflict.  
 In contrast to political commentators and scholars who saw the civil rights 
movement and the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act as a real 
threat to American unity, Fuchs contends that what was passing away were not the 
unifying liberal and democratic principles of American society but those exclusionary 
values that did not belong to “the system of voluntary pluralism based on individual 
rights and protected by the civic culture” that was established after the American 
Revolution (Fuchs 1990, p. xvii). Since the civil rights movement, this system has guided 
major immigration policies including the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act that dismantled the 
                                                 
17 See specifically the following report: USCIR (1997). 
18 Other authors that can be also considered as taking the second approach are: (Daniels 1990; Takaki 1990; 
Perea 1996; Sánchez 1998; Desmond 1999).  
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national origins quota system, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
that granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants, and the 1990 Immigration Act that 
facilitated a substantial increase in legal immigrant admissions.   
The system of “voluntary pluralism” Fuchs identifies was prominent in 
determining the incorporation of immigrants from Germany, Ireland and, later on, 
Southern and Eastern Europe. The underlying logic of this system was that immigrants 
were free to maintain the “affection for and loyalty to their ancestral religions and 
cultures” but were expected to develop an American identity “by embracing the founding 
myths and participating in the political life of the Republic” (Fuchs 1990, p. 5). 
Immigrants, then, were able to choose to be ethnic or to cross the boundary and be only 
American without any hyphenation, and either choice would be protected by the “civic 
culture”, which guaranteed freedom of religion and speech, and equality before the law.  
The process of incorporation of these European immigrants was not without 
difficulties, as Fuchs recounts. English, Scots, Dutch and Scandinavians had the easiest 
road, because they were Protestant. A large portion of Germans and Irish confronted 
more difficulties being accepted because they were Catholic. The major obstacles, 
however, were faced by Eastern and Southern Europeans not only because of their 
religion, which was either Catholic or Jewish, but because most of them, fleeing from 
social and political conflicts in their homeland, arrived to the U.S. with little money or   
skills. Nonetheless, all these groups eventually moved with relative ease19 into the 
political life for at least two reasons: first, they were white, a fact that granted them 
eventual access to citizenship, and thus to political rights; and second, they were helped 
                                                 
19 It is important to clarify, that those that integrated into the political life were mostly males, at least until 
1920 when women were finally granted the right to vote through the Nineteenth Amendment.   
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by the political machines that were being developed in the last part of the nineteenth 
century in American cities. In addition, efforts at Americanizing immigrants during the 
Progressive era facilitated their adaptation.  
The system of “voluntary pluralism” was not extended to other immigrant and 
racial groups. Parallel systems of incorporation–or systems that inhibited incorporation—
that worked outside the civic culture and were coercive were implemented against 
African-Americans, Asians and Mexicans. African-Americans were in the least enviable 
position. They were locked into a caste relationship and denied any meaningful 
participation in the “civic culture”, and most chances of economic progress. This system 
Fuchs calls “caste pluralism”. Since they were believed to be intellectually, spiritually, 
and physically inferior to whites, they were not granted, at the beginning of the Republic, 
access to membership into the polity, as were European immigrants. Even those founding 
fathers that opposed slavery did not contemplate citizenship for blacks because they 
thought that whites and blacks could never live peacefully side by side. Although the 
fifteenth amendment granted political rights to African Americans in 1870, they were 
kept virtually outside the civic culture for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
through different means and stratagems devised by racist and segregationist interests and 
institutionalized in the political system. Only after the civil rights movement in the 1960s 
were blacks able to break into the system and have access to some of the privileges 
already granted to white citizens, including the franchise.   
Asians and Mexicans were also denied access to the civic culture for most of the 
twentieth century. Along with African-Americans, Asians and Mexicans were considered 
unfit to become American citizens because they were stigmatized as racially and morally 
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inferior. Their presence in U.S. territory was expected to be temporary and their labor 
was systematically exploited with the enforcement and cooperation “of national and state 
governments, the local police and the system of justice” (Fuchs 1990, p. 111).  For this 
reason, Fuchs calls the system implemented towards them “sojourner pluralism”. As 
Fuchs explains, other immigrant groups such as Italians, Greeks, Turks, Poles, and 
French Canadians were also sojourners, because they went back and forth to their 
homelands. The difference, however, is that “they were not subject to widely enforced 
systems of sojourner pluralism that made Asian and Mexican workers particularly 
vulnerable to employer abuse” (Fuchs 1990, p. 111).             
  The Naturalization Law that dated back to 1790 made Asian immigrants 
ineligible for citizenship. No such provision existed specifically for Mexicans and those 
who immigrated lawfully had the choice of becoming citizens. However, since most 
came without authorization, a process institutionalized by an alliance between employers 
and law enforcement authorities, they faced political and legal restrictions. When in 1870 
persons of African descent were granted the right to naturalize, a Republican Senator, 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, proposed that this right should be extended to other 
nonwhite groups as well. Nativist interests in Congress, nonetheless, rejected this 
proposition. By 1882, Chinese laborers were effectively prohibited from immigrating to 
the United States. Japanese, Korean and Filipino migration was eventually severely 
controlled as well. Mexican migration, in contrast, continued to flow steadily at different 
periods during the twentieth century, depending on the needs of the American economy 
and, particularly, the agricultural interests in Texas and California. When their labor was 
not needed anymore, many were deported back to Mexico. Some, however, stayed and 
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settled and made some economic progress thanks to cracks in the exclusionary system. 
However, as in the case of Chinese and other Asian groups that settled in the United 
States, access to formal citizenship and thus to political rights was readily available only 
for the second generation through the jus soli system. Acquisition of political rights 
accelerated only after the civil rights movement, which finally introduced persons of 
Mexican origin to the system of voluntary pluralism.    
 Fuchs’ description of the threefold pluralism-- voluntary, caste, and sojourner-- 
shows that throughout American history exclusionary policies have been pursued. 
Nonetheless, his view is optimistic because he argues that ultimately the institutional 
restrictions on all previously excluded groups have been lifted. His view is also optimistic 
because he thinks that all immigrant groups have eventually embraced the civic culture. 
For this reason he thinks that the presence of very different national groups does not 
represent a disruption of the unifying principles that constitute the civic culture, and, 
furthermore, their incorporation into the polity is imminent. Immigrants, Fuchs 
concludes, have transformed the civic culture within the parameters of the civic culture 
itself, and by doing so they have guaranteed their incorporation into the American 
political system.    
A more pessimistic view is proposed by Samuel Huntington (2004b; 2004a). 
Huntington also argues that America has been guided by a predominant national creed 
that emerged from the Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers but that was 
enriched by the views of German, Irish and Scandinavian immigrants who shared with 
the first settlers a Christian heritage. This creed has as its key elements the “English 
language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, 
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including responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant 
values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and 
the duty to try to create a heaven on earth” (Huntington 2004a, p. 1). Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants who arrived later than their Western counterparts did not 
challenge this creed but embraced it as a promise for economic opportunity and political 
liberty. They thus assimilated in large numbers after World War II, virtually eliminating 
the idea of ethnicity as a component of national identity in the United States. The 
problem of race also declined following the achievements of the civil rights movement 
and the 1965 immigration reforms so that the USA became a multiethnic and multiracial 
country unified by the common and widely accepted creed. Immigrants from Mexico, 
however, represent a different challenge. While Fuchs believes that they are embracing 
America’s unifying principles and will assimilate as previous immigrant groups did, 
Huntington suggests that they will break this unity and transform America into “two 
peoples with two cultures (Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and 
Spanish)” (Huntington 2004a, p. 2).  
For Huntington, Mexican immigration represents a unique challenge for six 
reasons: its scale, its persistence, its illegality, its regional concentration, and the facts 
that Mexico has contiguity with the United States and Mexicans can assert a historical 
claim to the American territory. The solution, therefore, is to thoroughly assimilate those 
already here and to prevent more uncontrolled immigration from Mexico.             
Huntington’s argument is the response from the right to the perceived naiveté of 
scholars like Fuchs and of attempts to integrate Mexicans and other Western Hemisphere 
immigrants into mainstream America. Obviously, Mexican immigration has many 
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distinctive characteristics.  However, the fact that culturalist arguments that attach all the 
responsibility for non-incorporation to immigrant groups are being articulated and taken 
seriously in America is itself testimony to the difficulties that Mexicans still face in 
seeking acceptance.  
Rogers Smith identifies some of these difficulties. If there is a prevailing “civic 
culture” in America, he argues, it is not only composed of egalitarian, liberal and 
republican political principles, as Fuchs argues, but also of inegalitarian views  “that have 
shaped the participants and the substance of American politics throughout history" (Smith 
1997b, p. 15).  Smith reviews American citizenship laws from the colonial era through 
the Progressive years and demonstrates that inegalitarian legal provisions are hardly rare.  
Three ideological streams have informed civic identity and political membership in the 
United States:  liberalism, democratic republicanism, and inegalitarian ascription. These 
traditions have competed throughout American history and political actors have blended 
elements of the three in various combinations designed to be politically popular rather 
than ideologically coherent.   
The liberal ideology has helped advance effective claims “for personal 
independence from repressive structures”.  It has also institutionalized domestic tolerance 
and the rule of law, and has legitimized a market system that has promoted economic 
growth. The republican and democratic conception of society has enhanced the notion of 
“political self-governance and of membership in a community of mutually supportive 
citizens” (Smith 1997b, p. 36). Yet, liberalism and republicanism in America have gained 
part of their appeal from mythical components based on ascriptive views. These views 
suggest that, regardless of their personal achievements and economic status, Americans 
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have inborn characteristics that make them part “of a special community, the United 
States of America, which is, thanks to some combination of nature, history and God, 
distinctively and permanently worthy” (Smith 1997b, p. 38). Therefore, as much as 
American citizens have been willing to defend liberal and democratic principles, they 
have also supported white supremacy and political positions that attempt to preserve 
traditional gender roles and to uphold Protestantism in public life.  On many occasions, 
they have also resisted egalitarian demands of a liberal and democratic nature when these 
have challenged the ascriptive sense of belonging.  
Smith explains that, contrary to the views of influential authors such as (Hartz 
1955), the exclusionary attitudes that are present in America’s civic ideals are not 
vestiges of pre-Revolutionary institutions, but have existed throughout the history of the 
United States and have helped define membership in the polis. For instance, “major 
liberalizing changes have come more rarely and at far higher costs than many celebratory 
accounts reveal” (Smith 1997b). There have been three major eras of democratization in 
the United States: the Revolutionary war and the Confederation years, the Civil War and 
the Reconstruction era, and the Civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.    
It is a sign of how strong resistance to realizing liberal democratic ideals has been 
that during all these periods Americans fought great wars against opponents 
hostile to such ideals, first the British monarchy, then the Southern slavocracy, 
then the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin in World War II and the Cold 
War years. Only when those circumstances made fuller pursuit of egalitarian 
liberal republican principles politically advantageous –indeed, necessary for 
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national elites –did Americans create state and national democratic republics, free 
slaves, end Jim Crow, and expand women’s rights (Smith 1997b, p. 16). 
Even then, many of the accomplishments of these eras proved ephemeral, because 
many of the rights gained by marginalized groups were taken away from them again 
through the imposition of new institutional constraints. In this respect, Smith is far less 
optimistic than Fuchs. From his point of view, all the attempts to democratize the 
political system and include new groups have generated organized efforts to block them. 
Although these efforts have not always been successful, in many instances nativist 
interests have been able to incrementally recover and control some of the political ground 
they have lost.        
Smith does not refer to the particular experience of Mexicans in the United States. 
However, his analysis has major implications for understanding their incorporation into 
the United States.  Fuchs’ work leads us to conclude that the political integration of 
Mexicans is inevitable and that it will take place incrementally because Mexicans now 
have access to the system of voluntary pluralism that previously facilitated the 
incorporation of European immigrants. Smith’s analysis suggests, nonetheless, that while 
a large number of Mexicans in the United States have incrementally gained political 
status, their incorporation is far from assured because they still have to confront major 
institutional constraints imposed by recurrent ascriptive and inegalitarian interests 
affecting the policy process. 
Smith’s work suggests that the final incorporation of Mexicans into the American 
political system may require a wider democratization movement, one with strength 
similar to that of the civil rights movement. In this regard, the ways they organize and the 
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political resources they develop may be important determinants of their chance of 
becoming part of a broader democratic coalition against inegalitarian ideologies.          
Analyzing the immigration regimes that have emerged over the course of 
American political development, Daniel Tichenor (2002) arrives at conclusions similar to 
those of Smith. Smith’s multiple traditions approach, Tichenor suggests, helps explain the 
ideological foundations for restrictionist policy regimes that have emerged in different 
periods of American history. Nonetheless, Smith’s approach has trouble explaining 
expansive policy choices. Tichenor proposes, instead, an institutional approach to explain 
the various immigration regimes that have been created throughout American history. He 
suggests that the interaction of four variables has driven the expansive and restrictive 
periods of American immigration policies: “historically changing political institutions, 
policy alliances, privileged expertise, and international pressures” (Tichenor 2002, p. 10).    
Tichenor asserts that different traditions in America have played a crucial role in 
affecting immigration policy. First, he identifies an ideological strand that derives from 
the Republican and Liberal traditions that has had a clear influence in the expansive 
immigration policies that the United States has followed over the course of its history 
(Freeman and Betts 1992). Second, there is also a nativist and ascriptive view entrenched 
in Americas’ political life that has played a decisive role in seeking to restrict the 
entrance of newcomers. Ultimately, however, the expansive and restrictive periods in 
American immigration history have been defined more by the dynamics among the 
institutional variables he identifies than by consistent ideologies. For instance, his work 
shows that America’s immigration regimes have been characterized by ideological 
ambiguity.  
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With respect to the case of Mexicans immigrants, Tichenor suggests that 
ideological aspects have played complex and sometimes contradictory roles in 
determining their entrance and acceptance in the United States. For example, during one 
of the most restrictive immigration regimes in the 1930s and 1940s, there was an 
expansive policy towards the entrance of Mexican workers supported and even 
encouraged by the same actors who advocated limitations on the entrance of other 
groups. The ambiguous attitude of these actors had nothing to do with ideological goals, 
but reflected concrete economic interests deeply entrenched in the political process that 
had the capacity of influencing the decision-making process in Washington.  
In contrast, the period since the 1960s has been one of the most expansive periods 
in Americas’ immigration history. Mexicans have been both the beneficiaries of these 
policies which reflect liberal and republican strands, but also the target of ascriptive 
impulses. Tichenor’s work allows us, therefore, to understand the paradoxes of 
immigration policies as reflecting concrete institutional dynamics. Ideological factors, he 
reminds us, represent basically a negative or positive feedback that influences the system 
and motivates institutional change, depending on the timing and sequencing of the policy 
process.  
2.3 Institutional Actors and Legal Arrangements. 
 Host society institutions and legal arrangements clearly affect the extent and 
manner in which newcomers participate in the political process.  They determine the 
channels through which demands will be expressed and the extent to which they will be 
taken into account by decision-makers. Key institutions within this category are 
citizenship, immigration, and settlement policies that are clearly directed at newcomers. 
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Other institutions and institutional dynamics include institutional gatekeepers that control 
access to political participation, including political parties, trade unions, and ethnic, 
religious and humanitarian non-for profit organizations (Ireland 1994); the executive, the 
judiciary and the legislative powers, and the distribution of power among state and 
federal governments. In addition, education, housing, and entitlement policies also play a 
role in determining the political participation of immigrants.  
2.3.1 Citizenship and Immigration Policies: An Ambiguous System for Mexican 
Immigrants 
Citizenship is a key institution of contemporary societies because it is at the very 
core of democracy and national identity. The idea of citizenship implies “not only 
inclusion, but also exclusion: the citizenship of certain types of persons implies the non-
citizenship of others” (Castles and Davidson 2000).  In many countries around the world, 
people have been excluded from full citizenship rights because of their national or racial 
origins or their gender. In the United States, the struggle for the extension of full 
citizenship rights to the whole population has been long and arduous and has come at a 
substantial cost. Excluded groups have had to create political organizations that could 
enter the wider political arena.  In the end, their struggles have been a cornerstone in the 
democratization of the American political system.  
Today immigrants who live in the US and have not yet naturalized are the only 
significant group lacking citizenship, but this is, at least in terms of the law, merely a 
transitional problem. Discussion of citizenship rights, however, is more complex than this 
simple affirmation. As Aleinikoff has pointed out (Aleinikoff 2000), in everyday life 
newcomers (specifically those who have settled lawfully in this country) may enjoy many 
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rights and opportunities largely on equal terms with citizens20. For example, “they are 
permitted to work, to travel freely within the state, and to have access to the educational 
and legal systems of the state, and they may be eligible for social benefits” (Aleinikoff 
2000, p. 119; Plascencia, et al. 2003). Some commentators consider these rights a 
disincentive for permanent residents to naturalize21. Notwithstanding these privileges, 
their lack of political rights, which come with citizenship status, limits their possibilities 
of representation in the polity. In practical terms, the influence they can exert on the 
political system is mostly from the outside by following an interest group strategy.  
 Unlawful immigrants enjoy far fewer rights than those entering legally. First they 
cannot legally enter the formal job market even if most do work. Second, although their 
children have access to the educational system thanks to a 1982 Supreme Court ruling, 
the chances of attending a university are constrained in most states because illegal aliens 
do not qualify for most state-provided scholarship aid or for resident tuition.  In addition, 
they face more difficulties accessing social benefits that are available to immigrants that 
have arrived lawfully.  Their political weakness makes them an easy target for nativist 
groups, particularly in difficult economic times or when national security concerns arise.  
They, nonetheless, have access to court protection and their main support comes from 
                                                 
20 Also, they share many responsibilities on equal terms with citizens. Among other things, they have to pay 
taxes, obey the laws, and send the family’s children to school. 
21 A political commentator, for example, said the following about Mexicans in the United States:  
People of many lands and costumes have become American –which is different from what they were—even 
as they refashioned what it means to be American. By contrast, many Mexican immigrants have little desire 
to “join the American mainstream” precisely because their overriding motive for coming was economic and 
their homeland is so close. Their primary affection remains with Mexico (Samuelson 2000). 
This type of commentary has many flaws. It may be true that the closeness of Mexico may have been in the 
past a disincentive for them to naturalize. However, it does not take into account all the disincentives that 
United States institutions have created to deter the incorporation of Mexicans and people of Mexican origin 
into the American polity. Furthermore, arguing that the lack of desire to become Americans is linked to 
their economic reason for migrating (a real simplification of their migration experience because a lot of 
them migrate for other reasons as well) would imply then that all other migrant groups that have migrated 
to the United States because of economic reasons had also limited desire to become Americans, a 
proposition that has not been historically true.    
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not-for profit organizations, and ethnic organizations that provide them with basic 
services and advocate for them. The predominant form of direct political participation 
available to the undocumented is to take part in rallies and demonstrations.  
 Until 1986, when IRCA was approved, most Mexican immigrants living in the 
United States were undocumented22. Their irregular status was the result of the 
ambiguous regime that had governed their arrival and settlement in the United States for 
many years. On the one hand, purposefully weak regulatory policies facilitated their 
entry. On the other hand, they were historically denied access to membership into the 
polity. 
Originally, most Mexicans had come to the United States not as immigrants but as 
temporary laborers, in the same way that in the 1950s and 1960s Western European 
countries received a large pool of laborers from former colonies and other developing 
countries to support their reconstruction and economic development. To facilitate and 
regularize the arrival of Mexicans in the United States three guest-workers schemes, 
known as bracero programs, were negotiated between Mexico and the United States. The 
first was established in May 1917, in the middle of the First World War and, 
paradoxically, the same year that the United States enacted a literacy test for new 
immigrants. The law made a special exception for Mexican workers23 –a concession to 
agricultural interests—who were authorized to enter the country and work (mostly) in the 
farming sector. This program stipulated that after their contracts expired laborers should 
                                                 
22 In 2006, this is again the case since there are an estimated 6.5 million undocumented immigrants from a 
total of 10.3 million foreign born residents from Mexico (Census 2006; Passel 2006).  
23 In 1928, when employer desires for Mexican laborers waned, “U.S. authorities cooperated in keeping 
Mexicans out by applying the literacy test” (Fuchs 1990, p. 121) for which Mexicans were originally 
exempted.  
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return home. However, this last regulation was poorly enforced and many settled in the 
United States.  
A second bracero program was launched in 1942 with the outbreak of the Second 
World War. This program represented a subsidy to southwestern and California growers 
who argued that to supply enough food for America and American troops during wartime 
they needed more laborers. The agreement pledged that Mexican workers “would not be 
used to displace American workers or to lower wages” (Fuchs 1990, p. 12) and that 
minimum guarantees and working conditions would be granted to the workers. In fact, 
employers easily evaded these commitments, since Mexicans were unable to join unions 
and had no rights.   
In 1951, when the United States entered the Korean War, a third and final bracero 
program was established. It expanded the presence of Mexican workers in the agricultural 
sector. By 1960, braceros “accounted for 26 percent of the nation’s seasonal agricultural 
labor force” (Fuchs 1990, p. 124). The braceros were constantly at odds with organized 
labor. As Fuchs explains:  
No agricultural workers’ strike could be won in the Southwest in the 1950s and 
1960s as long as the bracero program was in effect. Strikers did not have 
unemployment insurance against lost wages, and when the strike was over, they 
found their jobs permanently filled by braceros (Fuchs 1990, p. 125).      
The emergence of a new liberal coalition that focused on the defense of civil 
rights finally motivated Congress to take notice of the wretched conditions in which 
braceros worked and lived and to investigate the issue. By 1964, shortly after a report 
was presented, the bracero program was brought to an end. 
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 From the time of the first bracero program to the moment the third was 
terminated, many employers, particularly in Texas24, continued to hire illegal workers or 
“wetbacks”.  This situation was supported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS), which facilitated the entrance of undocumented immigrants when there was 
demand for them and enforced the law when there was none. When the final bracero 
program was terminated, illegal immigration increased as the demand for Mexican labor 
grew. 
The condition of illegality in which many Mexicans lived in the United States did 
not improve much with the Hart-Cellar Act, an expansive immigration law that was 
adopted in the context of the civil rights movement. This act eliminated the national 
origins quota system and established a preference-based system under which immigrants 
were admitted as workers, family members, or refugees.  The end of the bracero program 
in 1964 and later on a cap on Western Hemisphere immigration in 1976 contributed to a 
new waves of illegal entries (Tichenor 2002). 
By the 1970s, it was evident that the problem of illegal immigration required a 
different solution, particularly when the number of apprehensions of undocumented 
immigrants had grown from 1,608,356 in the years 1961 to 1970 to 11,883,328 in the 
years from 1971 to 1980 (Tichenor 2002, p. 225). As in Europe, guest-worker programs 
to regulate the huge flows of Mexican migration were not an option anymore. The Civil 
Rights movement in the 1960s had helped expand individual and membership rights, thus 
                                                 
24 Mexico opposed Texas participation in the second bracero program because of its Jim Crow laws. 
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undermining the legitimacy of guest-worker systems, which were based on exclusionary 
provisions. Other options were, thus, explored25.     
Bills introduced in the House and the Senate proposed the legalization of 
undocumented immigrants but also contemplated sanctions against employers. Both ideas 
proved controversial. The Reagan administration resisted the legislation because polls 
showed that the general public was generally against more immigration and sanctioning 
employers would affect important business interests.  In 1986, after prolonged 
negotiations, and when it was evident that not tackling the problem would generate a 
bigger crisis, IRCA was approved and signed into law by President Reagan. 
Whatever its awkward origins, the passage of IRCA has proven to be a watershed 
event for Mexican migrants. IRCA gave access to political membership to those persons 
working illegally in the United States since 1982. To balance that expansive gesture, it 
sought to tightly close the doors to new undocumented migrants and encourage the return 
of those workers who arrived in the United States after that year26. IRCA was a near 
complete failure as a deterrent to new illegal migration, but its amnesty provision led to 
fundamental political change.  
After an expansive period of immigration policy during the mid-1980s and early 
1990s a new uncertainty has emerged. Although the American immigration regime is still 
expansive,27 as immigration flows to the United States continue steadily, the settlement of 
new immigrant groups, and especially of Mexicans, has mobilized nativist and 
restrictionist interests worried about the viability of America as a unified nation, or about 
                                                 
25 Ironically, in 2006 the United States is again considering this type of program to solve the problem of 
illegal immigration 
26 The purpose of the 1982 limit established by the law was to avoid a rush of undocumented immigrants 
trying to get into the country before the bill went into effect.  
27 On immigration regimes, see the work of Tichenor (2002). 
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the over-population of the territory. During the 1990s, these interests were not able to 
alter the regime established since the Hart-Cellar Act. For instance, in 1990, Congress 
raised annual immigration levels by 40% (Tichenor 2002, p. 224).  However, a few years 
later right wing groups were able to press new legislation on Washington with the help of 
a new Republican majority28.   
As Aleinikoff has explained, the United States has had a prevailing conception 
that lawful permanent residents are potential members of the polis or “full members-in-
training”. In 1996, however, Congress approved new welfare legislation that cut-off 
lawful permanent resident aliens from most federally funded means-tested programs and 
authorized the states to do the same with state-funded programs. Proponents of this 
legislation argued that because immigrants received many benefits without naturalizing, 
citizenship was being devalued, that immigrants were accepted to work and contribute to 
the society not become wards of it, and that eligibility for welfare was attracting the 
wrong kinds of immigrants.    
That same year the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) was approved by Congress. The main targets of the law were illegal immigrants 
and people with a criminal record that resided legally in the United States but had not yet 
naturalized. The act enhanced the policing of national borders.  It also established 
stringent provisions for criminal and undocumented workers and expedited the 
deportation process. Finally, it introduced new obstacles for legal migration by tightening 
asylum procedures and requiring U.S. financial sponsors for newcomers entering via the 
family category.   
                                                 
28 For more details about the political positions on immigration, see Plotke (1999). 
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During the 1990s the only solution proffered to the problem of illegal immigration 
from Mexico was to increase the size and resources of the Border Patrol. By the 
beginning of the twentieth first century, however, it was evident that this solution not 
only had not worked, but had created new problems: wider control of traditional crossing 
points had not deterred illegal immigration29 (Massey 2005) but had pushed migrants to 
more dangerous crossing points, thus augmenting the death toll.  
The 2000 election of George W. Bush appeared to create a more promising 
environment for a new approach. In his first year, the President indicated a strong 
commitment to working with Mexico to develop an accord that would address the issue.  
Bush understood that Latinos had the prospect of becoming a major electoral 
constituency. He hoped to break the near monopoly of Democrats over the Latino vote, 
particularly in California. For almost six months, from February to July 2001, Mexican 
and American officials negotiated the content of the accord. The guiding idea was that 
undocumented Mexicans would be able to regularize their status in the United States 
through a points system and gain legal residence for a period of three to five years. The 
points system would consider time of residence in the United States, the existence of U.S. 
citizen children, employer letters showing a willingness to hire the immigrant, and 
English proficiency. In exchange, Mexico offered to control and reduce emigration 
emanating from its territory in the next twenty years30. 
The agreement was far less ambitious than the 1986 amnesty. Even so, anti-
immigrant groups immediately attacked it when news of the negotiation leaked to the 
                                                 
29 The New York Times reported that the number of illegal immigrants has been growing by 350, 000 each 
year. By 2004 the number of illegal immigrants in the United States oscillates in between 8 and 10 million 
people (NYT 2004).  
30 This information is based on the talk given by Demetri Papademetriouat at the International Center for 
Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship, in New York, on October 30th 2001.  
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press.  Although the prospects for adoption seemed dim, by early September the Mexican 
president Vicente Fox managed to put it back on the agenda during a summit with Bush. 
A few days later, however, the terrorist attacks of September 11 took place and the 
windows of opportunity closed again. 
  Although undocumented immigration from Mexico remains a major problem for 
the United States, the fight against terrorism has overwhelmed this preoccupation.  Since 
September 11, a new immigration regime seems to be developing, one in which national 
origin and religious orientation matters a lot more than in the last few decades. Although 
the most affected by new security and immigration requirements are immigrants coming 
from Arab countries, an anti-immigrant environment has also affected Mexican 
immigrants, particularly those undocumented, as there seems to be less tolerance for their 
presence in the United States. For instance, anti-immigrant groups have advocated further 
curtailment of the few civil and social rights that undocumented immigrants have, 
including access to emergency medical care and police protection31.  
With increased pressure to take a decision on the subject, the Bush administration 
proposed a new immigration reform in January 2004. The plan was geared to satisfy his 
core business constituency and the Hispanic electorate in a presidential election year. 
Some analysts, however, also argued that his program attempted to show moderate swing 
voters that he was still a compassionate conservative (Bumiller 2004). In effect, his 
proposal was far less ambitious than the one suggested in 2001, showing the strength 
acquired by conservative and nativist groups since then.  
                                                 
31 There are current discussions in Congress about making police and hospital workers turn in people they 
believe might be illegal (Editorial 2003).   
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Bush’s program would let undocumented immigrants obtain work visas for three 
years, renewable for an unspecified period of time. Temporary workers would be 
required to return permanently to their country of origin. Although he said that some of 
them might have the option of acquiring permanent residency, he did not specify how and 
when that would happen. In effect, therefore, his proposal was for a new version of a 
guest worker program that did not grant any political rights.  
Alternatives to Bush’s proposal were proposed in Congress in 2003 and 2005. In 
2003 Representatives Jim Kolbe and Jeff Flake, as well as Senator John McCain, all 
Republicans from Arizona, introduced bills to revise immigration law. The major 
elements of these bills were similar to those that would have been part of Bush’s original 
immigration accord had it not been derailed by its premature presentation to the public 
and by the September 2001 events.  Along with Bush’s original proposal, they also 
included a major guest worker program to regularize the status of undocumented workers 
and a road to permanent residence through a points system.    
By 2005, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) summoned himself to the cause and, 
along with Senator McCain and Representatives Kolbe, Flake and Gutierrez, introduced 
The Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act of 2005, which was a more refined 
version of the bills presented in 2003. This act proposed the creation of a temporary visa, 
the H-5A, to allow foreign workers to enter and fill menial jobs in the United States.  
Undocumented workers already residing in the country would be able to adjust their 
status to this visa by showing their work history, clearing their criminal record, and 
passing a security background check.  Additionally, they could qualify for a permanent 
status by meeting future work requirements, paying substantial fines and fees, as well as 
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back taxes, submitting themselves to additional security checks, and meeting English 
proficiency and other civic requirements. Although the bill actually proposed a new 
guest-worker program, it also included a viable scenario for immigrants to acquire 
citizenship. The latter was attacked by conservative groups as a magnified repetition of 
the 1986 Amnesty32.  
A variation to this bill was proposed by Senators John Cornyn of Texas and Jon 
Kyl of Arizona in 2005. Their bill also included a guest worker program, but mandated 
that workers return to their countries of origin upon the expiration of their work permits. 
More focused on the enforcement side, this bill also provided a large increase in border 
security programs, including 10,000 additional border patrol agents and extra money for 
surveillance equipment.     
Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, and defying President Bush’s 2004 call for a 
guest worker program, the House of Representatives approved by 239-182 a bill 
introduced by James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Peter King (R-NY) that would make it a 
federal crime to live in the United States illegally. This bill, focused on the enforcement 
side only, would also criminalize those individuals who helped illegal immigrants to 
enter or stay in the country.  In addition, the bill mandated the construction of reinforced 
fencing as well as the construction and installation of other physical and technological 
barriers along approximately 700 miles of the United States-Mexico border.  
An uncontestable success for restrictionists and nativists, this bill pushed the 
immigration debate farther to the right. However, it also had the unexpected consequence 
                                                 
32 Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, has argued, for example, that 
this bill “embraces amnesty outright,” even though it imposes several obstacles before an undocumented 
immigrant can actually obtain a permanent resident status (Fitzgerald 2005).  The general view of 
conservative groups is that illegal immigrants should not be allowed to stay in the United States no matter 
what, because thy have broken the law.    
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of galvanizing immigrants and their supporters and promoting the creation of a pro-
immigrants rights movement. An issue that polarized the debate was President Bush’s 
endorsement of the House bill and the limited flexibility of the Senate’s majority leader, 
Bill Frist, to allow a thorough debate on immigration reform. Frist argued that if Senators 
did not agree on any other reform by March 27 he would bring to the floor a compromise 
bill proposed earlier that month by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) that included many of 
the tough measures against illegal immigrants of the Sensenbrenner bill but coupled with 
a guest worker program with no residency provision. 
 In the months of March, April and May 2006, millions of immigrants marched in 
the streets of American cities opposing the legislation being discussed in Congress and 
demanding a legal path for those that reside without legal documents in the United States. 
For the first time in years, pro-immigrant groups joined their forces to mobilize 
newcomers. A key and unexpected actor was the Catholic Church, which was adamantly 
opposed to any bill that criminalized immigrants or those who worked with them since 
many Catholics are deeply involved in helping them regardless of their legal status. 
Another unexpected actor in mobilizing the immigrant community, particularly in cities 
such as Chicago and New York, were the Mexican state federations, many of which 
turned their attention decisively towards their host society33. 
In this polarized environment, President Bush on May 15 announced a new 
immigration program that attempted to satisfy the interest of his conservative base, but 
also recognized the importance of not alienating the Hispanic community from the 
Republican Party. As was evident in the marches, this community was clearly 
                                                 
33 Personal interviews of the author with federation leaders in Los Angeles on April 21,, 2006 showed that 
they spent days personally calling immigrants to participate in the pro-immigrant rally in Los Angeles on 
March 17, and also in the economic boycott and immigrant rally on May 1st.  
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disappointed with the anti-immigrant legislation recently proposed and approved in 
Congress. The center of Bush’s new proposal was a provision to deploy up to 6,000 
members of the National Guard to enforce the security of the southern border until a 
similar number of border patrol agents could be trained to take their positions. However, 
drawing on the McCain/Kennedy bill, he also proposed a guest worker program and a 
legalization path for undocumented immigrants.  
Finally, on May 25th the Senate approved the McCain and Kennedy bill, but with 
considerable amendments that strengthened its enforcement side and limited the scope of 
its legalization and guest worker programs. At this writing the fate of both the House and 
Senate bills is unknown. 
The debates on immigration reform and the different bills that have emerged on 
the subject since 2000 show that the expectations of the population and the political class 
are different from those that resulted from the civil rights era and that persisted until the 
1980s. Since the 1990s amnesty has taken on negative connotations. Furthermore, while 
after the civil rights movement guest worker programs were abandoned as a viable policy 
option because they denied political rights to newcomers, in the twenty first century they 
have become the most attractive initiative to regularize the flows of Mexican migrants to 
the United States. The acceptance of these programs and of any others that attempt to 
regularize immigrants, however, is still by no means assured considering the sharp 
ideological divisions that exist today in the United States. To be implemented they would 
have to pass the substantial Republican opposition in Congress, particularly in the House, 
and also the opposition that may emerge from Democrats who believe these programs are 
not generous enough.  As Soysal has pointed out, “host states articulate their interests and 
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mobilize new policies and strategies according to what is ‘acceptable’ and ‘available’” 
(Soysal 1994). In contrast to the civil rights era, the current proposals being discussed 
show that there is strong opposition within the American society to grant formal political 
rights to temporary workers. Yet, paradoxically, this opposition is also helping mobilize 
the immigrant community, including Mexicans, towards its host society. 
Although the opportunity structure appears to be less favorable to the integration 
of Mexicans than it was in the 1980s because no straight path to citizenship is being 
considered, the current environment may have two positive effects for incorporation 
prospects: on the one hand, the strong anti-immigrant legislation being proposed in 
Congress is helping mobilize and organize immigrants and their supporters and, on the 
other hand, if an open-door guest worker program and even a regularization are finally 
approved in Congress the political leverage of Mexican newcomers over the American 
political system will certainly increase.    
2.3.2 Settlement Policies: Another Obstacle to Incorporation 
 Settlement policies refer to “state intervention into post-entry experiences of 
immigrants, refugees and the communities into which they move” (Bach 1992, p. 145). 
They reflect the character of the home state and clearly determine the ways in which 
immigrants will incorporate into their receiving polity. 
Since the United States has a liberal structure of power, in which state authority is 
decentralized and political action is often initiated by voluntary organizations, most 
activities to incorporate immigrants have taken place at the local level.  In contrast to 
other countries, there are few national and official policies to incorporate immigrants 
(Soysal 1994; Jones-Correa 2002; Bloemrad 2003).  Nonetheless, when the national 
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security interests demand it, specific groups have been favored through policies that have 
helped them not only to better adapt in the United States, but also to become an important 
political constituency. A prime example is Cubans who arrived in the United States after 
the 1959 revolution. This group benefited from a series of policies implemented by the 
Federal government that bypassed existing government agencies. 
As Bach (1992) explains, Cubans represented an immigrant elite. Most of the aid 
they received focused on making their adaptation in their host society successful. Doctors 
and teachers received professional retraining that would help them retain their previous 
social status. The government also funded bilingual education programs that could 
facilitate the adaptation of their children. By 1966 the Cuban Adjustment Act 
compensated South Florida for the impact of Cuban refugees on local budgets. This 
established the precedent of giving direct federal assistance to a locality to support the 
settlement of particular immigrant groups. Following this principle, other refugee groups 
were supported as well, particularly when they were fleeing from regimes opposed by the 
U.S. 
In contrast to the support that refugee groups received, Mexican immigrants as 
well as other groups of newcomers from Third World countries that arrived in the United 
States after 1965 received little if any help from the federal government. For instance, 
Bach argues that the bracero programs that regulated Mexican migration to the United 
States at different moments from 1917 to 1964 represented “an admissions policy with a 
punitive settlement plan” (Bach 1992, p. 152). On the one hand, the American 
government was directly involved in negotiating the contracting of Mexican workers. On 
the other, however, it left the responsibilities of employment assistance, housing and 
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other matters to employers, their agents and local social service groups.  This left 
braceros prey to the designs of their employers.   
 One of the major problems Mexicans confronted is that those arriving legally 
through the bracero program had a temporary status, and were not considered settlers, 
and therefore, there was no inclination to provide settlement assistance. The situation was 
even worse for the undocumented. When IRCA was approved, the federal government 
finally established what could be considered a settlement program that benefited 
Mexicans. Following the model established by refugee settlement activities, it “provided 
financial aid to states to cover increased costs to public treasuries as undocumented 
newcomers adjusted their status” (Bach 1992, p. 157).  This financial aid was provided 
through State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants (SLIAG). However, it had a 
drawback: “it reimbursed states and local governments while temporarily disqualifying 
newly legalized workers and their families from federal programs” (Bach 1992, p. 157). 
 The increased participation of the federal government in settlement policy through 
these grants became a subject of debate by the early 1990s when the support that was 
provided to immigrants through these grants became the target of conservative groups. 
One of the arguments they presented was that immigration was not cost-free, but rather 
its costs were passed on to taxpayers. A National Research Council study, for instance, 
documented some of these arguments as it demonstrated that although immigration 
produces net positive fiscal effects for the Federal government, it has a negative fiscal 
impact on local areas of high immigrant concentration (Edmonston and Lee 1996). This 
was the context that facilitated the approval of the 1996 welfare reforms that cut-off 
lawful permanent resident aliens from most means-tested programs. 
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 2.3.3 The Role of Institutional Gatekeepers  
 In the United States immigrant incorporation is generally seen as an individual 
choice: the newcomer decides when to naturalize, to register, to vote, and to join political 
associations. However, there are some organized efforts at incorporation made by private 
associations. These institutions may increase or decrease the resources available for 
immigrants to incorporate.  
 Political parties have been important engines of incorporation of immigrants, 
particularly at the turn of the twentieth century.  Their patronage structures in major 
American cities of the northeast and Midwest provided immigrants with material benefits 
that facilitated their adaptation. They also helped them in the naturalization process. In 
exchange, they expected immigrants to vote the party line, a situation that integrated 
newcomers into the political system even if their vote was highly controlled. Eventually, 
immigrant engagement in the political process became freer and more active as some 
ethnic groups became aware of their political strength and used it to support their own 
ethnic leaders, or others sympathetic to their cause. This was possible because the non-
ideological and decentralized character of American political parties permitted immigrant 
groups to switch from one party to the other when they thought it advisable.  
   The role that political parties played was, nonetheless, mixed. In some cities they 
were more effective in helping immigrants incorporate than in others, and certainly, 
within those cities, they helped only some immigrant groups incorporate. However, many 
scholars today doubt that the means they employed were effective in promoting true civic 
engagement34. In any case, the capacity they had to introduce newcomers into the 
political process was related to the fact that the American polity was in many respects 
                                                 
34 For a review on the subject see Sterne (2001). 
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much more open to immigrants than it is today. This was particularly true during the 
“second party system” that emerged in the 1840s and specifically for males migrating 
from European countries such as Germany and Scandinavia. At that time, many states 
allowed immigrants to vote, even without naturalizing, with the goal of encouraging them 
to settle there. Furthermore, immigrants arrived with an uncommon interest in politics 
and benefited from a vibrant and relatively accessible political culture. 
By the late nineteen century this vibrant political life declined due to Progressive 
Era civil service reforms aimed at rooting out urban corruption. In addition, new 
obstacles were imposed to deliberately disenfranchise the masses and deny the right to 
vote to marginalized minorities and newcomers. These constraints included literacy tests, 
property requirements, residency rules, and early poll closings. Although machines still 
played an important role in incorporating immigrants eligible to vote by helping them 
obtain jobs, advocacy and recognition, their capacity to coax them into the political 
system declined (Sterne 2001). 
In the 1930s the mobilization of European newcomers shifted from the local to 
the national level thanks to the creation of the “New Deal” coalition that kept Democrats 
in power almost without interruption until 1968 (Sterne 2001, p. 59). The social welfare 
programs developed by the Roosevelt administration motivated newcomers to participate 
actively in the political process and to vote in favor of the Democratic Party. By the 
1960s, this enthusiasm, however, declined as the second and third generations were 
already integrated and there were fewer incentives to participate in the political process. 
What role have American political parties played in the incorporation of Mexican 
immigrants? Certainly, it has been different and more limited than that played in the 
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incorporation of European migrants.  Since Mexicans arriving to the United States were 
generally considered sojourners, there were few incentives for parties to engage them and 
introduce them to the political process as newcomers.  
In the southwest, Democratic Party’s political machines did mobilize second 
generation Mexicans to vote in the 1920s and 1930s, but Anglo leaders controlled their 
vote and there was widespread discrimination against them. Diverse organized protests 
by Mexican-Americans throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and increased mobilization by 
this group in the context of the civil rights movement, led the Democratic party in the late 
1970s to adopt a policy “of having groups such as the Mexican-American Democrats (in 
Texas) and the Chicano-initiated Hispanic American Democrats become integrated parts 
of state and national party structures” (de la Garza and Vaughan 1985, p. 246).  This was 
also prompted by increased political participation of Mexican-Americans as a result of 
the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1975 to Hispanics, and the organized activities 
of the Southwest Voter Registration Project and the Mexican-American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund (MALDEF). By the 1980s Mexican-Americans were already 
positioned as an important pillar within the Democratic Party along with African 
Americans, even if they still did not vote in very large numbers.  
It is clear that first-generation Mexican immigrants have incrementally become an 
important constituency. Efforts to reach them, however, have been limited and localized. 
At the local and state levels political parties express interest in newly naturalized 
immigrants only when elections are competitive or when they are highly concentrated in 
specific districts thus inevitably having a say in the election.  
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At the national level since 1996 the Democratic Party has experimented with 
ethnic-specific campaigning in national elections. By the 2000 elections both the 
Democratic and the Republican parties attempted to employ a discourse that was 
appealing to Latino voters. For example, from very early in his campaign, George W. 
Bush established the practice of answering at least one question in Spanish at his news 
conferences. He also attended events relevant to Latino leaders, including a US-Mexican 
Foundation breakfast in San Diego, California, and his first foreign trip as a candidate 
was to the Mexican border to meet with Mexico’s president, Vicente Fox (Jones-Correa 
2002).  During these elections, both parties had operations targeted to Hispanic voters 
and donors, including youth organizations and materials and web sites in Spanish.  
All these activities show that the attitudes of political parties toward immigrants 
are changing. However, political parties cannot play the role in mobilizing immigrants 
they did before. When they were in their formative period, a lot of their activity was at 
the grassroots level. Nowadays, political parties have very defined constituencies, their 
grassroots activities have largely withered away, and in their place are professional 
political activists that target audiences via mass mailings and television advertising.  
  In locations where party machines still play an active role, they represent more 
an obstacle to the incorporation of immigrants than a useful vehicle to facilitate this 
process. As Browning, Marshall and Tabb have noted, today’s urban machines are “well 
institutionalized coalitions that predate minority mobilization of the 1960s.” Since they 
are not oriented toward reform, but to protect the power of the organization as well as the 
economic interests of its white leadership, they limit the formation of multiracial 
challenging coalitions, by dividing minorities and co-opting their leadership. Therefore, 
 73
although the machines create some minority incorporation and produce some minority-
oriented policies, ultimately, they “prevent the mobilization of a liberal, unified minority-
based coalition” (Browning, et al. 1990a, p. 217). 
2.3.4 The Role of Organized Labor 
Organized labor has had, historically, a conflictive relationship with immigrants 
because they compete with native, unionized workers. Despite that, in the nineteenth 
century the union federation, the Knights of Labor, helped mobilize newcomers. This 
federation was open to most immigrant workers regardless of gender, origin, and skill 
level. It saw politics as a supplement to workplace reform and mobilized workers to 
defend their rights. However, it subjected its members either to political co-optation by 
conservative interests or to attacks by a business-state alliance. By 1890, just when new 
immigration was picking up, the federation fell apart. In its place emerged the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which was much less open to immigrants. The AFL played a 
pivotal role in supporting the national origins quota system imposed in the 1920s, with 
the goal of cutting new immigration flows from Europe.  Although quite a few affiliates, 
especially the new unions that emerged in the 1910s, did organize immigrants, 
particularly Chinese, the AFL remained opposed to new immigration and this is a reason 
why the quota system persisted until 196535.  
Despite this, the AFL and the more progressive unions that made up the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which emerged during the New Deal, played an active 
role in mobilizing immigrants already present in the United States. By that time, 
                                                 
35 The position against the quota system changed in the 1950s once it merged with the CIO. From the 1950s 
onwards, the AFL and the CIO presented a united voice in favor of dismantling this system, a shift that 
contributed to the ultimate passage of the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act (Tichenor 2002). 
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immigration flows were small and, therefore, immigrants were not perceived as a major 
obstacle for improving the working conditions of their members.  
The relationship between unions and Mexican immigrants during the 1930s and 
beyond, however, has been very different. Since Mexican immigrants were constantly 
present while migration flows from other parts of the world were low, they were a 
constant threat to the position of unionized workers in the job market. Furthermore, 
employers frequently used undocumented Mexican immigrants to cross picket lines. 
From the 1920s, the AFL denounced Mexican migration as a calamity for American 
workers, and pressured Federal authorities to launch a general crackdown on 
undocumented Mexican aliens. During the New Deal, the AFL campaigned without 
success for legislation to impose an annual quota for Mexican immigrants and bar all 
those ineligible for citizenship, (nonwhite Mexicans) from entering the United States 
(Tichenor 2002). Organized labor opposed the three bracero programs, arguing that they 
exploited Mexican workers and were detrimental to the working standards of native 
laborers. Furthermore, in the 1950s AFL complaints against illegal Mexican immigration 
were a reason the Eisenhower administration launched Operation Wetback, a military 
campaign to deport Latino undocumented workers en masse. 
In the 1970s, in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, the AFL, merged with 
the CIO since 1955, still identified illegal immigration from Mexico as a major problem. 
However, instead of proposing mass deportations as in the past, it suggested the 
imposition of sanctions against employers that hired illegal aliens. This idea was 
attractive to liberal Congressmen in the House, who held hearings and proposed 
legislation on the subject. During that decade, nonetheless, the idea did not prosper, as 
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there was strong opposition from business. By the 1980s, sanctions were included in 
IRCA. By the end of the twentieth century, organized labor was still concerned about 
illegal immigration. However, in a major shift of policies, in 2000 the AFL-CIO called 
for a general amnesty for illegal immigrants already present in the United States and for 
the end of employer sanctions, since they “did not work” and promoted the abuse of 
workers by their employers36.   
2.3.5 Civic, Religious and Ethnic Organizations that Support Immigrants 
Ethnic and civic organizations were important actors in the incorporation of 
European immigrants at the end of the nineteenth century. For those immigrants unable to 
participate in the political process, and for whose access to established institutions was 
fairly limited, civic organizations facilitated adaptation by providing services and know 
how.  Furthermore, these organizations politicized immigrants, many times unexpectedly, 
by motivating them to organize and discuss their problems. One of the best-known 
organizations was the settlement house established by Jane Adams in Chicago. These 
types of institutions were effective in delivering specific benefits to immigrants. 
However, they went into decline as the state played a more active role beginning in the 
1930s in providing welfare for the poor. Furthermore, since migration flows diminished, 
there were fewer immigrants to attend these organizations and their children, now 
Americanized, rejected places built by and for their parents (Bach 1992, p. 151).   
  Mexican immigrants who arrived in the United States when the doors were 
closed to other immigrant groups were not similarly protected by such organizations. The 
role of these organizations was already in decline by the time they arrived in large 
                                                 
36 See: All things Considered, 02/17/00 at www.npr.org. 
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numbers. Most were located in urban areas and since a large part of Mexican migration 
was rural they did not have access to their services.    
After the 1986 amnesty, however, civic and not-for-profit organizations supported 
the adaptation and assimilation of Mexican immigrants in the United States. They have a 
humanitarian and social justice agenda derived from the civil rights movement that 
converts them into important advocates for immigrant rights. They provide immigrants 
with many services including English lessons and legal advice. They also help them 
organize and provide the know how to access government institutions. Furthermore, they 
have also filed “numerous lawsuits on behalf of immigrants, legal or not, and have 
generally succeeded in defining immigration policy controversies as matters of 
constitutional interpretation rather than political choices” (Freeman and Betts 1992, p. 
80). These organizations, thus, represent important channels of access to the opportunity 
structure of the receiving society.   
    Another source of protection and opportunity for Mexican immigrants comes 
from ethnic organizations, specifically those founded by Mexican-Americans or with the 
help of major foundations, which by the 1970s, in the aftermath of the civil rights 
movement, established offices in Washington, D.C. to defend the interests of American 
citizens of Mexican origin, but also to campaign in favor of immigrants’ rights. Mexican-
American organizations were a pivotal force in the support of the 1986 amnesty, even if 
they were originally opposed to it due to employer sanctions     
Mexican-American organizations such as MALDEF have been critical to the 
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, which has been an important step in helping 
immigrants incorporate. MALDEF and other Mexican-American organizations have also 
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been fundamental actors in opposing anti-immigrant measures such as Proposition 187 in 
California. Mexican-American organizations also provide immigrants with important 
resources such as leadership formation courses. However, the fact that these 
organizations have ceased doing major grass-root activities in the last couple of decades 
has diminished their direct contact with immigrant communities and their capacities to 
identify their needs. Even if native born Mexican-Americans and newly arrived Mexican 
immigrants do not always have a similar political agenda,37 the groups need to 
collaborate in order to advance their interests in the United States.     
2.4 Prevailing Elite Strategies/ Political Culture and Idioms 
 Despite the many ethnic groups that have arrived and live in the United States 
today, ethnic conflict has not been a major political challenge to the status quo as it has 
been in many other parts of the world. As Donald Horowitz has argued: “By world 
standards, the United States is a remarkably successful multiethnic society” (Horowitz 
1985, p. 60); although this is also in part because world standards are “abysmally low.” 
Horowitz identifies three important aspects that have helped contain ethnic conflict.  
 First, a federal system of government with dispersed power and decentralized 
institutions defuses many conflicts by playing them out on the local stage. In many other 
countries ethnic conflict has shaken the political system, because ethnic cleavages “tend 
to bifurcate the society at the national level of politics” (Horowitz 1985, p. 63). Second, 
ethnic parties are not a predominant form of electoral expression in the United States. 
Although ethnicity is a major topic in American politics the major American political 
parties do not represent any specific group, a situation that has fostered ethnic inclusion. 
                                                 
37 As Leiken (2001) has explained, many leaders of first generation Mexican organizations are 
uncomfortable with the liberal agendas of both labor unions and mainstream Latino organizations.  
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Finally, within the United States there are no restrictions against the free movement of 
people and there are many incentives to move from one place to another. Because of this 
geographical mobility, there is less proclivity to group concentration than in other 
countries, a situation that has historically diminished the chances of specific ethnic 
groups claiming the control of one specific territory.  
 These three characteristics have also facilitated the incorporation of newcomers 
into the polity, although in some cases they have facilitated the subordination of some 
ethnic groups by others. For example, federalism helped the Jim Crow system to prevail 
for many years without becoming a major national conflict until the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s. As Horowitz has clarified, the civil rights movement gathered 
force despite, not because of federalism. Thanks to the federal system, and the 
fragmentation of power, nativist interests in Texas were able to extend the Jim Crow 
system to Mexicans as well as blacks. Federalism also meant that many of the obstacles 
Mexicans faced were products of local government.  Since the issues Mexicans confront 
vary from place to place, it is difficult for them to assemble a coherent national alliance 
in favor of their interests.  
 The non-ethnic nature of American political parties implies that Mexican 
immigrants need to use a discourse that appeals to other groups within the mainstream 
society. It also means that they need to mobilize and organize to become part of dominant 
multiracial coalitions at different governmental levels. Since the United States has a 
winner take all electoral system, minority groups have difficulty winning elections unless 
they create alliances with other groups. So far there have been successful biracial 
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coalitions, mostly between blacks and white liberals. Latinos have played a secondary 
role in those coalitions. 
 Finally, geographical mobility benefits immigrants because they can move in 
search of better opportunities. In the last two decades Mexicans have left major cities of 
the southwest and Midwest to settle in non-traditional Mexican immigration areas. 
However, mobility also implies that their efforts to get their interests represented are 
dispersed.    
2.5 Contingencies of Time and Place 
2.5.1 Political Alignments and Immigrant Incorporation 
 The theory of political alignments posits that new policy regimes emerge from 
cyclical, radical shifts in the partisan alignments of voters in periods that range from 30 to 
40 years. These shifts have taken place in critical elections in 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 and 
1932 (Burnham 1970).   Each new political alignment has brought with it specific views 
about immigrants. For example, while the realignment of 1828 brought a vibrant political 
life in which newcomers were welcomed to participate (mostly immigrants from 
Northern Europe), the post 1896 configuration provided limited opportunities for recent 
immigrants (Southern and Eastern European). During the post 1828 configuration, 
American political parties where in a formative period and the political system was 
expanding to include new participants. The 1896 election marked, instead, a turning point 
towards disenfranchising large sectors of the population since mass political participation 
was perceived as a threat to the political and economic establishment. The main priorities 
after the post-1896 configuration and until the New Deal were economic growth, national 
integration, modernization and cultural assimilation. Efforts were thus made to 
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“Americanize” immigrants already present in the country, while the tendency was set 
towards closing the borders to new arrivals. Greater chances towards incorporating into 
the polity emerged for immigrants in the 1930s with the “New Deal” alignment. This 
alignment helped dismantle the Republican Party system that had predominated for three 
decades and facilitated the mobilization and gradual incorporation of immigrants through 
their participation in the labor movement and the Democratic Party. 
 The “New Deal” coalition persisted until the 1960s. After that the tendency has 
been more towards a dealignment from the party system, with a large sector of the voting 
age population abstaining. It is in this context that post-1965 immigrants are entering the 
polity. This is ironic: although incorporating Mexican immigrants face far fewer 
institutional barriers than previous generations of immigrants to participate in the 
political process thanks to decades of progressive civil and voting rights legislation, they 
are also entering the polity when politics are not perceived as a means to advance 
collective interests because traditional political institutions have declined. If anything, the 
last decade of the twentieth century has been marked by an ascendance of conservative 
interests, comparable to the ones that dominated American politics during the post-1896 
arrangement.  Even though these groups have not been able to build a winning majority 
that can sustain a long-term political alignment, they have effectively followed an 
incremental agenda that has as one of its main goals to dismantle civil and voting rights 
achieved by minorities after the civil rights movement.  This means that new immigrants 




2.5.2 Divided Government and Unstable Majorities 
 The fact that neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties currently have a 
stable majority in national elections opens new possibilities for immigrant groups. The 
2000 election returns, for example, revealed that 48.4% of Americans aligned with one 
party and 47.9% with the other.  In 2004, 48% aligned with one party and 51% with the 
other party.   Furthermore, although in 2006 Republicans controlled both Houses of 
Congress as well as the White House, a position not enjoyed since the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower administration, their control is marginal. After the 2002 mid-term elections 
Republicans held only 51 seats in the Senate and only 52.6% of the seats in the House. 
The nominally non-partisan Supreme Court is also narrowly divided, typically 5-4. 
 At the sub-national level, the stalemate is also evident: “Of the 5411 State 
Representatives nationwide, 51.8% are Democrats and slightly less than half are 
Republican” (Uresti 2004). Furthermore, Republicans occupy 26 of the governor’s 
mansions, while Democrats occupy 24. Because of this situation the Democratic and 
Republican parties need to incorporate new voters. Even the Republican Party, which 
traditionally has tended to attack immigrants, has made an effort to contain its anti-
immigrant constituency and to suggest policies popular with Latino voters such as 
President Bush’s recent guest worker proposals.  
 In this context Mexican immigrants have much to gain if they are able to 
organize, mobilize and tie their demands to those of a larger, winning coalition. Periods 
of divided government or unstable majorities have provided, for instance, the right 
environment to implement sweeping immigration and civil rights reforms that are almost 
unthinkable when close majorities have prevailed (Costain 1994; Tichenor 2002).  
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2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that Mexican immigrants confront important institutional 
barriers to incorporation, including the persistence of an ascriptive ideological view that 
considers them unfit to belong to the American polity and an institutional setting that 
creates few incentives for them to organize towards their host society. They also include 
the persistence of an immigration system shot through with contradictions. Nonetheless, 
there are also new windows of opportunity available to them, especially the newly 
acquired legal status bestowed by recent reforms.  In addition, they now have important 
allies some of which were previously hostile to them.  
With respect to the strategies that immigrants can adopt to advance their interests, 
they are now not only able to exercise their influence from outside of the system (interest 
group strategy), but from within the system (electoral strategy). Although Mexicans are 
still slow to naturalize and to vote, they are now gaining more attention from the two 








FROM “POCHOS” TO HEROES: THE POLITICAL 




 Mexico policy towards its expatriate community in the United States has changed 
remarkably over time. In the late nineteenth century and until the great deportation of 
Mexicans during the depression years, the Mexican government was considerably 
involved in the social, political and cultural life of émigrés in the United States 
(Santamaría Gómez 2001). Having a relatively small population, which declined as a 
result of the Revolution, Mexico also discouraged emigration since the entire population 
was needed to rebuild the country. Emigrants who went north, notwithstanding, and were 
perceived as adopting Anglo-Saxon values, were called Pochos and in the national 
imaginary they were considered almost traitors.  
 The somewhat close relationship established with the expatriate community 
during the first few revolutionary governments changed to a more distant one from the 
1940s to the 1980s when the Mexican government turned inward, focused its energy on 
promoting economic development, and became suspicious of involvement in Mexico’s 
political affairs by people living outside its national territory. During that period, the 
government recognized that it could not prevent emigration, even though the exploitation 
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of emigrants in the United States was seen as an offense to the national pride. Now that 
the population was growing at a rapid pace, emigration started to be seen and used as a 
safety valve to contain political conflict at home. For this reason, after negotiating the 
second guest worker program with the United States during World War Two, the 
Mexican government promoted the recruitment of braceros or laborers from Mexico’s 
central plateau, a densely populated region with limited job opportunities (Corwin 1978). 
In this second period, the only explicit policy towards Mexicans abroad was to protect the 
rights of Mexican workers in the United States (both of braceros and undocumented 
immigrants) and to provide them with consular support. Since the government had a 
foreign policy doctrine of non-intervention in the political life of other countries (so as to 
avoid the intervention of other countries in Mexico’s political life) it did not intervene in 
Mexican-Americans’ struggles to gain political rights in the United States during the 
1960s and 1970s.  
 Since the 1990s, the Mexican government has implemented a series of policies 
that differentiate among the various groups that compose the Mexican population in the 
United States. First, there have been policies aimed at improving relations with Mexican-
Americans so that they become an important ally in Mexico’s foreign policy agenda 
towards its northern neighbor. Second there have been policies targeted towards 
expatriates that have settled in the United States. Here the main goal has been to mobilize 
and organize them so that they participate more actively in the economic development of 
their places and country of origin. More recently, they have been granted political rights 
as well. Finally, the Mexican government has maintained its active policy of defending 
the rights of Mexican workers in the United States regardless of their legal status. This 
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goal acquired even greater priority when Vicente Fox became president in 2000. One of 
Fox’s major foreign policy goals was to negotiate with the United States a program to 
regularize the status of undocumented Mexicans. Emigrants became so central to Fox’s 
discourse that he even revalued their previous status in national rhetoric and called them 
“heroes”.  
    The different interactions between the Mexican government and the Mexican 
community abroad over a century have provoked different responses from expatriates. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century to the mid 1930s Mexican émigrés were 
highly interested in Mexico’s political developments, a stance that was encouraged by 
Mexico’s political class, particularly by that which emerged from the Revolution.  The 
limited interaction between the Mexican government and the Mexican community living 
in the USA after the 1940s discouraged any mobilization and claims-making focused on 
the homeland. This lack of mobilization was reinforced by the fact that Mexican 
emigration to the United States evolved from being political and economic in nature, to 
being mostly economic. Thus while emigrants from the beginning of the twentieth 
century came from different strata of the Mexican society most emigrants after the 1940s 
were young, male, and temporary laborers from the countryside, with limited education. 
By the 1980s the political democratization that was taking place in Mexico motivated 
émigrés to look back again to their homeland, a situation that was encouraged by 
opposition leaders from the left who courted the support of expatiates to advance their 
political agendas. The new policies implemented by the Mexican government in the 
1990s towards Mexicans abroad encouraged the involvement of expatriates in Mexico’s 
economic and political life. As was seen in Chapter 2, this situation was also facilitated 
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by the fact that many Mexicans had by then achieved a stable legal and economic status 
in the United States, and thus had the time and financial means to be involved in 
activities focused on their homeland. 
 This chapter traces the interactions between the Mexican state and the Mexican 
community in the United States. These interactions will be studied by using a political 
opportunity structure approach that considers how Mexico’s different institutions and 
practices have motivated or inhibited the mobilization of Mexicans in the United States 
towards their home and host countries. The main point I want to stress is that political 
developments in Mexico and Mexican institutional practices towards Mexicans abroad 
have clearly influenced the ways in which Mexican immigrants have mobilized and 
organized themselves in the United States. They have shaped their political agendas 
towards both their home and host countries. For instance, the political mobilization of 
Mexicans in the United States has been expanding as new structures of opportunity are 
being opened up for them in their homeland. In this regard, to the extent that Mexicans in 
the United States have developed something close to a social movement38 towards their 
homeland, and more recently towards their host country, their success has been 
determined by the recent institutional actions taken by the Mexican state towards 
Mexicans abroad. Many of these steps, intentionally or not, allowed the emergence of a 
political class within the Mexican community in the United States with an interest and a 
relative capacity to influence political events in their home and host countries.            
                                                 
38 Here I follow the definition of social movement applied by Costain (1994) and Mcadam (1999). These 
authors define a social movement as “the actions of excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political 
leverage to advance their collective interests”(McAdam 1999, p. 37). Since these groups are political 
outsiders their agendas usually challenge the status quo and are perceived as a problem by many insiders. 
Another important thing is that “for a movement to emerge its followers must believe that problems have 
political roots and that they can do something to change existing conditions” (Costain 1994).     
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3.2 The Incorporation of Mexicans into Their Homeland Polity: A Political 
Opportunity Structure View 
 As demonstrated by research on transnationalism, emigrants tend to retain many 
emotional ties with their countries and places of origin that propel them to get involved in 
what happens there. However, these do not always translate into political action. Political 
developments in the homeland as well as its policies towards émigrés shape the 
possibilities for political activity. These opportunities and constraints also determine the 
extent to which the political agenda they articulate towards their country of origin will 
succeed. 
Mexico has created a variety of incentives and obstacles relating to expatriate 
participation in Mexican political life.  These have resulted from specific political events 
in Mexico, from the perceptions Mexican political elites have held about expatriates, and 
from the policies that have been implemented as a result of those perceptions. My 
analysis of the impact of Mexico on Mexican-American political life includes how 
emigrants have been incorporated into the idea of the Mexican nation (national cleavage 
structures); the channels that have been opened or closed by different institutional actors 
and legal arrangements for their participation in the political process (institutional actors 
and legal arrangements); the ways emigrants have been able to insert their demands 
within the political system (prevailing elite strategies/political culture and idioms); and, 
finally, specific events that have mobilized expatriates towards political developments 




3.2.1 National Cleavage Structures. 
 The national cleavage structures that I am interested in are those that define the 
ideological spaces available for emigrants to articulate political demands towards their 
homeland. They include institutionalized debates about who belongs to the nation and 
who does not and how access to political membership has been historically constructed.  
With respect to Mexico they encompass the ways Mexican expatriates have been 
included within the highly nationalistic discourse used by Mexican institutions and 
political actors; as well as within the general notions of democracy and citizenship that 
have prevailed in that country.   
3.2.1.1 The Mexican Nation and Mexicans Abroad 
 President Ernesto Zedillo declared at the outset of his presidency that the Mexican 
nation was not limited to the physical territory of the country. This was affirmed in his 
National Development Plan 1995-2000 in the chapter called “the Mexican nation.” The 
new notion of the Mexican nation offered by Zedillo was the basis of the Congressional 
initiative that reformed Mexico’s nationality laws in 1997.  Taking effect in 1998, this 
measure allowed Mexicans to naturalize as citizens of another country while retaining 
their Mexican nationality. In practice, Mexican-Americans with at least one Mexican 
parent would keep or obtain important economic rights such as the acquisition of 
property in places restricted to Mexicans alone. Even if some Mexicans abroad 
considered the new nationality law unsatisfactory because it said nothing about the right 
to vote from abroad, Zedillo’s redefinition of the nation, and his reform of the nationality 
laws, reflected a dramatic change in the notions that the Mexican state had had until then. 
 Since independence Mexico has been a strongly nationalistic country. 
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Nationalism served two purposes: first, establishing a new, cohesive country from a 
former Spanish colony; second, counterbalancing the constant threat to Mexico’s 
sovereignty posed by European powers (for example, France imposed a puppet emperor 
in Mexico from 1861 to 1867) and the United States (which on two occasions invaded 
Mexican territory). 
  Although the Mexican population has never been homogeneous,39 Mexican 
political authorities and intellectuals argued that Mexico was a nation-state integrated by 
a mestizo people, that is, people from a mix of European and indigenous ancestry. The 
political class that emerged from the Mexican Revolution enthusiastically embraced this 
conception. Concerned about unifying the country after years of war, this elite developed 
a nationalistic discourse that reinforced the notion of a mestizo state in which the various 
indigenous groups were gradually fused with one another and with a lesser number of 
Spanish (Castilian) people to form an undifferentiated whole. From this homogeneous 
whole, which José Vasconcelos famously called “the cosmic race ”, the Mexican nation 
evolved and became coterminous with the state (Connor 1985, p. 13). 
 This discourse evidently excluded many groups from the idea of the nation. The 
large indigenous population of the country, for example, did not have a distinct space in 
this conception. Although the governments that emerged from the Revolution 
consistently exploited an idealized view about Mexico’s pre-Hispanic cultures, the 
indigenous people that descended from those cultures were perceived as a problem from 
the point of view of national unification and economic advancement. As a result, many 
                                                 
39 World Almanac figures describe the ethnic composition of the country as 60 percent mestizo, 10 percent 
European and 30 percent native-American see: 
http://www.ivacation.com/ivhalmanac/almanac.asp?CityID=356 
 90
efforts were oriented towards their assimilation into the mainstream culture, to the 
detriment of their linguistic and cultural heritage.  
 Mexican emigrants were also excluded from the idea of the nation. However, the 
view of their role was ambiguous. On the one hand, the state has always shown a deep 
concern about the fate of those that emigrated to the United States in search of work. 
From 1900 until the 1930s40 the government attempted, futilely, to discourage 
emigration, which was viewed as a drain of the national labor force. Even when Mexico 
agreed to the bracero programs of the 1940s and 1960s, which implied an acceptance by 
the government that emigration was unavoidable since the country could not provide all 
of its population with economic opportunity, Mexican authorities followed a policy of 
discouraging emigration by advising of the risks of going north. 
 On the other hand, those emigrating north were viewed critically and in many 
occasions they were portrayed as disloyal.  Mexican intellectuals and politicians were 
suspicious of emigrants who adopted “American values”. Only a limited number of 
Mexicans had the chance of fully integrating into American society. Nonetheless, those 
Mexicans who established themselves in the United States, even if their integration was 
partial, were despised because they were thought to have adopted English terminologies 
and American values to the detriment of their Spanish language and Mexican heritage. 
This critical attitude grew in part out of the fact that a main element of Mexican 
nationalism was anti-Americanism, a product of the constant threat that the United States 
                                                 
40 Probably the most effective policy to discourage emigration would have been strict controls at the 
Mexican border. However, the Mexican government never attempted to follow such a policy because as 
Corwin points out, since the early revolutionary regimes of Carranza, De la Huerta, Obregón and Calles, an 
open border was considered as a necessary “escape valve” for revolutionary unrest and political enemies. 
Furthermore, since then political authorities were painfully aware that “Mexico had little to offer miserable 
peons and underpaid industrial and mine workers, except unfulfilled revolutionary promises” (Corwin 
1978, p. 178). 
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was perceived to represent for Mexico. Therefore, anyone perceived as embracing the 
American culture was viewed with scorn.  
By the mid-1950s negative attitudes were extended to poor laborers or mojados 
whom Mexican authorities had usually treated as innocent victims of unfortunate 
circumstances. A specific event contributed to this. Mexican officials closed several entry 
points on the border with California in January 1954 with the goal of preventing 
employers from recruiting braceros without meeting Mexican conditions spelled out in 
the bracero convention of August 2, 1951. This provoked aspiring braceros to fight the 
“Mexican police and border guards in an effort to cross over and sign up with waiting 
contractors” (Corwin 1978, p. 186). 
 The spectacle of Mexicans against Mexicans, which was graphically registered by 
the national press, shocked not only Mexican authorities but also the public. Increasingly 
thereafter, emigrants were seen less as “humble campesinos driven involuntarily into the 
jaws of Anglo capitalists” (Corwin 1978, p. 186) and more as laborers who allowed 
themselves to be exploited by American employers. 
   In the mid 1980s when a large number of émigrés were granted legal status in the 
United States, Mexican authorities slowly realized that the situation of expatriates in that 
country was being transformed. First, many of the newly legalized would certainly settle 
permanently in the United States and bring their families with them, diminishing their 
direct ties to Mexico. Second, living conditions would improve with legal status and 
facilitate adaptation to American society. Their loyalty to Mexico, and the remittances 
they sent, therefore, could not be taken for granted anymore. A new policy towards 
expatriates was needed. Emigrants could not be regarded simply as victims of Anglo 
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employers, even if many would not be able to regularize their immigration status and 
would thus continue to endure substandard working conditions. Emigrants could no 
longer be perceived as traitors, or as people who abandoned their heritage, because most 
of them had maintained a strong sense of Mexican identity. 
 At the policy level, however, major changes towards expatriates did not take place 
until 1990 when the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari institutionalized the 
relationship between the state and Mexicans abroad by creating the Program for Mexican 
Communities Abroad within the Ministry of Foreign Relations41. Major changes in the 
general conception about Mexicans abroad, and their role in the Mexican nation, 
however, had to wait a little longer. During the Salinas administration, the major 
elements of Mexican nationalism were in crisis or no longer represented the national 
reality. Among other things, it became more evident than ever that Mexico was not a 
mestizo state but a multiethnic state in which the interests of the indigenous population 
and other minorities had to be taken into account. The 1994 upraising in Chiapas 
demonstrated the failure of those policies attempting to incorporate the indigenous 
population into the mainstream society and culture without recognizing the importance of 
their culture and languages as well as their economic needs.   
The Salinas administration was also a period in which the traditional anti-
Americanism of the Mexican political system abated. The deep economic crises of the 
1980s showed that Mexico could not develop economically by applying only inward 
looking policies, but needed to integrate itself into the world economy. The solution 
                                                 
41  Expatriates support to Salinas opponent Cuahutémoc Cárdenas during the Presidential elections of 1988, 
certainly convinced Mexican authorities of the need to redefine and control the relationship with the 
Mexican community abroad. Furthermore, Mexican authorities also became conscious that it was very 
important to establish a positive and long term relationship with Mexican-Americans to advance Mexico’s 
strategic interests towards the United States.  
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offered by the Salinas government was to look for a rapprochement with the United 
States.  These pressures facilitated the reformulation of the idea of the nation introduced 
in 1995 by Ernesto Zedillo, Salina’s successor.  
Zedillo’s reformulation of the idea of the nation as well as reforms in the 
nationality laws that were approved in 1996 implied that Mexico no longer expected 
emigrants to return, but recognized that they could be both Mexican and members of 
American society.  This became a major goal of Zedillo’s policy towards Mexicans 
abroad. The approval of   Proposition 187 in California seemed to demonstrate that the 
best way for the Mexican government to defend Mexicans abroad was to motivate them 
to become American citizens so that they could defend themselves.   
In 2000 President Fox, Zedillo’s successor, went beyond Zedillo’s ideas by 
arguing that Mexican emigrants were not only members of the Mexican nation but also 
national heroes. Two days after his inauguration, on December 3, 2000, Fox hosted a 
special reception for Mexicans abroad that included a broad delegation of both well- 
known Mexican-Americans and successful expatriates. At this unprecedented event he 
vowed that he would govern “for 118 million Mexicans” –the 100 million in Mexico and 
the 18 million people of Mexican descent in the United States (Smith 2000). His 
comments created confusion and skepticism among Mexican-Americans as well as 
political pundits in Mexico and the United States. While Zedillo’s argument that the 
Mexican nation extended beyond the Mexican borders was mostly a symbolic gesture 
that attempted to reconcile Mexico with its émigrés and with Mexican-Americans, Fox’s 
goal of governing those Mexicans who resided outside Mexico’s territory brought with it 
a complex political content that was difficult to digest. Fox was probably trying to say 
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that he wanted to be accountable to Mexicans abroad as he was to Mexicans within the 
national territory, but his ill-fated suggestion raised many troublesome questions: how 
could he govern for a group of people that did not vote for him? How could he govern a 
specific population within the territory of another sovereign country?  How could he be 
accountable to them? Could they be expected to comply with Mexico’s law? Despite 
these doubts, Fox’s discourse, as well as Zedillo’s reformulation, certainly opened new 
opportunities for the mobilization of Mexican expatriates in the United States, since they 
now had a legitimate claim on Mexico’s destiny.  
3.2.1.2 Citizenship, Democratization, and the Incorporation of Emigrants Into 
Mexico’s Polity 
During the 1990s and until 2005 one of the main goals of Mexican emigrants to 
the United States was the acquisition of political rights in their homeland. This type of 
demand did not emerge exclusively within the Mexican expatriate community. Other 
emigrant groups have made similar demands in the last few years, including Dominicans, 
Haitians, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Indians, Turks and many others. Even though these 
claims had become common at the end of the twentieth century, the Mexican case is still 
striking. Before the 1980s, Mexican emigrants would not have demanded political rights 
in their homeland for the simple reason that, strictly speaking, these rights were not yet 
available to many Mexicans residing in Mexico. The expatriate demand for political 
rights can be linked, therefore, to the structures of opportunities that have been opened by 




3.2.1.3 Political Rights: An Old Demand? 
Santamaría Gómez has argued that the expatriate’s desire to vote from abroad is 
very old.  In 1929 a group of Mexican émigrés raised this issue with José Vasconcelos, 
then a candidate for Mexico’s presidency (Santamaría Gómez 2001). The plea, however, 
had not the remotest chance of being considered because the democratic rights that these 
émigrés were seeking were not relevant in Mexico at that time. For instance, that same 
year Vasconcelos was forced into a long political exile in the United States when his 
opponent, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, was elected as the candidate of the party that eventually 
became the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). After that election, the PRI 
consolidated its control of Mexico’s political life for more than sixty years. Although 
elections were held every six years, they were not competitive and did not determine 
Mexico’s political destiny. This situation guaranteed that no such demands from 
expatriates would emerge until 1988 when Mexican elections became meaningful again. 
For this reason, it is possible to argue that the demand to vote from abroad articulated in 
the last two decades does not represent a continuation of the old demand. They are not 
really connected because they emerged in different contexts and under different 
circumstances. 
 The expatriates’ demand to vote form abroad can be traced, in contrast, to 
Mexico’s recent democratization process and the struggles of many sectors of the 
Mexican population to acquire effective political rights. These struggles emerged at the 
end of the 1960s with the student movement, but became more prominent during the 
1970s and 1980s. During those years one aspect of citizenship as described by Marshall 
(1992), the political, became more prominent in Mexican debates than ever before. 
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Scholars, intellectuals, and leaders from the opposition all argued for an opening in the 
political system and the inclusion of a greater proportion of the population who were 
deprived of real citizenship rights because their votes were controlled and electoral 
competition did not really exist. Citizenship in Mexico was thus only linked to the notion 
of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to those decades, the notion of citizenship 
was not really connected to political rights in the national debate (although it was in the 
Constitution) but rather to social and civil rights. 
 Since the Mexican revolution had a powerful social content, the 1917 Constitution 
that resulted from it strongly emphasized social entitlements and liberal rights that would 
be advanced through the consolidation of post-revolutionary institutional arrangements 
around the corporatist state and an ambitious agrarian reform (Domingo 1999). The 
Mexican constitution was arguably one of the most progressive charters in the world 
when it was written. Article 123, for example, gave workers the right to organize and to 
strike against employers, while in article 3, the state assumed the responsibility of 
educating every child through elementary school. Furthermore, article 27, which talked 
about land redistribution to the poor, was the basis of one of the most ambitious, if in the 
end not fully successful, agrarian reforms ever implemented in Latin America.    
All these goals established by the Constitution gave the political regime that 
emerged from the Revolution a legitimacy to act on behalf of the different social sectors 
integrated in its corporatist structure even though it lacked democratic legitimacy 
obtained through electoral processes. For many years, social justice framed the idea of 
citizenship, and was the major promise in governmental discourses. By 1982, when the 
“Mexican miracle” stop producing economic growth and the country entered into a deep 
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economic crisis, the goal of social justice got somewhat lost as the state no longer had the 
necessary resources to reproduce its corporatist and clientelist alliances with different 
sectors of society. In this moment the notion of democratic rights started finally to 
become the core idea of citizenship. From then on, the national debate centered on 
opening the political system to include formerly excluded actors and political parties, a 
situation that was facilitated by electoral reforms implemented in 1977 with the goal of 
permitting a viable opposition42. Young people, the middle class, and urban groups, even 
if not well organized, called for a greater voice in the polity. By the late 1980s early 
1990s, this same agenda had been adopted by emigrant organizations that represented a 
sector of the population historically excluded not only from the polity but also from 
national development projects. 
The event that marked a turning point in the way Mexicans abroad related to the 
Mexican political system was the 1988 election. Until then, expatriates had not 
articulated any specific political demand towards the Mexican state. Although a few 
years earlier there were attempts by Chicano political activists to organize the Mexican 
community in the United States around a demand for democracy in Mexico, they were 
not very successful, probably because they centered on an abstract agenda (Dresser 
1993). The political campaign that preceded the 1988 presidential election gave them, in 
contrast, a concrete political agenda: to participate in Mexico’s democratization process 
by helping Cuahtémoc Cárdenas, the candidate of the Frente Cardenista or Cardenista 
Front, to win the presidential elections against Carlos Salinas, the PRI candidate. Visits 
                                                 
42 The electoral reforms of 1977 had the goal of facilitating the representation in Congress of opposition 
political parties. These reforms were implemented after the elections of 1976, when the PRI presidential 
candidate did not have any competition for the presidency, a situation that marked a major political crisis 
for the PRI since it showed how meaningless were Mexican elections. In practice this elections facilitated 
the creation of Mexico’s modern party system.   
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by Cardenas to California during his campaign helped mobilize expatriates who formed 
various groups to support him.  Expatriates supported the Frente Cardenista because they 
saw in it a sign of political change in Mexico; specifically, the possibility of participating 
in Mexico’s political life as individuals and not through the mediation of corporativist 
institutions43. 
Those who mobilized in favor of Cárdenas belonged to a sector of dissatisfied 
expatriates that had emigrated in the 1980s as a result of Mexico’s economic crises and 
had a profile different from the one that had characterized Mexican emigrants of previous 
decades (Dresser 1993, p. 99). This sector included electricians, mechanics and people 
with higher levels of education, many of whom were already politically active in Mexico 
through their participation in unions and student or professional organizations. In other 
cases members of this group had acquired some political experience in the United States 
through participation in pro-immigrant and labor rights organizations 44.  A large number 
of the members of this sector had achieved a stable legal and socio-economic status in the 
United States that facilitated their participation in political causes. This sector was not 
organized prior to 1988. Cárdenas’ political campaign, however, and later on the 
relationship they built with the Party of the Democratic Revolution which succeeded the 
Frente Cardenista, finally gave them concrete reasons to organize and to articulate new 
demands of the Mexican state. By the 2000 election people within this sector also 
provided important support from the United States for Fox’s campaign for the 
presidency. 
 
                                                 
43 Author interview with Carlos Olamendi, October 11, 2001 in Orange County, California. 
44 This information is corroborated in the individual profiles of those that supported Cárdenas described by 
Martinez Saldaña (2002, p. 215-218). 
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3.2.2. Institutional actors and legal arrangements 
 Institutions and legal arrangements in the home country determine the channels of 
access for emigrants. These include availability of citizenship rights for expatriates, 
specifically political rights such as the right to vote and to hold political office. They 
include the relationships of emigrants with their homeland state institutions and political 
actors such as the executive and legislature at the national and local levels, the electoral 
authorities, and political parties. In addition they include debates about centralism and 
federalism as well as the ways in which the dismantling of the developmental institutions 
of the state has transformed the relationship between émigrés and the Mexican state.  
3.2.2.1 Mexican Citizenship and the Incorporation of Mexicans abroad 
 The ways citizenship has been structured in Mexico’s constitutional and legal 
arrangements has clearly determined the type of political mobilization that emigrants 
have articulated towards their homeland, as well as the extent to which they have been 
able to assert political influence in their country of origin.   
As was seen in the previous section, the acceptance of emigrants and Mexican-
Americans as members of the Mexican nation did not imply their access to full 
citizenship rights. When reforming the nationality laws to allow dual nationality, 
Mexican authorities were particularly careful to differentiate between nationality and 
citizenship, a distinction that already existed under Mexican law. As Becerra Ramírez has 
pointed out, under Mexico’s constitutional law nationality is a broader concept that binds 
an individual to the Mexican state; citizenship, in contrast, is one aspect of nationality 
that “signifies the eligibility of nationals to participate in governance through the right to 
vote and hold office” (Becerra Ramírez 2000, p. 314).  
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When the Zedillo administration devised the idea of reforming Mexican 
nationality laws to allow dual nationality, his administration had the goal of facilitating 
the naturalization in the United States of Mexicans who were eligible for U.S. citizenship 
but did not obtain it due to fear of losing their Mexican nationality (and with it some 
economic rights in Mexico such as their property rights in communal lands or ejidos). In 
addition, the reform had two additional goals: gaining back the loyalty of those Mexicans 
who had naturalized already as American citizens by allowing them to recover their 
Mexican nationality; and cultivating the loyalty of Mexican-Americans by giving them 
the right of obtaining Mexican nationality and with it the possibility of acquiring property 
in places restricted to Mexicans45. The universe of this reform was thus clearly limited to 
Mexicans who had already acquired United States citizenship or were in a position to 
acquire it, and to Mexican-Americans, that is people of Mexican descent born in the 
United States. For this reason Mexican authorities did not consult the general Mexican 
community in the United States about their views but only Mexican-American 
organizations, and a few first-generation Mexican organizations (Santamaría Gómez 
2001). 
Although Zedillo demonstrated commitment to grant Mexicans abroad a new 
status within the nation, his administration was consistently opposed to granting 
citizenship rights to expatriates46, a demand that had emerged since 1988 within Mexican 
communities abroad and was being supported by the Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD). The Zedillo administration perceived this issue as complex and as one that would 
                                                 
45 For a similar but broader description of these goals see de la Garza (1997). 
46 In 1998, however, during a visit to California, Zedillo declared that he was not opposed to the right to 
vote from abroad, “a thing that opened for us the hope that we would be able to exercise that right for the 
2000 presidential elections.” Author’s Interview with Carlos Olamendi, October 11, 2001. 
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galvanize a lot of opposition inside his own party and from other sectors of the country’s 
political and intellectual community. His government’s opposition to voting rights for 
expatriates had many bases.  First, it was widely assumed by his government and many 
members of the PRI that if elections were conducted among the Mexican community in 
the United States, they would be lost to the opposition47 because the vote from abroad 
would be punitively directed against the PRI.  Even though the government apparently 
conducted a survey that showed that the electoral preferences of Mexicans abroad were 
no different from those of Mexicans in Mexico48, there was widespread concern that 
emigrants would vote against the PRI.  Second, there was a technical issue: the 
implementation of an electoral process abroad would be expensive and challenging 
considering the large number of Mexicans living in the United States, their distribution 
across the territory, and the difficulty of estimating their exact numbers since many of 
them were undocumented. A related consideration was that there were also doubts that 
Mexico’s electoral laws could be effectively implemented and enforced beyond Mexico’s 
territory, a situation that would limit the legitimacy of the electoral results from outside 
the country.  Third, there was a nationalistic concern. Granting political rights was seen 
as possibly affecting Mexico’s sovereignty since the number of potential voters abroad 
was huge as compared to other countries that allowed emigrants to vote. Thus they had 
the capacity of deciding elections without residing permanently in Mexico and, therefore, 
without having to face directly the consequences of their electoral decisions49. This 
                                                 
47 Ross Pineda has argued that in private conversations with PRI Congressmen they expressed that fear 
(Ross Pineda 2000).  
48 This survey was mentioned to Raúl Ross Pineada in personal conversations with the presidential adviser 
José Luis Barros Horcasitas (Ross Pineda 2000).  
49 Many of these concerns, particularly those regarding the challenges to Mexico’s sovereignty that the 
new relationship with Mexicans abroad would imply were already present since the reforms to the 
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concern grew once the dual nationality laws were implemented in 1998 since American 
citizens would now have the right to vote and possibly decide electoral outcomes50. 
Finally, there was a foreign policy dimension. Mexican authorities were well aware that 
to implement an electoral process of the size and magnitude of the one Mexico would 
have to conduct in the United States would require the collaboration of American 
authorities at the national and local level. This certainly would require the negotiation of 
some kind of agreements for which Mexico would have to pay a price in detriment to 
other foreign policy goals with that country (Zárate 2004). In addition, there was also the 
fear of how American authorities and American public opinion would react to a Mexican 
election conducted on US soil. Would immigration authorities detain undocumented 
emigrants when they went to vote? Would American public opinion turn against 
naturalized Mexican immigrants by questioning their loyalty to the United States?  
Many of these questions had no direct answers until some serious research was 
conducted or until electoral processes were actually implemented beyond Mexico’s 
territory. Despite this, the movement in favor of granting emigrants the right to vote from 
abroad continued to gain strength51.  In the context of a vital democratization process, the 
emigrants’ demand to vote from abroad was evaluated as a “historical debt” Mexico’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
nationality laws were designed and discussed. For instance, to avoid the existence of a large pool of 
American citizens that could have an inference in Mexico’s affairs over the years, the nationality laws were 
designed in such a way that Mexican nationality could not be transmitted by the jus sanguinis system for 
over a generation. The previous law allowed for the indefinite transmission of Mexican nationality to 
overseas generations, provided that members of the first generation did not naturalize as citizens of another 
country (Aleinikoff 2000; Becerra Ramírez 2000). 
50 This concern was expressed by many members of Zedillo’s administration and was clearly articulated by 
respected judicial analysts such as Jorge Carpizo and Diego Valadez (Carpizo 1999; Valadéz 1999).  
51As will be seen later on, the first political party to take as part of its agenda promoting the right to vote 
from abroad was the PRD. For almost all the 1990s this was the only party that officially supported this 
cause. The PRI in contrast was completely against, while the National Action Party (PAN) assumed a 
neutral position. By the next decade in a context of increased political competition all three political parties 
were advocating in favor of granting the right to vote from abroad.  For arguments by Mexican scholars in 
favor of the right to vote (Silva-Herzog Márquez 1998; Calderon Chelius and Martinez Saldaña 2002; 
Zárate 2004). 
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democracy owed them (Zárate 2004). Mexican emigrants, they argued, did not leave the 
country voluntarily but as a result of years of authoritarian rule and disastrous policy 
making. Mexico’s democratization process could not, therefore, be completed until they 
were incorporated into the political system.  
Notwithstanding Zedillo’s opposition, his administration tacitly approved the 
concept in April 1996 by signing as a witness of honor the “Bucareli Table” accords in 
which Mexican political parties and authorities agreed to reform Article 36 of the 
Constitution to facilitate the vote in presidential elections outside of Mexico’s territory. 
The reform, which was finally approved in Congress on July 31st of the same year, 
included the elimination of the requirement to vote in specific electoral districts for 
presidential elections. This would permit voting in any jurisdiction within or beyond 
Mexico’s territory.  This was not the main subject of the “Bucareli table” accords. The 
government’s main goal in these negotiations was to approve definitive reforms to the 
Federal Code for Electoral Procedures and Institutions (COFIPE) that would guide 
Mexico’s electoral processes from 1997 onwards. These negotiations were particularly 
difficult. When the time came to sign the main commitments one of the three main 
political parties in Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN), left the negotiation table as 
a protest against the government on issues not related with these reforms. Thus, the other 
two main political parties, the PRD and the PRI, stayed alone to finish the process. With 
the goal of keeping the PRD involved in the negotiations, the PRI accepted many PRD 
demands that under different conditions it would certainly have rejected including that of 
allowing the constitutional amendments to article 36 (Ross Pineda 2000). 
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The last point of the agreement as well as the subsequent reforms that allowed 
voting from abroad in presidential elections, passed, curiously enough, almost without 
public notice in Mexico.52 At the moment, the main news was the unprecedented changes 
that were to be implemented to the COFIPE, the most important of which was that the 
government agreed to hand over to civil society the complete control and implementation 
of Mexico’s electoral institutions and processes. This change was considered a crucial 
step in Mexico’s democratization process and one that would certainly have lasting 
consequences. There was not, therefore, a national debate over whether émigrés should 
vote in Mexico’s national elections and the subject was left unresolved because no 
procedure or legal framework was designed for its implementation. However, the reform 
to the Constitution did help mobilize Mexican political activists abroad, who now 
concentrated their energy on lobbying the authorities who could influence the further 
elaboration of the law. These included, specifically, the Federal Electoral Institute and 
Congress. Activists argued that the question was no longer whether Mexicans abroad 
should vote in Mexico’s elections, because that was now guaranteed by the 
Constitution53, but how to make it happen.     
On November 22nd 1996 a large package of changes to the COFIPE was finally 
approved. Within this package was a reform that had the apparent purpose of legislating 
the right to vote from abroad. However, the topic was considered so difficult and 
conflictive, that the reform actually delayed the possibility of implementing it, by 
                                                 
52 Jorge Carpizo a major constitutional scholar and one of the main opponents of the reform expressed the 
following on the subject: “Incredible! Incredible! And one thousand times incredible! The most important 
political issue in Mexico’s life in the last fifty years and it passed almost clandestinely through the 
legislative power (Carpizo 1999, p. 89) (translation is mine).”  
53 It is important to point out that the reform to article 36th of the Constitution did not make any explicit 
reference to the right to vote from abroad. It only opened its viability by eliminating the requirement that 
people had to vote for presidential elections in their respective district.    
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conditioning the elaboration of the necessary law 1) on the integration of the National 
Citizen Registry (RENACI), which would provide identity cards for all Mexicans, 
including those living abroad, and 2) on the establishment of a commission of specialists 
by the General Counsel of the National Electoral Institute that would conduct a study on 
the viability of implementing presidential elections abroad (Ross Pineda 2000).  
Because of the confusion created by this article, nothing happened for more than a 
year. The compilation of the National Citizen Registry was supposed to be done by the 
Interior Minister, but it could take a long time and the ministry was not doing anything in 
this respect, anyway. Additionally, it was not clear whether the commission of specialists 
could be established prior to the completion of the registry or after. One of the counselors 
of the Federal Electoral Institute54 (IFE) with close connections to political activists 
abroad, Juan Molinar Horcasitas, argued that since the original goal of the COFIPE 
reform was to grant the Mexican community abroad the right to vote, and the integration 
of the Renaci was only a means of achieving that goal, then if that became an obstacle it 
should be put aside. 
 On April 29, 1998 the IFE’s General Counsel approved the formation of a 
specialists’ commission to study the subject.55  The commission included 13 specialists 
from different academic disciplines. After six months they presented a long report in 
which they provided responses to the concerns expressed by members of the Zedillo 
administration and at the same time argued that the implementation of the 2000 
presidential elections abroad was viable and that there was no judicial, economic, or 
                                                 
54 9 counselors with voice and vote that belong to the civil society take the decisions within the Federal 
Electoral Institute.  
55 On April 24th of that same year Mexico’s interior minister recognized that the government had not the 
capacity to integrate the Renaci prior to the 2000 elections.      
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logistic condition that could deny the right to vote to Mexicans abroad. It also did not see 
any international obstacles to the vote (IFE 1998). 
The fact that the report was written by specialists without specific connections to 
any political party increased the legitimacy of the movement for voting rights from 
abroad. It also showed Mexican political leaders in the United States that the privilege 
might be obtained in the near future if they lobbied effectively. What had seemed in the 
early 1990s as an unrealizable dream was becoming a real possibility. In a mere few 
years Mexicans abroad were revalorized in national rhetoric and were allowed to keep or 
recover their Mexican nationality and with it important economic rights; the Constitution 
was no longer an obstacle to obtaining the vote from abroad because article 36 was 
changed with that goal in mind. Finally, there was a study commissioned by probably the 
most prestigious Mexican institution at the moment, the IFE56, and conducted by 
independent specialists, arguing that there were no legitimate reasons to deny Mexicans 
abroad the right to vote. It was now the turn of the Mexican Congress  to specify how this 
right could be implemented.  
Political parties that had been sharply divided in Congress found that after the 
report it was difficult to openly oppose the right to vote from abroad, even if they still 
may have had legitimate doubts57. The PRD was already openly in favor.  Other political 
parties, however, had not taken positions prior to the report. After it was released, the 
                                                 
56 In the late 1990s the IFE became a highly respected institution because of its independence from the 
government, acquired after the reforms to the COFIPE, at a time when many other state institutions were 
seen as dominated by an executive that represented still represented remnants of Mexico’s authoritarian 
history.  
57 The three main political parties have had different doubts about granting the right to vote to Mexicans 
abroad. Personal interviews with officials from the PRD and the PAN reveled that there have been constant 
doubts within those parties about what impact Mexicans abroad would have within their own structures as 
well as for Mexico’s general political process. This issue will be discussed further in the next section of this 
chapter.    
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PAN, which originally assumed a neutral position on the subject and had expressed some 
technical concerns about its viability, finally took a favorable position. The same 
occurred with Mexico’s smaller political parties. In the next year, members of the various 
opposition parties would introduce initiatives in the Congress seeking to clarify and 
advance the political rights of Mexicans abroad. None of these initiatives were approved 
due in great part to opposition from the PRI 58.   
For the PRI the situation became complicated. Many of the reasons presented by 
the party and the government to oppose granting emigrants the right to vote from abroad 
were publicly questioned by the specialists. One of the main problems created by the 
report, however, was that it argued that it was feasible to implement voting from abroad 
for the 2000 presidential election The party knew that these elections would be the most 
competitive it had ever confronted, and incorporating into the process a new constituency 
whose political behavior was yet unknown further complicated the situation for them. 
Furthermore, there were still highly nationalistic groups within the party that blatantly 
opposed granting political rights to expatriates since that could threaten Mexico’s 
sovereignty. 
There were, however, some members for whom it became clear that opposing this 
initiative might further galvanize Mexicans abroad against the party, with negative 
consequences for its candidates at the local and national level59.  On many occasions 
expatriates had appeared to influence the selection of candidates and the political 
                                                 
58 To see a good review of all the initiatives that have been introduced in the Mexican congress about the 
right to vote from abroad check the table “Agenda Legislativa en material Electoral de Voto de los 
Mexicanos en el Extranjero” on the IFE website: http:// www.ife.org. 
59 Members of the party from states that produce emigrants have had this picture clear for a long time. This 
is clearly the case of Senator Genaro Borrego, whom has been cultivating a strong relationship with 
emigrants since he was the governor of Zacatecas. 
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preferences of family members and communities of origin even if they were not yet able 
to vote. Furthermore, it was no secret that they could represent an important source of 
campaign funding, even if that was illegal under Mexico’s electoral law (Hughes 1993). 
Although the party had been cultivating a relationship with Mexicans abroad 
since at least the beginning of the 1990s through governmental policies and the creation 
of political committees in different cities (Dresser 1993; Hughes 1993), fear of the 
unknown consequences for the party and the country of granting emigrants the right to 
vote was substantial.  For this reason, on July 8th, 1999 the Mexican Senate, still 
dominated by the PRI, voted against an initiative proposed originally by the PAN and 
approved already in the lower house of Congress on April 29th that would have allowed 
Mexicans abroad holding a voting identification card to vote in the 2000 elections.   
Although this initiative was considered quite modest by the advocates of the cause, and 
would have created a limited number of potential voters, the PRI was not yet ready to 
accept it. 
The party’s attitude changed after the 2000 presidential elections. Although many 
members may still have had doubts about the wisdom of granting political rights to 
emigrants, few were willing to express them openly. The support that the campaign of 
Fox received from Mexicans abroad, both financially and politically, made it clearer than 
even though emigrants could not vote they were already important political actors that 
had to be taken into consideration. Both the PRD in 1988 and the PAN in 2000 had 
assiduously and effectively cultivated the support of Mexicans living in the United States 
for their presidential candidates. The PRI was now willing to take advantage of that 
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support as well, as was reflected in the fact that many members of the party became 
major advocates of granting political rights to expatriates60.  
3.2.2.2 Citizenship after the 2000 Presidential Elections 
    Since the 2000 presidential elections no political force in Mexico has been 
openly opposed to granting political rights to emigrants, such an attitude becoming 
“politically incorrect”.  If anything, politicians and analysts were arguing that the 
procedures to finally implement Mexico’s electoral processes abroad would have to be 
thought out with care, so that Mexico’s sovereignty would not be affected (Gomez Mena 
2004).  During 2003 and 2004 Mexicans abroad obtained unprecedented attention from 
Mexican officials.   Senators, deputies, executive officials at the national and local level, 
IFE counselors, and leaders of political parties not only received the many delegations 
that emigrants sent to Mexico to lobby for the vote, but they also visited various 
Mexicans communities in the United States and made promises that they would fight for 
their cause61.  
On February 22nd, 2005, in a context in which all political parties were looking 
ahead to the 2006 presidential elections, and in which the relevance of the expatriate vote 
was magnified (one estimate was that at least four million Mexicans abroad held voting 
registration cards (Medrano 2005)) political parties in the Chamber of Deputies approved 
with almost complete unanimity a new bill that granted expatriates the right to vote in 
                                                 
60 See as examples the following newspaper articles (Cardenas 2002; Irizar 2002; Ochoa 2002; Ochoa 
2003). 
61 In a meting I attended for this research in October 2003 in the Mexican Consulate in New York City the 
PRI governor of Oaxaca, José Murat told Mexican leaders in the area that he not only supported the right to 
vote from abroad, but also the creation of a sixth circumscription that would that allow Mexicans abroad to 
be elected to the Mexican Congress. Curiously enough, this last demand had not yet been clearly articulated 
within the Mexican community in the area (this demand had been mostly articulated from Chicago and Los 
Angeles). In other words, the governor was mobilizing them towards goals that went beyond their political 
expectations towards Mexico. 
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presidential elections. This law contemplated the implementation of the electoral process 
abroad in terms similar to elections in Mexico. Political parties would be free to 
campaign everywhere and voters could use voter registration cards issued and ballot 
boxes installed where voters resided.  
The approval of this bill produced many reactions. For the first time the Mexican 
public became aware of the potential impact of expatriates on Mexico’s political life. 
Many analysts called it irresponsible and in the Senate, where the bill next went, various 
members declared that they would not approve it in its current form. In the end, the 
Senate modified the bill and on July 1, 2005 a new version with many limitations was 
approved again in the Chamber of deputies. This law finally granted expatriates the right 
to vote in presidential elections, but only through mail. In addition only those that had 
voter identification cards issued in Mexico and that expressed in advanced an interest to 
participate in the election would be able to vote, a condition that effectively excluded 
those expatriates that could not travel to Mexico on the specified dates to obtain it.  These 
limits imposed for the participation of expatriates had probably the implicit goal of 
reducing the size of the potential electorate and thus diminishing the effects of émigré 
enfranchisement on Mexico’s political stability. However, by establishing negative 
incentives for the participation of emigrants in the electoral process the new law also lost 
a large part of its democratic appeal, which had been its main justification in the first 
place62.  
                                                 
62 As Bauböck has explained, temporary absentees and emigrants who are allowed to vote in their country 
of origin do not in fact enjoy exactly the same franchise as domestic residents, because voting from abroad 
creates many hurdles that a citizen in its own country does not have to face, such as having to go to the 
closest consulate or express in advance his or her interest to vote. This situation creates a process of self-
selection, which separates those expatriates with the greatest interest in their homeland (those who usually 
do everything to vote) from those with the less interest to participate there (those who would not incur any 
cost). In this scenario the participation of expatriates in their homeland’s political life becomes more 
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Despite this fact, the law allowed Mexicans residing abroad to have access to dual 
citizenship rights, even if in the perspective of many activists they were not full 
citizenship rights. For this reason, the approval of the law can be considered historic and 
demonstrates not only the increasing level of receptiveness towards emigrants of the 
Mexican political system but also the growing political influence that they have acquired 
in their homeland in the last decade.     
3.2.2.3 The Policy Process and the Incorporation of Expatriates 
 During the nineteenth century, the Mexican state had limited control of its 
northern frontier. Since the country was still struggling with state formation and national 
integration, events that took place in its Northern territories, which were far away and had 
a small population, “remained little more than afterthoughts” (Gutiérrez 1999, p. 484).  
When the United States annexed Mexico’s Northern territories in 1848, there was some 
concern about the future of those Mexicans that were left behind. For this reason the 
Mexican government attempted to negotiate the best terms for them with the American 
government when giving up the territories and allowed them to keep their Mexican 
nationality. After that, however, there was not much involvement on the part of the 
Mexican authorities in their future. During that period and until the first decade of the 
twentieth century, those Mexicans that remained behind as well as their descendents 
struggled to adapt to their particular situation in their new country and developed a new 
                                                                                                                                                 
justifiable within a theory of Republican citizenship, because those that participate tend to have greater 
stakes there (Bauböck 2005a).  The Mexican case, however, is more complex because a large share of the 
Mexican emigrant population leaves the country without documents and resides illegally in the receiving 
country. This means that many of them do not probably carry voter identification cards issued in Mexico, 
which are a requirement for their participation. In this regard, the obstacles established by the law to the 
participation of émigrés will certainly have the effect of cutting the participation of emigrants across social 
classes. Those that are better off and have a legal status have greater chances of participating than those that 
reside illegally in the United States. Because to a great extent the extension of political rights to émigrés 
has been justified by Mexican authorities as an attempt to include those persons that left the country due to 
lack of economic opportunities in Mexico, the democratic legitimacy of the extension is reduced.      
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identity highly determined by their particular circumstances. These circumstances were 
characterized by a widespread discrimination from the American society because of their 
Mexican origin. Therefore, except for a white elite which was able to easily integrate into 
the American society through intermarriage and other means, most of them were 
segregated in barrios and rural-colonies where they spoke Spanish, and continue to 
practice their family customs (Gutiérrez 1999).  
 On the eve of the Mexican Revolution many Mexicans migrated north, 
substantially changing the composition of the Mexican population in the United States.  
From that period and until the mid-1930s Mexican émigrés and people of Mexican origin 
that were already living in the United States were highly involved in Mexico’s political 
developments. This was related to the fact that Mexican politics at the time were not only 
played in Mexico’s territory but also north of the border, among other reasons because 
many emigrants had left the country for political reasons.  Dissent against the 
authoritarian government of Porfirio Díaz was initially expressed from Texas, where 
many of his political enemies had taken refuge. From there too Francisco I. Madero 
promulgated the Plan de San Luis, which called for insurrection against the Díaz regime 
and marked the initiation of the Mexican Revolution.  
During the Revolutionary period, there was even more Mexican emigration to the 
United States representing different political and social extractions from the Mexican 
society. From there they followed the conflict, which on many occasions was extended 
inside American territory, since many military factions crossed the border to get 
armaments and financial support from expatriates. The latter not only provided the 
revolutionaries with financial resources, they also recruited troops, engaged in espionage, 
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distributed propaganda, and lobbied the American government to recognize the different 
governments emerging from the Revolution. This support for the Revolution came from 
both Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. Those opposed to the Revolution, many of them 
members from the old political and business class of the Díaz government exiled north of 
the border, were also politically active.  
The intensive participation of expatriates in Mexico’s political developments 
made it only natural that Mexican political and military leaders visited the communities 
north of the border and used them as a political arena to advance their agendas. 
José Vasconcelos, for example visited Mexican communities in California, New Mexico 
and Texas to launch his campaign against Ortiz Rubio, the official candidate of the 
already mentioned PNR.  Vasconcelos’ visits generated enthusiasm and support among 
many expatriates, particularly those opposed to the anticlerical governments installed 
after the Revolution. These people collected funds in his favor and elaborated a list of 
demands that included getting the right to vote from abroad if he won the elections which 
he did not63.  
 The different Mexican presidents who governed during this early period of the 
twentieth century did not have a specific policy towards Mexicans abroad. They however, 
made some efforts to control emigration to the United States, which became a major 
national concern particularly because the size of the Mexican population diminished 
considerably due to the revolutionary wars (Corwin 1978).   Even though there was not a 
coherent government policy, the political mobilization of Mexican expatriates stimulated 
by the Mexican Revolution had its impact in the United States.  The liberal ideas that 
flowed from the revolutionary movement and that were integrated into the Mexican 
                                                 
63 A full recount of these events appears in Santamaría Gómez (2001). 
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Constitution of 1917 influenced the attitudes of expatriates towards their host country. 
Mexican consuls of the time became active in organizing the community north of the 
border and encouraged immigrant workers to establish liberal clubs in the United States, 
unionize and demand better working conditions.   These activities were obviously limited 
in scope (Corwin 1978). 
During the Great Depression, a large number of Mexicans in the United States 
were deported back to Mexico. This situation along with a new highly nationalist and 
inward looking attitude on the part of Mexico’s elite marked a decline in the interactions 
between Mexican political actors and the expatriate community. For more than forty 
years, the Mexican government did not interact with Mexicans in the United States, 
except when defending the rights of Mexican laborers, who were seen as highly 
vulnerable to the exploitation of Anglo employers64. Therefore, expatriates and Mexican-
Americans alike turned their attention to the United States.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Mexican government avoided any intervention in the 
Chicano Movement. When the leadership of that movement visited Mexico to request 
support from the Mexican government they received no response, a reception that 
generated resentment and distrust towards the Mexican authorities. Despite that, Luis 
Echeverría (1970-1976) took the most active interest in expatriate colonies since the 
government of Lázaro Cárdenas and in the summer of 1972 toured Mexican-American 
communities (Corwin 1978). 
                                                 
64 It is important to remark, however, that there was some relationship between the government of Lázaro 
Cárdenas and the Mexican community abroad (although there were no defined policies towards expatriates 
during his administration). Therefore, the oil expropriation in 1937-38 generated an important support from 
the Mexican community in the United States to this policy.   
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This trip created a strong impression on President Echeverría who “found himself 
besieged by mojados asking el jefe for a contract labor program, or some form of 
legalization” (Corwin 1978, p. 197). As a result, he supported the establishment of a new 
labor accord between Mexico and the United States but by 1974, when it became evident 
that the American government would not accept such an idea he abandoned that plan. 
Influenced by new advisers like sociologist Jorge Bustamente who insisted that Mexico 
should not subsidize American economic imperialism with a cheap labor program, he 
then followed the policy of protecting by any means possible undocumented workers and 
their families already in the United States.  
Echeverría’s government also made the first efforts to understand the reasons 
behind Mexican emigration to the United States. For this purpose, he created a 
commission65 in 1972 to study the subject. Thanks to the data produced by this 
commission, remittances were regarded, for the first time, as a pillar of the Mexican 
economy. After that, Mexican authorities focused on guaranteeing that they continued to 
flow into Mexico, a goal that would drive, in later years, the policies implemented 
towards Mexicans abroad.        
At the end of his administration, Echeverría met with the leadership of the 
Chicano movement in San Antonio, Texas.  Afterwards, the government established a 
limited scholarship program for Mexican-Americans to study in Mexican universities and 
offered to promote cultural events in the United States oriented towards the Mexican 
community. In the end, however, these proposals were limited in scope and did little to 
                                                 
65 The full name was Comisión Intersecretarial para el Estudio del Problema de la Emigración Subrepticia 
de Trabajadores Mexicanos a los Estados Unidos de America.  
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establish a working relationship between the Mexican state and the Mexican community 
in the United States.   
 Echeverría’s successor, López Portillo (1976-1982), implemented few public 
policies towards Mexicans abroad.  Perhaps the most important was an attempt to have a 
more systematic relationship with Chicano organizations by creating the Comisión Mixta 
de Enlace (Mixed Linking Commission), a body that promoted various meetings between 
those organizations and the Labor Ministry to discuss topics related to emigration to the 
United States. However, neither López Portillo nor Miguel de la Madrid, who succeeded 
him in 1982, attempted to establish a relationship with the first-generation Mexican 
community in the United States. Their timid rapprochement was only with Mexican-
Americans. This can be explained by two facts: (1) first-generation Mexicans were not 
yet organized, and the Mexican government did not have any specific interest at the time 
in organizing them, and (2) they were not considered a settled community in the United 
States but only temporary migrants.  
When the American president Carter proposed a double amnesty plan that would 
grant permanent immigrant status to all illegal aliens who had resided in the United States 
before January first, 1970 and a non-deportable alien status to those that had taken up 
residence between that date and December 31, 1976, the López Portillo administration 
responded skeptically. Even though his government had expressed a desire to solve the 
problem of illegal immigration, which was seen as a national crisis, the proposal offered 
by Carter was not attractive. As Corwin reports, Mexican authorities were concerned that 
this program could force or induce   
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hundreds of thousands of perennial workers, as well as countless of family 
members already surreptitiously over the line since 1970 to settle permanently on 
the American side, thus eventually cutting down income flow to Mexico and 
accentuating a problem in Mexican identity (Corwin 1978, p. 212).       
 Permanent residency was seen as a potential threat to the continued flow of 
remittances to Mexico66. This view, however, was not officially expressed and the 
Mexican government avoided taking any position on the different amnesty proposals 
introduced in the American Congress between the 1970s and early 1980s67.  When in 
1986 the United States Congress finally approved an immigration amnesty that benefited 
3.5 million persons, more than half of whom were from Mexico, the Mexican 
government had no choice but to deal with the new reality: a large share of Mexicans 
abroad would likely settle with their families in the United States and, as a result, would 
probably send less money to Mexico. This situation pointed towards the need of a new set 
of policies that would help guarantee loyalty to Mexico on the part of the expatriate 
community as well as the continuous flow of foreign currency. During the 1980s, 
however, the Mexican government was not ready to develop a concrete program in that 
direction. 
The relationship with Mexican-Americans and first generation Mexicans in the 
United States was finally institutionalized during the administration of Carlos Salinas 
(1988-1994) when in 1990 his government created the Program for Mexican 
                                                 
66 Mexican officials may have also been opposed to Carter’s double amnesty plan, because that program 
was opposed by the major Mexican-American organizations which saw in this and other proposals 
introduced in Congress during the 1970s a limited solution to the problem of illegal immigration. As de la 
Garza (1997) points out, in 1978 Mexican-Americans suggested Mexican officials to work with them to 
opposed proposed immigration reforms introduced at the time. Although the Mexican government refused 
to work with them, due to fears of a negative reaction by the United States government, it is possible that it 
still attempted to be congruent with the Mexican-American position.      
67 Conversation with Arnaldo Torres, former leader of LULAC. May 21, 2004. Atlanta Georgia.  
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Communities Abroad (PMCA) within the Foreign Relations Ministry. Officially, the 
PMCA was established in response to a direct demand of Mexican-American 
organizations (Gonzáles Gutiérrez and Schumacher 1998; Gonzáles Gutiérrez 2003).  
Unofficially, it was also a response to the widespread support that Cárdenas’ 1988 bid for 
the presidency received among Mexican communities in the United States (Smith 1998b, 
p. 222) because the government realized the capacity of expatriates to mobilize towards 
their homeland with unpredictable consequences for the PRI.   
The PMCA had two implicit short-term goals. The first was to cultivate ties 
between the Mexican government and the Mexican-American community so that the 
latter could become an important ally in lobbying the American government at a time 
when Mexico’s foreign and economic policy goals had become more attached than ever 
to political developments in the United States (De la Garza 1997). The second was to 
formalize the relationship between the Mexican government and Mexican expatriates to 
mediate and control when necessary their influence on Mexico’s political developments.   
The program was to be coordinated by the 42 Mexican consulates and 23 cultural 
institutes in the United States. Its main tasks were to change the image of Mexican 
communities abroad in Mexico; to educate Mexicans abroad about Mexico, to help them 
establish organizations to acquire better representation in their adopted communities; and 
to collaborate with other institutions in the United States at the local and national levels 
to design and develop public policies that would help elevate the living conditions of 
Mexicans and people of Mexican descent (Gonzáles Gutiérrez and Schumacher 1998, p. 
190-191).  
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In this regard, the PMCA was presented as an instrument for cooperation between 
Mexico and the United States over long-term goals as well. The guiding idea was that by 
tightening the relationship with the Mexican community abroad, Mexico not only would 
strengthen the identity and sense of belonging of Mexicans on both sides of the border, 
but would also increase its economic and cultural ties with the United States. After all, 
both Mexico and the United States could benefit from the economic and social 
improvement of the Mexican communities in the United States (Gonzáles Gutiérrez and 
Schumacher 1998). The program would, thus, require an unprecedented negotiation with 
the American government at the local and national levels.  
This program has had many consequences for both Mexico and the United States. 
For example, it has contributed to the unprecedented mobilization of Mexicans towards 
their homeland as Mexican authorities (including consular officials and state governors) 
have encouraged expatriates to organize around organizations based on the place and 
state of origin. As a result the number of HTAs grew from a handful prior to the 1990s to 
more than 1000 by the year 2000. Although, HTAs and SFs were non-political, over time 
it became evident that they could exercise important political influence in local and sub-
national political processes on the identification of municipal and state budgetary 
priorities. Over the years, HTAs and SFs joined forces with expatriate political 
organizations that emerged independently to demand the right to vote from abroad (see 
Chapter 4).  
The PMCA was also a catalyst towards the 1997 dual nationality reforms and the 
consolidation of state offices that attend to émigrés (Gonzáles Gutiérrez 2003). Although 
the program did not achieve its original goal of converting Mexican–Americans into a 
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lobby that could advocate in favor of Mexico’s foreign policy goals, it certainly 
contributed to increasing the ties between the Mexican-American community and the 
Mexican government and has allowed their collaboration on common goals.     
In the year 2000, when Fox became president of Mexico, he established a 
structure parallel to the PMCA that created a lot of confusion in the relationship between 
Mexico and the Mexican communities abroad. This was the Presidential Office for 
Mexicans Abroad (POMA), which was established with the goal of giving émigrés and 
Mexican-Americans a privileged access to the president. It was headed by a Mexican-
American, Juan Hernández, who acted as an ambassador of the president to those 
communities. During his trips to the United States, Hernández constantly raised the 
expectations of the Mexican community by promising that they would be able to vote in 
Mexican elections soon, a promise originally made by president Fox, and by encouraging 
them to invest in Mexico under very privileged conditions. As Gónzalez Gutierrez 
explained, in contrast to the PMCA, whose actions were implemented through consular 
offices in a deliberately discreet form that avoided any direct interference in American 
domestic affairs, the activities of the new office were constantly publicized by Hernández 
and highlighted in the Mexican and American press (Gonzáles Gutiérrez 2003).       
In the end, the office achieved little, except for unrealistically increasing the 
political expectations of émigrés towards their homeland. On August 6th, 2002 President 
Fox eliminated the office and replaced it with the National Council for Mexican 
Communities Abroad in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Mexican expatriate organizations 
protested the decision and demanded an explanation. Why should they give up privileged 
access to the Mexican president and accept being assigned again to the foreign affairs 
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ministry?  This strained relations between the Fox administration and émigrés, which for 
two years had generally supported its governmental actions.  
The government explained that the new Council, which attempted to integrate the 
functions of the PMCA and the POMA would include as a central structure the Institute 
for Mexicans Abroad (IMA)68.  The institute would be governed by a 120-person 
Council, one hundred of whom would be elected from within the United States. This 
proposal generated again a lot of opposition among émigrés. Three groups were easily 
identifiable. First there were those that had been very active since the early 1990s in 
lobbying for the right to vote from abroad and that belonged to the CDPME. This 
organization had the greatest access to the Mexican government and had significant 
influence over the design of the IMA. Despite this, it took a cautious attitude towards the 
establishment of the IMA and some of its members complained that it had an 
authoritarian decision making structure in which émigrés would not have an independent 
voice. Political activists linked with the most left-wing sectors within the PRD composed 
the second group. Having promoted unsuccessful economic boycotts against the Mexican 
government as a means of getting political rights in Mexico, they resisted the creation of 
the IMA from the beginning, joining forces with a third group consisting of the presidents 
and former presidents of state federations and with Mexican businessmen from California 
and Texas, (some of whom were linked to the PRI). Together they signed the California 
Act69, which rejected the IMA and instead proposed the creation of an autonomous body 
                                                 
68 Interviews of the author with members of the Coalition For the Political Rights of Mexicans Abroad 
during September and October 2002.  
69 Personal conversations with the leadership of organizations from Zacatecas on May 2004 point out that 
the California Act was supported by the governor of Zacatecas, Ricardo Monreal, who along with the 
governor of Oaxaca José Murat, attempted to undermine Fox’s policies towards the expatriate community. 
These affirmations could be true considering that one of the main promoters of the Act was Manuel de la 
Cruz, the official representative in the United States of Zacatecas’ government.  
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made up of delegates from Mexican communities abroad according to state of origin, and 
having direct access to Mexican ministers and members of Congress.   
Although the Council was eventually set up, the widespread opposition and the 
contentious process of selection of candidates in different American cities put the 
government on the defensive and diminished the legitimacy of the new body.  Overall, 
this episode demonstrated the extent to which Mexican communities had become 
politicized in the last decade, thanks in large measure to the receptiveness that Mexican 
authorities had shown to them. 
3.2.2.4  The Role of Sub-national Governments 
 In the last two decades state governors and local authorities from areas that 
produce high emigration levels have interacted with expatriates as much as the federal 
authorities. For instance, prior to the creation of the PMCA, some governors such as 
Genaro Borrego from Zacatecas (1986-1992), were already visiting their expatriates with 
the goals of tightening ties with them and guaranteeing that remittances would keep 
flowing into their economies. These visits helped expatriates organize around their places 
of origin and motivated them to participate more actively in the economic and social 
development of their hometowns. Although originally these policies of rapprochement 
may have had the goal of controlling the political and economic participation of 
expatriates, eventually they also allowed emigrants to acquire greater autonomy vis-à-vis 
the governments of their states of origin and even the federal government. 
The active role played by sub-national entities in the incorporation of expatriates 
is directly related to the processes of deregulation and decentralization that the Mexican 
state implemented during the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the deep economic crisis the 
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country confronted after 1982. The dismantling of the developmental and interventionist 
state forced sub-national and local authorities to find new ways to finance the economic 
and social development of their regions. One path available for states that produced high 
levels of emigration was by tapping their population residing abroad. 
 For this purpose, the government of Zacatecas first established a program 
negotiated with the state federation of Los Angeles in 1992 called 2x1 in which every 
dollar invested by the organization would be matched by the state government and by the 
Federal government70. 
 Between 1993 and 1995 the federal government under the administrations of 
Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo, implemented the program Solidaridad 
Internacional or International Solidarity, which was the version oriented towards émigrés 
of the original Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program) or 
PRONASOL. This program worked along with the PCMA and institutionalized the 2x1 
model negotiated with Zacatecas (Goldring 2002). A few other governments took 
advantage of this program including that of Guerrero71.      
 When the International Solidarity program ended due in great part to a new 
economic crisis that started in December 1994, the state of Zacatecas kept implementing 
the program 2x1 through special agreements between successive governors, the federal 
government, and the Zacatecan Federations in the United States. The implementation of 
the 2x1 program brought important investment to the state, but also created tensions 
between the local political class and the emigrant community. A particular bone of 
contention was that municipal governments were forced to allocate parts of their budgets 
                                                 
70 Interview with the President of the Zacatecan Federation in Los Angeles, October 10th, 2001.  
71  Interview with a president of an organization from Guerrero in Chicago, October 5, 2001. 
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already designated to other priorities to the projects suggested by HTAs.  The 2x1 
program was giving emigrants political strength at the local and state level that 
represented a challenge to the clientelistic arrangements that had allowed the state to be 
dominated by the PRI for years without opposition. Émigrés established a system to 
guarantee the transparent dispensation of the funds and, in cases where they suspected 
corruption, immediately protested. This was not well received by local politicians.  In 
many municipalities émigrés started to influence the selection of candidates within the 
PRI itself and the emerging opposition parties and even became candidates themselves. 
   When Vicente Fox arrived in power, the Federación Zacatecana del Sur de 
California, as the Zacatecan Federation had been called since 1997, had become so 
strong that the president of the organization at the time, Guadalupe Gómez de Lara72, was 
able to get direct access to Fox. In February 2000, Gómez was invited to a meeting in 
Mexico about remittances and, in a public presentation, he told the president that the 
federation would raise 5 million dollars to invest in Mexico if the federal government 
matched this money through a 3x1 program. The president took the challenge seriously 
and a month later he traveled to California where he officially launched the 3x1 program, 
which became a signature policy of his administration. The attention given to Fox’s visit 
to California in the Mexican and American press transformed Gómez de Lara and his 
organization into an essential participant in any discussion that dealt with the Mexican 
diaspora or the role that émigrés should play in the economic development of their 
country of origin.  In the following two years he was invited to the White House and to 
meet with the minority leader of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. The 
                                                 
72 This information is based on an interview with Guadalupe Gómez on May 21, 2004, in Atlanta, Georgia, 
and a follow up of Mexican an American press in the last four years.  
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political influence Zacatecan émigrés acquired during years of constant dealing with the 
authorities of their state of origin was already being felt, for instance, in Zacatecas and 
Los Angeles. In 1998 the Federation of Los Angeles helped elect Ricardo Monreal as the 
first PRD governor of the state. For that purpose they created the Frente Civico 
Zacatecano (Civic Front) an organization with a specific political orientation, which 
originally emerged as a result of divisions within the federation between those supporting 
the PRI candidate and those supporting the PRD candidate. Since then the Frente Cívico, 
has also supported politicians in the United States.  
  Besides Zacatecas, other states have opened up opportunities for the participation 
of expatriates. Although the government of Guanajuato did not originally implement an 
ambitious program to encourage expatriate investment, after 1994 it turned to a more 
aggressive policy.  In September 1994, the first PAN governor from the state, Carlos 
Medina Plascencia, visited the large community of Guanajuatenses in Dallas and 
provided them with ten thousand dollars to help the city’s HTAs to integrate into a wider 
organization representing the whole state of Guanajuato, which was eventually called 
Casa Guanajuato. This money was used by the newly created organization as a down 
payment to buy a building for their headquarters. The governor who followed Medina 
Plascencia in Guanajuato, Vicente Fox, also provided on-going support for the 
organization. The strong relationship established between the leadership of Casa 
Guanajuato in Dallas and Vicente Fox, eventually translated into support from the 
Guanajuato community in Dallas for his campaign for the presidency in 2000. Although 
Guanajuatenses in Dallas have not acquired the level of political autonomy that has the 
organization of Zacatecans in Los Angeles, they have been able to exercise important 
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political influence in their communities and state of origin. In December 2001, for 
example, they protested the removal of a state official who previously had worked very 
closely with Casa Guanajuato in Dallas. As part of that protest they threatened to stop 
sending money back home through the 3x1 program in which they were participating. 
Eventually they accepted the governor’s decision, but not without an explanation and 
after causing adverse publicity in the press of Guanajuato and Dallas (Corchado and 
Sandoval 2001). 
 The examples of Zacatecas and Guanajuato show how the structures of 
opportunity for the participation of émigrés in their homeland’s political life have been 
created simultaneously at the national and the sub-national levels. State level policies 
towards expatriates may have had the original purpose of controlling the political 
attitudes of expatriates (Zacatecas) or establishing a stronghold for an opposition party 
within the Mexican community in the United States (Guanajuato), while at the same time 
motivating emigrants to invest in their states of origin. However, by helping emigrants to 
organize and by giving them a specific purpose they have also showed them that they 
have considerable political and economic strength.   
3.2.2.4.1 The National Governor’s Conference 
 Since 2000, when Mexico elected a non-PRI president for the first time in 70 
years,, the country has been confronting an uncertain process of institutional redefinition. 
One of the major subjects of debate has been the extensive centralism that still exists in 
Mexico even though the constitution describes Mexico as federal system.  In this context, 
sub-national authorities have demanded greater autonomy from the Federal government, 
and greater participation in the distribution of the national income. For that purpose, on 
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July 13, 2002, fifteen governors from different political parties formed the Conferencia 
Nacional de Gobernadores (National Governor’s Conference) or CONAGO.  
 During its meeting in Monterrey, Nuevo León on September 29, 2003, the 
organization passed a resolution asserting an independent role in the definition of 
Mexico’s policies towards Mexicans abroad.  This resolution emerged from previous 
attempts by different governors to establish a relationship with expatriate organizations, 
not only with those from their state.  The governor of Oaxaca, for example, organized an 
event in December 2002 in which governors, emigrant leaders and legislators declared 
that they would try to build the necessary consensus in Congress to grant expatriates the 
right to vote. Although further steps in this respect were probably never taken, governors 
that belonged to the CONAGO became very active in developing a relationship with a 
variety of Mexican organizations in different American cities. In this regard, the 
CONAGO become a space from which emigrants were able to exercise their influence to 
advance their political agenda in Mexico.   
3.2.3. Prevailing Elite Strategies/ Political Culture and Idioms. 
Mexico’s political system for many years presented a dilemma for scholars. In 
contrast to other Latin–American countries it was fairly stable since the 1930s and, 
although it had many authoritarian features, during the 1950s and 1960s some American 
academics believed that the country had a pluralist system, even if in a diminished form 
as compared with the US (Tucker 1957; Vernon 1963; Scott 1964).  By the 1970s a 
consensus emerged that the country had an authoritarian regime (Kaufman 1977; Reyna 
1977; Smith 1979), but even this regime was difficult to define, because authoritarianism 
in Mexico did not look like the authoritarianism established elsewhere at the time and 
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because many sectors of society had at least some form of representation within the 
system through the PRI’s corporatist structure. Whatever the political situation that led to 
Mexico’s unique political system, a few things were clear.  Conflicts among the elite 
were resolved within the system itself at least until the 1980s, and emerging political 
challengers were consistently co-opted through the corporatist structure of the state even 
as late as the early 1990s when signs that the country was moving towards a new regime 
were already evident. In addition, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s new electoral laws 
were developed to gradually allow the inclusion of an emerging opposition that could not 
be co-opted through the traditional means. 
Some sectors, however, were consistently excluded from the political system. 
These included people from the countryside, many of whom became emigrants. Some 
areas such as Mexico’s Central Plateau (which includes states such as Michoacán, 
Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas) were densely populated and this surplus population 
could not be absorbed into Mexico’s industrial development or into the agricultural labor 
force. As Corwin (Corwin 1978, p. 184) has pointed out, government officials and 
planners, but not the public, were aware of this situation, and for this reason they sought 
to select braceros from that region of the country with some success during World War 
II. The perpetuation of the migratory networks probably helped contain political conflict. 
In this regard, emigration became a safety valve for Mexico’s political stability.         
When Mexico liberalized its economy in the 1980s and 1990s, people from the 
countryside were still excluded from enjoying the fruits of economic development. Those 
that emigrated north, however, were thought by bureaucratic elites as crucial actors in the 
development of at least certain regions of the country and, as a result, the country’s 
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political and administrative elite sought to intensify its relationship with them. At the 
beginning, the Mexican government did what it knew best: it attempted to co-opt 
emigrants as a new corporative sector within the state. This strategy, however, did not 
work in great part because many émigrés had already been exposed to other forms of 
political participation more pluralistic in nature.  
 The new degree of political autonomy that emigrants developed after the 1990s 
demonstrated to Mexican authorities that it was necessary to develop new strategies to 
channel their participation in Mexico’s politics and economics.  
3.2.4. Contingencies of Time and Place 
A large part of the incorporation or reincorporation of émigrés into their 
homeland polity is determined by specific balances of power and the alliance structure at 
a given time. The composition of the party system, the relative strengths of certain 
political parties over others, and divisions within the elite at a given moment open up 
opportunities for the incorporation of emigrants that may not be available in other 
contexts. 
 For many years Mexico had a hegemonic party system in which electoral 
competition was almost none existent or very limited. By the 1990s, as a result of 
democratization, Mexico became a multiparty system with three main parties that 
together took 90% of the vote, though none managed alone to cross the 50% threshold. 
Elections held at the local and national level since 1997 have shown that the three main 
parties are highly competitive and have the chance to win elections. These processes, 
however, also have shown that swing voters, who represent around ten percent of the 
electorate, are the ones who decide most elections. In this regard, Mexico has now a 
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scenario of unstable political alignments, which is particularly promising for the 
incorporation of new political actors such as émigrés into the system. As Costain has 
pointed out, “unstable alignments indicate governmental weakness, which in turn lessens 
the costs for new movements to form” (Costain 1994, p. 24) and to participate. Since 
none of Mexico’s three main political parties can count on long-term majorities to win 
elections, Mexicans abroad may represent an attractive electorate even if only a small 
part of the potential electorate participates in the election.  
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that Mexican expatriates have been able to achieve high 
degrees of incorporation into their homeland polity. This has been possible after changes 
in Mexico’s citizenship and nationality laws, the implementation of a policy of 
rapprochement with those residing abroad, and the opening up of new spaces for the 
participation of emigrants as a result of democratization.  
 As new opportunities for their participation were gradually opening up, Mexican 
expatriates chose to follow an interest group strategy to push for even greater levels of 
incorporation—namely, the right to vote from abroad and the right to be elected.  
Although full incorporation has not yet occurred (as defined in Chapter 1)—Mexicans 
abroad cannot yet be directly elected for political office (although they can be elected 
indirectly through parties’ lists)—it is clear that they are more incorporated in their 
homeland polity than ever before.  
 The question remains what this incorporation will imply for Mexico; and whether 
this incorporation will increase the interest in participation of Mexican emigrants in their 
homeland. So far, only some sectors within the Mexican community have been politically 
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active towards their homeland. After the right to vote from abroad was approved, only 
56,749 persons registered to participate in the election, “about one half of one percent of 
all the adult Mexicans in the U.S. and fewer that two percent of the eligible voters 
registered for absentee ballots” (Center 2006).  The was probably the result of the many 
limitations that the law imposed to participate in the election, but also it reflected the lack 
of knowledge émigrés possess about politics in their home country (Center 2006). 
 Yet, it is too soon to conclude anything definitive about the ways in which 
Mexicans will participate in the political life of their home country.  The spaces for their 
involvement in their home polity have just been opened. It may well be that in later years 
a larger number of Mexicans will participate in their countries’ electoral processes, as for 
example is the case of Dominicans (Center 2006), or that only a few of them will keep 






Mexican organizations in the United States 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present an overview of the organizations that Mexicans in the 
United States have established in the last two decades. The evidence is based on a study 
of 34 organizations in four American cities: Dallas, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New 
York. These cities have large Mexican immigrant communities and represent different 
patterns and timing of migration flows and diverse political and socioeconomic settings 
(see discussion in Chapter 1).  
Mexican organizations have been extensively studied in the last decade, 
particularly by scholars interested in transnational activities(Gonzáles Gutiérrez 1995; 
Goldring 1998a; Smith and Guarnizo 1998a; Smith and Guarnizo 1998b; Smith and 
Guranizo 1998; Zabin and Escala Rabada 1998; Moctezuma Longoria 1999; Smith 
1999b; Smith 1999a; Fitzgerald 2000; Goméz Arnau and Trigueros 2000; Leiken 2000; 
Moctezuma Longoria and Rodriguez Ramírez 2000; Cano 2001; Goldring 2002; Rivera 
Salgado and Escala Rabada 2002; Moctezuma Longoria 2003; Smith 2003; Moctezuma 
Longoria In press). Most scholars concentrate on those based on the immigrants’ place of 
origin.  I build on this research, but also try to address some of its limitations. First, most 
of this literature deals with activities directed towards the home state73.  Furthermore, this 
                                                 
73 Exceptions are Zabin and Escala Rabada (1998) and Cano (2001) 
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literature has barely touched on the role these organizations are playing in the political 
aspects of incorporation of Mexicans abroad into home and host polities, since most of it 
is the work of sociologists and anthropologists with little interest in politics74. Second, 
except for a few specific cases (Martinez Saldaña 2002; Smith 2003), most of this 
research has not identified other forms of organizational life that Mexicans have recently 
built in the United States. This is problematic because post-IRCA Mexican immigrants 
have been organizing in more than one way.  If we conclude that organizations based on 
place of origin are the only ones that matter, we may miss much of their organizational 
life in the East Coast of the United States, where their strongest organizations are of 
another type.  
I selected three types of organizations that have been created and sustained by the 
Mexican government, as well as autonomously generated in the last two decades, and that 
have the potential of impacting migrant incorporation:  (1) Organizations focused on the 
communities and states of origin including home town associations (HTA) and state 
federations (SF); (2) political organizations; and (3) civic or service provider 
organizations.  
4.2 Research Methodology and Results 
While conducting this research it became evident that the membership and 
activities of these organizations tend to overlap. For example, members of SFs can also 
be members of civic or political organizations or vice versa.  In addition, some 
organizations considered here might be part of wider, less structured organizations that 
have other purposes. For example, various SFs may amalgamate into a council with 
                                                 
74 A few transnational studies have started to focus on the incorporation process in the host country, but 
none of them covers the Mexican case (Guarnizo 2001; Morawska 2001; Ueda 2001). 
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political purposes as happened in Los Angeles and Chicago, or into another organization 
with service provider purposes such as happened in Dallas.  In this regard the 
classification presented here represents a useful but not definitive tool to study the 
organizational life of the Mexican immigrant community in the United States. 
 I organize my data on first-generation organizations according to their 1) history 
2) mission and profile, 3) institutional strength 4) political leverage both towards their 
home and host countries and, 5) the role they are currently playing in facilitating or 
hindering the incorporation of Mexican migrants into the polities of both Mexico and the 
United States. Finally, I give a short review of the Consultative Council of the Institute 
for Mexicans Abroad, an important institutional innovation of 2002. The data that I will 
present about the council is based on a collection of internal documents, talks with its 
members and with Mexican officials that work for the institute, as well as my personal 
observations during its third ordinary meeting in Atlanta, Georgia in May 2004.  
4.2.1 Origins and History 
Data on the origins of immigrant organizations are relevant because they illuminate 
the extent to which immigrant groups have developed autonomously or have been shaped 
by state or non-state actors. Even when they were created autonomously, the activities 
and agendas of immigrant organizations may be affected or transformed as a result of 
their interaction with state actors both in their sending and receiving societies, as well as 
their enhanced access to political influence that was not previously available to them. As 
can be seen in Figure 4.1, while there has been a steady increase in the number of 
organizations since the 1970s, most of the organizations originated in the 1990s or later, 
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well after the implementation of IRCA and the adoption by the Mexican government of 
















Figure 4.1: Origin of organizations 
 
The only organization in my sample created in the 1970s was an HTA. I focused 
on SFs, but since most state federations are composed of HTAs, the heads of many of the 
SFs I interviewed also led HTAs and as a result I was able to gather the history behind 
some of these organizations as well. Their accounts were varied but the points in 
common were that some HTAs emerged autonomously (e.g. a trip to the hometown after 
many years led to the realization that there were a lot of things to improve) or were 
motivated by hometown political or religious authorities around the 1980s or early 1990s. 
Many of the original leaders of these organizations were Mexican immigrants who 
obtained legal status with IRCA or a few years prior to 1986.  Once established, the 
HTAs integrated into federations after the governor of their state of origin and/or 
consular officials in the cities where they resided suggested that they do so. Many HTAs, 
however, were organized after the Federations were established. The Federación 
Zacatecana del Sur de California (Zacatecan Federation of Southern California) the 
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oldest SF existent in the United States, for example, started with five HTAs in 1986 and 
by 2004 it represented 60. In this regard, once in place, SFs have motivated other people 
to organize around HTAs and join their ranks. In many cases they provide incentives to 
do so, because they give new leaders of HTAs knowledge about effective ways to invest 
in their communities of origin and may even be, for instance, the main intermediaries 
between the associations and local and sub-national authorities in Mexico.  Furthermore, 
as was the case of the Zacatecan Federations until 2003, they have monopolized the 
control of programs such as the “3x1” discussed in chapter 375.  Finally, SFs also give 
presidents of HTAs the chance to participate in wider and more influential organizations 
that can have greater political impact in their state of origin, and in some cases in the 
cities were they reside.   
   Figure 4.2 presents the main circumstances that led to the emergence of the 
first-generation Mexican organizations considered in this sample, while Figures 4.3, 4.4, 








                                                 
75 In 2003, when President Vicente Fox decided to institutionalize at the national level the 3x1 program 
followed until then by some states such as Zacatecas, it became possible for a HTAs or an individual 
immigrant to participate without having to belong to a SF. For some people interviewed for this research 
this situation may have had the effect of diminishing the strength of some federations such as those from 
Zacatecas.  
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A: Autonomously generated; B: Reaction to homeland-generated conflict; C: 
Reaction to host- state generated conflict; D: In conjunction/collaboration with sending 
state institutional organizations; E: In conjunction/collaboration with non-state actors; F: 
As a result of activities in host state 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Main factors leading to founding of first-generation 








A: Autonomously generated; B: As a reaction to homeland generated conflict; C: 




Figure 4.4: Main factors leading to founding of first-generation 











A: Autonomously generated; B: As a reaction to homeland generated conflict; C: 
As a reaction to host state generated conflict; D: In conjunction/collaboration with 




Figure 4.5: Main factors leading to founding of first-generation 








A: Autonomously generated; B: In conjunction/collaboration with sending state 
institutional organizations; C: a result of activities in host state 
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 As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the homeland state’s actions are directly correlated 
with the emergence of most of the organizations identified (47%), either by helping 
immigrants organize or by giving them reasons to do so (for example by involuntarily 
provoking a reaction from emigrants to a state policy). These data lead me to conclude 
that while host state actions (specifically the implementation of IRCA) have created the 
conditions for emigrants to organize, home state actions have played a more direct and 
consequential role.  
 This last assessment, however, is clearest for organizations based on place of 
origin and politics. Figure 4.5 demonstrates that most SFs and HTAs were created in 
conjunction with the Mexican authorities. For example, the Federación Zacatecana del 
Sur de California was created in 1986 with the support of Genaro Borrego, then the 
Governor of Zacatecas, while the Federación de Clubes Unidos de Zacatecanos en 
Illinois (Federation of United Zacatecan Clubs in Illinois) was created after a visit to 
Chicago in 1995 of Borrego’s successor, Arturo Romo Gutiérrez. Another example is 
Fraternidad Sinaloense (Sinaloense Fraternity) in Los Angeles, which was established in 
1991 after the local Consul, José Angel Pescador Osuna, encouraged people form Sinaloa 
to establish HTAs and then to amalgamate into a Federation.  The same scenario applies 
to all the other cases of groups based on place of origin.   
Figure 4.3 demonstrates that political organizations originated in reaction to 
homeland-generated conflicts including unpopular policies and the reluctance of Mexican 
authorities to grant voting rights from abroad. An example of an organization that has its 
origins in unpopular policies is the International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad (CIME), 
which was created in November 1999 after the Mexican government raised the deposit 
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for taking foreign vehicles across the border from $11 to between $400 and $800. This 
measure generated outrage among Mexican immigrants, including members of HTAs and 
SFs, since they often cross the border from the United States to Mexico with their 
American vehicles when visiting home. As a result of protests, the government withdrew 
the measure. Emboldened, some first-generation leaders, particularly in Dallas and 
Chicago, decided to create CIME as a first-generation organization separate from 
Mexican-American groups. CIME had a very strong take off because it was able to profit 
from the movement against the auto deposit. Nonetheless, divisions among its founders 
based on Mexican party lines have diminished its strength so that today it is a minor 
organization. Nevertheless, it was the first time first-generation Mexican immigrants 
organized themselves around a clear bi-national agenda.    
The Coalition for the Political Rights of Mexicans Abroad (Coalición por los 
Derechos Políticos de los Mexicanos en el Exterior) (CDPME) represents another 
example of a group created around homeland-generated conflict. Officially established in 
December 2001 with the purpose of agitating for the right to vote from abroad, it is 
composed in part by people who have been politically active towards Mexico since the 
late 1980s when Cuahutémoc Cárdenas campaigned for the presidency. Its membership 
also includes persons residing in Mexico with important political connections or 
academic posts, making it one of the most effective organizations lobbying the Mexican 
government.   
 The circumstances leading to the formation of an organization explain in great 
part its autonomy vis-à-vis the Mexican state. While HTAs and SFs have been closely 
linked to Mexican authorities from the beginning, political organizations tend to be more 
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independent (although some of their members may be close to specific political parties in 
Mexico). For instance, the origins of groups based on place of origin and politics reflect 
two different aspects of emigrants’ interactions with their homeland. While HTAs and 
SFs are an organizational model encouraged by the Mexican state, political organizations 
reflect the unintended effects of Mexico’s democratization process on the Mexican 
diaspora. Although political organizations have greater capacity to lobby in Mexico, 
some SFs have become very powerful as they have acquired greater autonomy from the 
Mexican state. SFs and HTAs may end up with greater influence than political 
organizations because of their larger bases and their considerable economic influence.  
Another possible scenario that has taken place already is the establishment of strategic 
alliances between different types of organizations.       
In contrast to organizations based on place of origin and politics, civic 
organizations (see Figure 4.4) tend to arise in reaction to an injustice in the host state 
usually committed by local authorities. Occasionally they emerged in collaboration with 
host state non-governmental institutions such as the Catholic Church or pro-immigrant 
coalitions based in specific cities. The Concilio Hispano (Hispanic council) in Chicago 
and Cecomex in New York, for example, were created as a response to perceived 
injustices against their founders or against others related to them. Meanwhile, Asociación 
Tepeyac, also in New York, was established in 1977 in collaboration with the Catholic 
Church in protest against the physical abuse of a Mexican restaurant worker by his 
employer. Because they were created as a result of host state-generated conflict, civic 
organizations tend to give most of their attention to the receiving country.     
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4.2.2 Mission and Profile 
4.2.2.1 Original Profile 
As can be seen in Figure 4.6, 42% of the organizations are based on place of origin of 
which three are HTAs, and the rest are SFs. Twenty-nine percent are political 
organizations76 and 29% are civic organizations. This sample does not represent the real 
composition of first-generation Mexican organizations in the United States. A truly 
representative sample would show that organizations based on place of origin are more 
common. Nonetheless, the sample presented here includes enough variation of 
organizational types to allow some comparison.  
 












                                                 
76 Two out of the 10 political organizations derive from state federations: basically they represent the 
integration of various federations in Chicago and Los Angeles. These are the Consejo de Federaciones 
Mexicanas (Council of Mexican Federations) or Confemex and the Consejo de Presidentes de 
Federaciones Mexicans en Los Angeles, California (Council of Presidents of Mexican Federations of Los 
Angeles, California). Since their goals are predominantly and explicitly political, I classify these as 
political.  
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4.2.2.2 Evolution of Profile 
 Even though many of the organizations had a specific and limited profile when 
they first emerged, over time many have evolved and acquired additional purposes. This 
is particularly evident for SFs and civic organizations. Of the ten SFs, eight were created 
to participate in the economic development of their state of origin (the remaining two, 
Casa Puebla in New York and Familia Nuevo León in Dallas, had from the outset more 
multidimensional profiles). However, the original mission has typically evolved with 
greater experience and more resources. Most of them now engage in various activities 
focused on the host state that are common to those performed by civic organizations. 
Besides the beauty pageants and similar events, which they carried out to raise money, 
they are now more directly preoccupied with facilitating the assimilation and 
incorporation of their members. Casa Guanajuato in Dallas is a good example. After 
acquiring a building thanks to the help of the government of Guanajuato, this group has 
been offering immigration advice, English as a Second Language classes and pre-
Hispanic dance and Karate lessons for children to keep them off the streets in an area 
where they are at high risk of becoming gang members. These activities are not only 
oriented towards members but the general Mexican community in Dallas, which has 
allowed this organization to profit from the professional and technical experiences of 
people not only from Guanajuato but from other places of origin as well.  To motivate the 
cohesion of the community, this organization presents exhibitions of artistic works of the 
Guanajuatense and Mexican population in Dallas, and celebrates cultural and social 
events over the year. The different Zacatecan federations are another example. The 
Federación de Zacatecanos del Norte de Texas (the Zacatecanos’ Federation of North 
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Texas) provides assistance to undocumented immigrants from the state and  identification 
documents in addition to the Matrícula Consular distributed by the Mexican consulates 
to facilitate opening bank accounts. In addition, it has conducted workshops with local 
banks to secure acceptance of these documents. The Zacatecan federations of both 
Chicago and Los Angeles are also active. Both offer university scholarships to children of 
Zacatecan immigrants and have created youth organizations.   
 Due to their non-profit status, many of these organizations avoid performing open 
political activities (this will be discussed in the next section). However, in interviews 
their leaders argued that they usually encourage members with United States citizenship 
to register and vote. Even if they have not adopted open political stances on American 
political issues, beyond the demand for legalization of the undocumented, SFs have 
provided the major grass-roots base for the movement in favor of the right to vote from 
abroad. Only two of the presidents of these organizations I interviewed opposed that 
measure. Since my fieldwork, these two have been replaced by new leaders supporting 
that cause. The debate about the right to vote from abroad certainly helped politicize 
organizations based on place of origin. Even if their members and leaders originally 
avoided politics--in some cases because of negative experiences in PRI-dominated 
Mexico--the possibility of voting from abroad gave rise to expanding expectations. It is 
not rare to see, for example, former presidents of these organizations, or even their 
current leaders, proposing themselves as candidates for the Mexican Congress through 
their inclusion in the candidate lists of the Mexican political parties77 even when they 
                                                 
77 For the 2003 mid-term elections in Mexico, Manuel de la Cruz, a former president of the Zacatecan 
Federation of Los Angeles became a candidate for Congress for the PRD through his inclusion in the party 
list.  The number of candidates on the list that are elected for office is a function of the share of the total 
vote won by the party. Another example is Gustavo Santiago, current president of the Federación 
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cannot be directly elected for political office at the national level. This door to 
participation in Mexico’s political life was opened during the 2000 elections when for the 
first time an expatriate from Los Angeles was elected to the Chamber of Deputies for the 
PRI.  In this regard, SFs have become political organizations even if they do not 
explicitly recognize it. The issue of the right to vote from abroad, however, is not the 
only factor that politicized them. Democratization in Mexico has meant that Mexico’s 
political parties have turned their attention to new constituencies. This is particularly 
clear for local and sub-national political candidates from the regions where large 
emigrant groups originate. As a president of a SF from Guerrero pointed out: 
the economic resources we are investing in our states of origin are too large not to 
be noticed by the political classes there. We have a great impact in what happens 
there and it is thus obvious that many politicians come to visit us in the United 
States with the goal of gaining our endorsement. 
For instance this endorsement has become essential for some political candidates. 
As another president from a Federation explained: “we clearly influence the political 
behavior of the people we have left behind in our towns of origin.”   
The constant visits from politicians to the SFs representing their states have 
certainly had an impact on those organizations. On the one hand, it has given them a 
concrete consciousness of their political power not only towards Mexico, but also 
towards the United States. On the other hand, it has divided them along party lines, 
threatening in some occasions their very existence. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oaxaqueña de Comunidades y Organizaciones Indigenas en California, who also proposed himself in 2003 
(although he was not finally selected) as a candidate for Congress on the PRI’s list.   
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In the same way that SFs have been adopting new political and social goals, civic 
organizations have also been acquiring a political profile. In their case that may be a 
natural step, since the many immigration problems they deal with every day have made 
them conclude that the solutions are ultimately political. These organizations have 
become active supporters of initiatives to regularize the immigration situation of those 
illegally in the United States. Some organizations have also been establishing links with 
first-generation political organizations and thus also became open advocates of the right 
to vote from abroad. 
4.2.2.3 Mexican Organizations: Exiles or Integrationists? 
 In his work on Turkish organizations in Germany Ogelman (2003) argued that 
most Turkish groups focus exclusively on their homeland, which he called an exile 
strategy. This was contrasted with an integrationist strategy focused on the host country. 
The explanation of the choice of an exile strategy is tied to the structures of opportunity 
available to Turks. While Turkey has been active in cultivating ties with its diaspora, 
Germany has made scant effort to facilitate their political incorporation; until recently 
(1998) even their offspring born in Germany could obtain citizenship only with great 
difficulty.  
 At first glance my research suggests that most Mexican organizations are strongly 
focused on their homeland: promoting the economic development of their places of origin 
or obtaining political rights in Mexico. Even civic organizations do not seem to be 
articulating a concrete political agenda in the United States even when much of their 
work is focused on helping immigrants improved their living conditions. However, 
having observed these organizations for more than four years, I doubt the veracity of such 
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a conclusion. Their profiles have been evolving and it is clear that as they become more 
institutionalized, more autonomous from Mexican authorities, and more conscious about 
their political power they are increasingly turning their attention to the host country. At 
the time I conducted my field work at least five of the eight traditional SFs had been 
courted by local politicians. Follow-up interviews show that interactions between local 
politicians and SF’s leaders are on the rise.  Furthermore, at least three of the ten political 
organizations demonstrate that Mexican immigrants are interested in incorporating in 
their host country. These include the Frente Cívico Zacatecano (Zacatecan Civic Front) 
based in Los Angeles and founded in 1998, the Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas 
(Council of Mexican Federations) or Confemex based in Chicago and established in 2003 
and the Consejo de Presidentes Federaciones Mexicanas en Los Angeles, California 
(Council of Presidents of Mexican Federations in Los Angeles, California) or CPFLA 
based in Los Angeles78 created in 2002. The first organization has pursued bi-national 
goals aimed at influencing political events both in Zacatecas and California.  The other 
two organizations are part of the SFs Mexicans have established in Chicago and Los 
Angeles, respectively. In both cases, they seek to advance the political interests of 
migrants in both Mexico and the United States. As the first president of Confemex 
explained,  
We in the federations were very focused on our communities of origin, and were 
forgetting about our lives in the United States. Now we want to focus on 
advancing our political interests in this country. We know that we do not have a 
                                                 
78 It is important to point out that all the state federations from Chicago and Los Angeles studied in this 
research belong to these new organizations.  
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lot of skills and resources to do so, but we will start local by supporting politicians 
in their campaigns for Congress, and by asking them to speak for our interests.  
Then he added:  “The first thing we need is an immigration amnesty, because without that 
we will not be able to solve all the other problems we confront in the United States.”  By 
2006, CONFEMEX was an active participant in the rallies in Chicago against the 
Sensenbrenner bill.  Members of the council in Los Angeles also expressed their intention 
to participate in both countries. They wish to create a strong political front that can 
advance the interests of Mexicans first in California and then, when they acquire more 
political skills, nationally, through the creation of alliances with organizations based in 
other states.  Furthermore, several political organizations that have been largely focused 
on Mexico (CIME, based mostly in Chicago and Dallas, Mexicanos Unidos, based in 
Dallas, and more recently CDPME) have also participated in lobbying campaigns for an 
immigrant regularization or amnesty program.  
Even though some organizations may be pure exile groups, some are also 
acquiring integrationist goals. Instead of being either one or the other, they are becoming 
truly bi-national. The main questions now are: What are their organizational resources?  
How effective are they in advancing their bi-national agenda?  
4.2.3 Resource Mobilization Capacities   
This section analyses membership and leadership structures and whether organizations 
have acquired a non-profit status and what implications this has. It also explores fund 




4.2.3.1 Membership Structure 
A survey conducted by Desipio et al. (2003) demonstrates that first-generation 
organizations have been unable to reach a large portion of the Mexican immigrant 
community. My research shows that membership varies according to the type of 
organization and fluctuates depending on specific events and circumstances. I also 
discovered, however, that the number of members does not necessarily correlate with 
their capacity to mobilize immigrants or to influence specific political events. Smaller but 
more cohesive organizations may have, sometimes, greater impact than larger ones.  
 The organizations with the most members are the SFs, although it is important to 
distinguish between active members and mobilizable constituencies. Most SFs are made 
up of HTAs, which usually send their main leader to represent them in front of the 
federation.  The membership of HTAs belonging to a federation thus represents the total 
membership of the Federation. The largest federation identified for this research is the 
Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, which had 60 members in 2004. In contrast, 
the smallest, the Asociación Potosina del Norte de Texas (Northern Texas Potosina 
Association), had only seven members. Federation leaders argued that the reach of their 
organizations depends not only on the number of individual members in each HTA, but 
the number of people that each of those members can influence. None of the 
organizations keeps a record of how many people belong to the HTAs that constitute their 
federations. This makes it difficult to know with certainty the number of people they can 
actually reach.  Most claimed to influence from one thousand for the smaller federations 
to twenty five thousand for the larger ones.  While these numbers are certainly 
exaggerated, it is nonetheless true that these organizations have considerable ability to 
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mobilize first-generation Mexican immigrants for specific political causes on both sides 
of the border, particularly because they rely on strong networks built around family and 
other long-standing relationships.  
 SFs have affected electoral outcomes in certain Mexican states and municipalities. 
Some of the interviewees admitted, for example, that they had encouraged their members 
to call their family members in Mexico to urge them to vote for Fox during the 2000 
Mexican presidential elections79. It is important to note, however, that the organizations 
that have real grass-roots bases are the HTAs and not the federations themselves. As a 
former president of a federation from Guerrero argued, the SFs are quite loose 
organizations whose strength depends on the vigor of the HTAs that belong to them.  
Other organizations based on state of origin but that do not operate as SFs have an 
obviously lesser impact within the Mexican community. These cases are sui generis and 
difficult to characterize. Some have an individual membership structure such as Durango 
Unido80 in Chicago that claimed to have 300 members, although only around 150 were 
active at the time of the research. La Familia Nuevo León in Dallas claimed 200 
members, although only around 8 were active. Others do not have an explicit 
membership structure. For example, Casa Puebla in New York falls into this category 
                                                 
79 There are still no studies evaluating the real influence that Mexican emigrants had on Fox’s and other 
sub-national and local elections, so it is difficult to conclude the extent to which SFs can influence 
elections. An article in the Financial Times about the gubernatorial election in Zacatecas in July 2004 
argued that emigrants had an important effect in helping the winning PRD candidate, Amalia Garcia, by 
placing thousands of phone calls to their family members living in the state from Chicago, Los Angeles and 
Dallas (Silver and Authers 2004). Also, it is worth noting that many political candidates from states with 
relatively high levels of emigration consider the federations as important actors which is reflected in the 
frequent visits they pay to those organizations during their campaigns. In some cases, furthermore, the 
leaders of these organizations have become political candidates themselves, for example Martín Carvajal, 
president of the Zacatecan Federation in Dallas, who became the PRD mayor of his hometown, Apulco, in 
2004.    
80 After I conducted my field work Durango Unido was divided and a new organization from Durango in 
Chicago emerged as the Federación de Duranguenses del Medio Oeste (see Chapter 6) 
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but nonetheless claimed to have 45 committees and to work with 36 organizations in the 
New York Metropolitan area.   
The political and civic organizations have less explicit membership policies and 
their influence within the Mexican immigrant community in the United States is much 
more difficult to evaluate. Some groups with an original political profile had an 
individual membership policy. This was the case of CDPME, which had around 50 active 
members, and Mexicanos Unidos, which had eight. Others had collective membership 
policies such as Confemex and the CPFLA.  
The CDPME is a fairly new organization that has acquired, nonetheless, 
important political standing in Mexico. Among other things, it was pivotal in the 
negotiation of the initiative presented by the Fox administration to the Mexican Congress 
to implement the right to vote from abroad81. It also lobbied for final approval of this 
measure.  Its influence is related to the educational backgrounds and political experience 
of its members82. The group’s activists live mainly in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Tucson. 
Others are Mexican scholars that have useful political connections in Mexico. Members 
engage in frequent exchanges through an internet discussion list that is open only to those 
committed to regular participation. Decisions taken there are presented for discussion by 
another internet group whose membership criterion is less restrictive. The leaders of 
                                                 
81 The main issues of the initiative (Presidencia 2004) to implement the right to vote from abroad were 
originally proposed by this organization. Also, prior to the presentation of the initiative in June 2004, the 
deputy Secretary of Interior, José Francisco Paoli Bolio, made various trips to the United States to 
“consult” the Mexican community. These trips were coordinated with the CDPME, which sent its members 
to each of the discussions in the different cities. This generated a lot of anger among the members of the 
political commission of the Consultative Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad since they were not 
brought into these discussions although the council was the official institution that the Mexican government 
established to mediate between émigrés and the Mexican state.   
82 This organization could not have exercised influence in Mexico if favorable political conditions had not 
existed. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is in a context in which many Mexican political actors and authorities 
have shown an interest in incorporating expatriates into Mexico’s political life   
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many organizations belong to the latter list, including state federations and civic groups. 
Through these activities CDPME helped forge a consensus among the emerging Mexican 
leadership around the need of obtaining political rights in the homeland.   
In contrast to the CDPME, Mexicanos Unidos in Dallas operates mostly locally. 
Although one of its primary concerns was to obtain political rights in Mexico, the 
organization lacked the leadership resources of the CDPME. With fewer members, most 
of its activities have had to do with the political participation of Mexicans in Dallas. On 
occasion the group joined demonstrations against the Mexican consulate and the Mexican 
government. Mexicanos Unidos has links with the PRD and helped the party establish a 
base in Dallas. Thus, the CDPME and Mexicanos Unidos are distinct associations, one 
with a national and the other a local scope.   
CPFLA and Confemex constitute yet another style of political organization. They 
grew out of the SF’s in Los Angeles and Chicago, respectively. Properly speaking, they 
are confederations and demonstrate the extent to which first-generation Mexican 
organizations have tended to overlap and develop links among themselves. In a way, they 
imply a process of maturation: their leaders have gradually realized that living conditions 
in Mexico and the United States will not change until Mexican expatriates get involved in 
political developments of both places.  These organizations have few active members. 
However, their potential influence is quite large if they are able to mobilize all the people 
that belong to the SFs and, by implication, the HTAs that make up these organizations. 
They produced position papers on political and economic developments in Mexico and 
the United States and they operated campaigns to mobilize the Mexican vote in Chicago 
and Los Angeles during the 2004 US presidential election.  CPFLA also played a 
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prominent role in mobilizing Hispanic voters in favor of Antonio Villarraigosa in 2005 
and was also a pivotal actor in the city’s pro-immigrant rallies on March and May 2006. 
The civic organizations identified in this research have much less clear 
membership policies. Usually, they have a staff of one to four persons who receive a 
salary or are volunteers (usually interns) that work regularly in the provision of services 
for immigrants. The Concilio Hispano in Chicago charges a reduced fee on the services it 
provides and the people that receive these services are considered members of the 
organization. Similarly, Cecomex, in New York, charges forty dollars a year for its 
services and those who pay are identified as members. In contrast, the Centro 
Comunitario Mexicano (Mexican Community Center) does not have a structured 
membership policy. An eight-person board of directors, which includes respected 
members of the Dallas Mexican community, takes decisions and provides services to the 
general community without requiring membership.       
  As is evident from these examples, civic organizations tend not to have members 
that clearly identify with them. Nonetheless, their direct contact with the immigrant 
community, particularly with the undocumented, gives them significant clout even 
though they are not very representative organizations. This facilitates their ability to 
organize the community around specific causes. For example, the president of Concilio 
Hispano was once able to gather more than three thousand people to demonstrate in front 
of the Chicago Tribune offices because of stories portraying the Mexican community in a 




4.2.3.2 Leadership Structure 
Organizations that elect their members democratically have a higher level of 
institutionalization because periodic changes of leaders indicate that the group can 
survive regardless of the specific personalities in charge. Democratic elections and the 
alternation of power also show that the organization can survive many of the divisions 
that leadership competitions generate. Furthermore, the election of leaders through 
democratic means reflects to a certain extent a process of learning of political values of 
the host country and, thus, some sort of incorporation into the adopted society. This is 
especially likely considering that most Mexican émigrés left their country when 
clientelism was the predominant characteristic of the political system. This assertion 
cannot, however, be taken too far because some types of organizations are more 
compatible with democratic structures than others. Furthermore, given that most of the 
work of these organizations is voluntary and carried out by people who have other jobs, it 
is clear than in some cases there are not enough people available to replace the current 
leaders. Many organizations are still in a formative period and are highly dependent on 
the work of a few.  If they retire, the probability of organizational survival is low.   
Regarding the leadership selection process, 53% of the organizations choose their 
leaders through some sort of democratic procedure, while 47% do not.  Of those that 
select their leaders democratically, 56% are based on place of origin, 33% are political, 
and only 11% are civic (see Figure 4.7). Among the organizations based on place of 
origin, the SFs tend to be most democratic. Although the data I produced here are too 
limited to support strong generalizations, I believe this is the case because they have a 
larger leadership pool, have received support from Mexican officials in writing 
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democratic constitutions, and since they are older have had more time to change leaders. 
Overall, SFs are the most institutionalized first-generation Mexican organizations.  
 









Most political organizations are issue organizations83 and depend on a few leaders 
who established them.  In general terms, the leaders of these organizations tend to think 
that no one is better qualified than themselves to run things and, therefore, there are no 
formal statutes governing leadership changes. However, some political organizations 
elect their leaders through some sort of democratic processes (Confemex and CPFLA in 
Chicago and Los Angeles, respectively). The CDPME does not properly elect its 
leadership through a democratic process, although every decision taken by the 
organization, including who should lead it, is amply discussed over the Internet.   
                                                 
83 In a follow up talk in July 2004 in New York City, a leader from the CDPME explained that they were a 
single-issue organization because “we have learned from the Americans that this is what works best to 
advance a specific goal. If we work with many goals at a time it is difficult to achieve anything.”  In 2006, 
after Mexicans abroad were granted the right to vote in presidential elections, this organization turned its 
attention to the US by issuing a proposal to reform the immigration system. 
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Civic organizations are the least democratic, probably because they require their 
leaders to be committed full-time to the organization. In some cases, such as Asociación 
Tepeyac, they are economically and institutionally dependent on other bodies that 
actually decide who will lead them; in the case of Tepeyac it is the Catholic Church.  
4.2.3.3 Leadership Identity  
Leadership identity is important because it gives an idea of how post-IRCA 
Mexican leaders think of themselves, as well as the ways they may help construct and 
mobilize the identity of the first-generation. It also indicates what kind of relationships 
they may establish with other ethnic groups in the United States, specifically Mexican-
Americans with whom they would be expected to have a natural connection since they 
share a similar origin. 
 I asked leaders whether they identified mainly as Mexicans, Mexican-Americans 
or Americans. While I did not ask them a direct question about their immigration status, 
it became evident that most of them had already acquired United States citizenship or 
could have access to it if they wished. I received varied responses, but almost all the 
interviewees disliked the idea of identifying themselves as Mexican-Americans. 
Practically, this was an expected response because Mexican-Americans are routinely 
thought of as people born in the United States of Mexican descent. Technically, however, 
any person of Mexican origin who naturalizes as a United States citizen could identify 
herself or himself as a Mexican-American. What is interesting about their answers is the 
negative view they displayed.  A common response was that Mexican-Americans have 
rejected their Mexican heritage or felt guilty about it. The most common identification 
was “Mexican”. This, however, does not mean that they rejected an American identity. 
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On the contrary, many of them said that they felt Mexican but also American and in most 
cases they expressed respect and loyalty for their adopted country. In summary, most 
leaders identified first as Mexicans and then as Americans but not as Mexican-
Americans. This points towards the possibility that they may adopt a different strategy of 
incorporation than that embraced by Mexican-Americans. While the latter have attempted 
to demonstrate that their loyalty belongs exclusively to the United States, post-IRCA 
Mexican immigrants recognize and assume as unproblematic the possibility of dual 
loyalties and identities, and they do not think that their loyalty to Mexico brings into 
question their loyalty to the United States. This may be consistent with the general 
attitude they have adopted of claiming political rights in their homeland–that is 
attempting to incorporate there—but assuming that they also deserve political rights in 
their host country.  
 From this we may also surmise that the relationship between first-generation 
Mexican leaders and Mexican-Americans may be contentious. However, this conclusion 
should be assessed with care because most leaders recognize that to advance their 
political goals in the United States they need to work with Mexican-Americans. The 
predominant view was that although they had different political priorities and views 
toward Mexico than Mexican-Americans84, they needed to learn from the experiences of 
the latter. In follow up interviews during the summer of 2004 it became evident that some 
                                                 
84 Mexican-Americans and first-generation Mexican immigrants hold different positions about engagement 
in Mexico’s political life. While Mexican-Americans see the policy of rapprochement adopted by the 
Mexican government in a positive light, and they in a way requested and promoted it, they generally 
rejected the idea of obtaining political rights in Mexico because they thought it had the potential of creating 
doubts about their loyalty to the United States.  In contrast, post-IRCA first-generation Mexican 
immigrants had as one of their main goals obtaining political rights in their homeland. It is important to 
point out, however, than on March 2004 The league Of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) seems to 
have reversed its opposition to obtaining political rights in Mexico, when it endorsed the goal of obtaining 
the right to vote from abroad advocated by the CDPME (interview with a leader of the CDPME in March 
2004). 
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organizations, particularly State Federations in Chicago and Los Angeles, were already 
developing ties with Mexican-American organizations. Mexican-American organizations 
that originally ignored first-generation Mexican organizations realize that they need to 
develop ties with them to increase their appeal within the first-generation Mexican 
community. At the same time, Mexican organizations, particularly the SFs and others 
based on state of origin, have turned their attention to the United States and, therefore, 
they have become more interested in working with Mexican-American organizations85.   
  Leaders of political organizations, particularly those that do not derive from the 
federations, are more likely to identify only as Mexicans. Leaders of HTAs and SFs as 
well as civic organizations, tend to identify both as Mexicans and as Americans. This 
may be explained in part by the different life experiences of the leaders. Most leaders of 
HTAs, SFs and similar organizations arrived in the United States when they were 
relatively young and typically from rural areas. Many were originally without documents, 
but were able to acquire a legal status in the 1980s and 1990s through IRCA or through 
other legislative means.  Having lived almost all of their adult lives in the United States, 
they learned new skills and adopted many American values. Many of them became 
successful by supplying services or selling goods mostly within the ethnic enclave, 
although a few worked for American companies or were professionals.  Although they 
feel connected to Mexico, and particularly to their places of origin, they also feel attached 
to their adopted country.  
 Leaders of civic organizations tend to come more from the Mexican middle class 
(in most cases with professional degrees) and thus have had less difficulty gaining 
                                                 
85 Interviews with Mexican leaders during the meeting of the Consultative Council of the Institute of 
Mexicans Abroad showed that organizations in Los Angeles and Chicago were now working with the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (Maldef).    
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acceptance in American society, in the first place because they typically arrived legally. 
They have seen the hard times that many undocumented Mexicans confront in the United 
States and have focused on helping them to cope. Since the organizations they lead are 
focused on the host country, they think that becoming American is important and they 
value that identity. Since they were born in Mexico, however, and probably earned their 
professional degrees in Mexican institutions, it is also evident that they identify with 
Mexico.    
 Leaders of political organizations, in contrast, were in most cases politically 
active in Mexico (e.g. members of a union, student movement or political party) and this 
experience may be connected to their migration process. Therefore, they are more 
interested in political developments in Mexico than in the United States and embrace a 
predominantly Mexican identity.      
4.2.3.4 Leadership Experience 
 Leaders do not emerge in a vacuum. It takes time for an immigrant group to 
produce leaders able to articulate and advance their interests. Leaders of political 
organizations have had the greatest political experience, in most cases prior to their 
arrival in the United States. This is the case of members of the CDPME and CIME. 
Leaders of HTAs, SFs and similar organizations, in contrast, acquired their leadership 
skills mostly through participation in those organizations, a reason they have been slower 
in developing a strong public profile. During the interviews it became evident that on 
many occasions these leaders relied on previous experiences of community involvement. 
Some of the interviewees, for example, had been on local school boards and chambers of 
commerce or had served on their city councils. For example, the president of Durango 
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Unido in Chicago was at the time of the interview (October 2001) a member of the local 
school board and had been previously the president of the Pilsen Chamber of Commerce. 
He also had participated in a program organized by the Chicago Police to fight crime. 
Others have been involved in community activities organized by the local churches.  In 
some cases, even if the interviewees themselves had not been directly involved in local 
community activities, they belonged to organizations that had.  
 Leaders of civic organizations typically got involved with the Mexican 
community through their professional activities. For example, the president of the Centro 
Comunitario Mexicano in Dallas and of Casa Mexico and Mixteca Organization Inc. in 
Metropolitan New York did not have any direct political experience in Mexico or the 
United States, but have been active in professional associations or in local institutions 
(e.g. school boards, or city councils).  
4.2.4 Fund Raising Capacity and Legal Status of the Organization 
First-generation Mexican organizations have as one of the main activities raising 
funds to invest in their hometowns and many have been quite effective. Despite this, they 
are often unstable because they have not been able to establish a secure and diversified 
source of income. Those organizations based on the state of origin and civic activities 
rely for the most part on the monetary contributions of their members.  Political 
organizations, in contrast, do not have any identified sources of income and their 
members have to finance their own expenses.   
Of the thirty-four organizations identified for this research, only three have 
applied for and obtained external grants. These are Fundación Mexico, based in Tucson 
but considered in this project because its membership extends to the cities I studied, 
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Asociación Tepeyac in New York and the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California. 
In the last case they were able to get support for two years from the Rockefeller 
Foundation (Imagen 2004).    
In a few cases, state-of-origin organizations receive economic support from the 
governments of their states, for example Casa Guanajuato in Dallas and the Federation 
of United Zacatecan Clubs in Illinois. In both cases, this support was crucial to their 
growth and viability. Asociación Tepeyac has also received important financial support 
from the archdiocese of New York, including a building in lower Manhattan. These 
cases, however, are more the exception than the rule.    
4.2.4.1 Non-Profit Status 
  In the United States most organizations that attend to community needs apply for 
a non-profit status with the Internal Revenue Service so that they can avoid being taxed 
on the money they raise and obtain external resources from foundations and corporations. 
Of the thirty-four organizations studied here, nine had obtained non-profit status at the 
time of the research and five others had applied for it. Of the nine that had obtained non-
profit status, 56% were State Federations/HTAs and 44% were civic organizations. Only 
three non-profits, the Asociación Tepeyac, Fundación Mexico and the Zacatecan 
Federation of Southern California were able to raise external resources in the United 
States.  
 The adoption of a non-profit status has had unexpected results. Among other 
things, it has affected the way these organizations talk about and participate in politics.  
Non-profit status requires avoiding partisan politics and direct political activities. This, 
however, does not mean that non-profits do not act politically. For example, occasionally 
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they may host events with prospective or actual candidates for governors of their states of 
origin but present these events as educational rather than political. In general, political 
attitudes tend to be presented as individually rather than organizationally adopted.  
Non-profit HTAs and SFs tend to be more cautious about participating in political 
activities in the United States than in Mexico. This is probably because their members 
perceive that any political action towards their host country could be more easily detected 
than that taken towards their homeland. Since most of them have assumed a non-profit 
status fairly recently, the long-term effects are unclear. Certainly, the tax exempt status 
creates a negative incentive to be involved in voter registration campaigns86. Some 
organizations, however, have found creative solutions to this dilemma. For example, the 
members of the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California created a new, separate 
organization focused only on political activities called the Frente Cívico Zacatecano. 
Although it emerged as a result of political divisions within the federation during the 
1998 gubernatorial election in Zacatecas, the creation of the Frente Cívico actually 
allowed organized Zacatecans in Los Angeles to develop an open bi-national political 
agenda. The effectiveness of this organization in advancing political goals (e.g. it 
successfully promoted a pro-immigrant law in Zacatecas) has made it a model for other 




                                                 
86 This status, for instance, forces them to avoid any direct or indirect participation or intervention in any 
political campaign for or against any candidate for public office (see www.t-tlaw.com/np-01b.htm). 
However, it does not prohibit them from urging their members to register and vote as long as they do not 
take any position, publish or distribute any statements made in connection with a specific campaign.  
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4.2.5 Political Leverage  
 So far, I have described the emergence and general characteristics of a sample of 
first-generation Mexican organizations in the United States, as well as some of their 
resource mobilization capacities.  Among other things I have shown that in most cases 
these organizations emerged as a result of a direct involvement of homeland political 
actors and officials, or in reaction to host or home state policies. The interaction of these 
organizations with their home state political dynamics and political and administrative 
officials has politicized many of them. Therefore, organizations that were not originally 
political have acquired an explicit or implicit political focus. As they have become more 
sophisticated and more autonomous from homeland authorities, some organizations that 
were not originally focused on the United States have started to develop new activities 
aimed at their host country. These include the provision of services to their members and 
the local Mexican community to facilitate their adaptation. In addition, some of them, 
specifically organizations based on the state of origin, have started to articulate a political 
agenda focused on advancing their interest in the United States. These processes have 
been facilitated by the development of leadership resources that were unavailable to the 
Mexican immigrant community prior to the 1986 amnesty, and of the policies of 
rapprochement adopted by Mexico towards its expatriates.  
The political agenda this new leadership has been articulating attempts to differentiate 
between the interests of the Mexican immigrant community and those of Mexican-
Americans. Overall, most Mexican leaders interviewed for this research do not identify as 
Mexican-Americans. Nonetheless, they seem to understand that the latter could be an 
important political ally. Despite their interest in developing a politically active profile in 
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the United States, Mexican organizations have a limited capacity to raise external 
financial resources. Others have failed to develop a fully democratic structure to 
guarantee their survival in the long run. So far, many of them still have a leadership 
structure dominated by a few actors that block the arrival of new persons to the higher 
positions, very much in the same way that cliques have dominated many aspects of the 
community life in Mexico. 
What are the capacities of these organizations to influence political events in their 
home and host countries? What links have they established with different political actors 
and organizations in Mexico and the United States? Have they been able to use these 
links to advance their autonomous interests and political agenda?     
4.2.5.1 Links with the Mexican Government 
    Twenty-four of 34 organizations have an established relationship with the 
Mexican government, meaning that they have been in regular touch with authorities in 
Mexico87, and have worked with them towards specific goals. Relationships tend to be 
with one specific level of government, either national or sub-national, although six 
organizations work with both.  Organizations based on the state of origin tend, obviously, 
to lean predominantly towards the sub-national level, although some organizations such 
as the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California have become so strong that they also 
have assured access to federal authorities.  
 In most cases, the relationship that organizations based on the state of origin have 
with sub-national authorities is more or less positive, although in some instances it has 
been predominantly conflictive. This is the case of the Federación de Clubes 
                                                 
87 All the organizations have been in touch at some point or another with the Mexican consulates in the 
respective cities, but these contacts will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Jaliscienses, based in Los Angeles, which for many years had a difficult relationship with 
the government of Jalisco. Since the PRI administration of Guillermo Cossio Vidaurri 
(1989-1992), there had been numerous complaints by municipal authorities that the 
money the Jaliscienses abroad invested in the state benefited local churches. This 
probably would not have worried PAN officials due to the strong connections this party 
has with the Catholic Church but certainly was perceived as a problem by municipal 
authorities from the PRI, which was the predominant party in the state at the time.  In 
1994 the organization started to participate in a 3x1 program, in which every dollar it 
invested was equally matched by the Federal government, the state government, and the 
municipal government. When this program ended, they negotiated a 2x1 with the state 
and municipal governments but, again, this stimulated complaints from municipal 
authorities who argued that they had to redirect already assigned budgets to emigrants’ 
demands and in the end they decided not to collaborate with the program. Along with 
constant departures of governors before their terms ended created a difficult relationship 
between the federation and the government of Jalisco. Zabin and Escala Rabadán (Zabin 
and Escala Rabada 1998) argue that these political problems made the federation from 
Jalisco less successful in promoting public work projects than those from Zacatecas.  
 The type of relationship that each organization establishes with sub-national 
authorities in Mexico affects their performance. At some points this relationship may 
strengthen the organization, while at others it certainly divides it. The Zacatecan 
federations in Los Angeles and Chicago for a long time enjoyed good relations with the 
state authorities. Both the PRI administrations of Genaro Borrego Estrada (1986-1992) 
and Arturo Romo Gutiérrez (1992-1998) worked to strengthen and institutionalize the 
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organizations. In both cases, these authorities expected the organizations to be allies of 
the government and their party (Moctezuma Longoria 2003). During all this time, the 
leadership of both organizations leaned towards the PRI. Finally, when in 1998 Ricardo 
Monreal Avila, an influential PRI politician, decided to run for governor as a PRD 
candidate, the federations, particularly the one from Los Angeles, split over whom to 
support. In this regard, these organizations basically reproduced for a while the political 
environment of the state, which was dominated by the PRI for many years, but later 
became more competitive. When he arrived in power, Monreal Avila also expected the 
loyalty of the federations. These, however, had learned the extent to which they could 
influence political events in the state and, thus, adopted a more autonomous position.  
Along with the Frente Cívico Zacatecano, which emerged from the divisions in the Los 
Angeles federation, these federations supported the candidacy of Andrés Bermudez, an 
emigrant from California, for mayor of Jeréz, and defended his triumph even when the 
local electoral authorities and the PRD governor argued that he could not take office due 
to legal technicalities. Afterwards, the Frente Cívico, with the support of the federations, 
designed and promoted the “migrant law” which, after being approved by the state 
Congress in 2003, allowed Zacatecans residing abroad to be elected to political positions 
in the state.  
 The Zacatecan example shows that a strong relationship with the sub-national 
authorities has helped some organizations become more institutionalized, which in turn 
has allowed them to become more autonomous and exercise more political leverage in 
their states of origin. What kind of relationships have Mexican organizations established 
with Mexican authorities at the federal level? Of the thirty-four organizations I studied, 
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thirteen have established some form of relationship with the Mexican government at the 
national level, meaning that they have contacts with officials at least from time to time. 
The main goal at the national level has been to obtain the right to vote from abroad. To 
achieve this, they have established ties with administrative officials, mostly from the 
interior ministry and the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), while lobbying members of 
Congress. Evidently they are not as close as the relationships the federations have 
established with sub-national authorities. At that level, immigrants have greater political 
leverage. At the national level, they may expect more from the authorities (e.g. make 
them act on specific legislation) than the authorities expect from them, which diminishes 
their ability to influence events. Nonetheless, the leverage they have is also determined 
by their importance for the government. For more than four decades, when the political 
system in Mexico was fairly closed to newcomers, emigrants were not able to exercise 
any influence on the government. As the political system liberalized, and they became 
more organized, their influence increased but it was still not strong enough to decisively 
affect political events. During the PRI governments of Carlos Salinas de Gortari and 
Ernesto Zedillo, various groupings lobbied for the right to vote from abroad to no avail. 
During the government of Vicente Fox, priorities changed and emigrants became an 
important pillar of his administration’s political and foreign policy discourse. Does the 
achievement of voting rights for expatriates imply that they are more effectively 
organized than ever before?  There are more migrant organizations focused on advancing 
a political agenda towards their homeland than there were a decade ago. Also, their 
actions are more institutionalized. Despite this, I believe that these groups are getting 
more attention from the Mexican government than their level of organization merits. A 
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follow up of these organizations has shown that their efforts are still mostly 
uncoordinated (although the CDPME has managed to unify some interests), and that they 
have not been able yet to create a cohesive front vis-à-vis their homeland, even though 
almost all the leadership of the organizations studied agreed than one of the major goals 
of Mexicans abroad should be to obtain political rights back home.  
4.2.5.2 Links with Mexican Political Parties  
 Political leverage is also affected by the importance that other political actors, 
specifically political parties, assign to Mexican groups in the United States. Among the 
organizations I studied, at least thirteen have had some identifiable connection with one 
or more political parties, having explicitly or implicitly endorsed the candidate of a 
specific political party, having many of their members belong to a particular political 
party, or having established a strong association with a specific official who belongs to a 
party or faction.     
4.2.5.3 Links with the American Government 
  Mexican organizations have not been as effective in establishing links with the 
American government at the national, state, or local levels as they have been with the 
Mexican government. While Mexican authorities tend to be involved in many activities 
of these organizations and pay frequent visits to them, the contacts of these groups with 
American authorities, even in the cities where they reside, tend to be limited. In fact, 
contacts with American authorities tend to take place only after an organization has been 
established for some time and local authorities have noticed it. Even so, seventeen of the 
associations I studied reported having been in touch with, and even supporting the 
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political campaigns of, local authorities and politicians.  Most of these contacts were with 
city councilors, mayors, Hispanic assemblymen, and state Congressional delegations.  
 The organizations most active in this regard are those based on state of origin. 
The Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, along with the Frente Cívico 
Zacatecano, supported the campaigns of various local politicians and members of 
Congress in California. Other federations, such as the Federación de Clubes 
Michoacanos en Illinois and the Federación de Clubes Unidos de Zacatecanos en 
Illinois88 placed a similar role. A former president of the latter organization has, on 
occasion, acted as a liaison between the Zacatecan government and the mayor of 
Chicago, while the president of the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California has done 
the same thing in California. These examples show that these organizations and their 
leaders have been gradually acquiring some presence in the host society and are being 
identified by local politicians and authorities as useful intermediaries with the constantly 
growing Mexican immigrant community.  
 The political organizations, particularly those focused on a single issue like the 
CDPME, did not report contacts with American officials, but this mostly reflects their 
single issue status and lack of need for such contacts. In contrast, political organizations 
that have more recently emerged from various efforts to coordinate the actions of SFs, 
such as the CPFMLA in California and Confemex in Chicago, principally pay attention to 
American politics and, thus, are working on building new ties with American officials. 
CPFMLA, for instance, established a strong relationship with Antonio Villaraigosa, the 
Los Angeles mayor, after it supported his campaign. Although these efforts are fairly 
                                                 
88 In the cases in which they have a non-profit status, they participate in mobilizing the vote on an 
individual basis. This means the organization does not officially endorse any candidate in particular.   
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new, it is possible that these organizations may become important advocates of the 
Mexican immigrant community in the United States. Civic organizations, for their part, 
tend naturally to establish ties with local politicians and officials since their activities 
involve helping immigrants better adapt in the host country.  
4.2.5.4 Links with Other Actors in the United States  
 To advance political goals in their host country, immigrant organizations require 
establishing alliances with other groups. Important potential allies include ethnic and 
other immigrant organizations, immigrant rights advocates, and unions. Overall, the 
organizations reviewed have not yet developed, with few exceptions, many links with 
other groups. Only nine organizations had established contacts with Mexican-American 
groups (e.g. LULAC, La Raza, Maldef and the National Association of Latino Elected 
Officials, or NALEO) and one had created some links with Dominican associations. 
These contacts had mostly resulted in invitations to attend meetings of these 
organizations or receiving leadership training from them. Overall, the organizations that 
have had the most contacts with these ethnic groupings are based on place of origin, 
particularly those in existence for at least a few years.  
 Links with unions have been more limited. Of the organizations based on state of 
origin only the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California and the political organization 
that emerged from it, the Frente Cívico Zacatecano, have worked in joint projects with 
the AFL-CIO. The Frente and the AFL-CIO, for example, collaborated in California in a 
campaign to broaden access to legal driver’s licenses for undocumented Mexicans. 
Furthermore, both the Federation and the Frente have joined efforts with the AFL-CIO to 
promote the legalization of undocumented Mexicans. These examples, however, are more 
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the exception than the rule. Why are links with unions so limited? The main reason that 
emerged from the data is that few leaders of first-generation Mexican organizations have 
much connection to unionized labor or union life. Few obtained employment in unionized 
blue-collar jobs, but instead ran small businesses or were professionals. Despite this 
situation, the recent decision of the AFL-CIO to support the legalization of 
undocumented workers and the fact that some immigrant organizations are becoming 
more oriented toward American politics, may eventually foster more intensive 
connections between Mexican immigrant organizations and unions.  
  Most civic organizations have no discernible relationships with Mexican-
American organizations or with trade unions. Some have established links with pro-
immigrant rights organizations in those places where they operate, or at the national 
level. For example, the Centro Comunitario Mexicano in Dallas has been working with 
Dallas International, a pro-immigrant organization, on social, medical and legal 
assistance projects that benefit Mexican and Latino residents of the Dallas-Fort Worth 
region. Meanwhile, Asociación Tepeyac belongs to the National Coalition for Amnesty 
and Dignity whose main goal is obtaining permanent residency for all undocumented 
workers living in the United States.    
 As they have been gradually turning their attention to the host country, 
organizations based on their place of origin have also been establishing links with pro-
immigrant groups in the places were they operate. This is the case of the Federación de 
Clubes Unidos de Zacatecanos en Illinois, which has worked along the Illinois Coalition 
for Immigrants and Refugees and the Heartland Alliance in projects that support 
immigrant rights. Overall, however, to be effective first-generation Mexican 
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organizations have to develop more ties with pro-immigrant organizations. At the time of 
my research, only eight out of the thirty-four organizations had done so.    
4.2.6 Effects on Incorporation 
One of the major interests of this research project is the role that first-generation 
Mexican organizations in the United States are playing in motivating the political 
incorporation of migrants in the USA and Mexico. Since the situation is still unfolding, 
the data and analysis support only tentative conclusions. The effects these organizations 
have on the incorporation of Mexicans can be derived by implication from the specific 
positions and activities these organizations have developed towards this end. 
4.2.6.1 Incorporating into the Homeland Polity 
 Almost all the organizations agreed on obtaining political rights in their home 
polity, because most emigrants left the country more or less involuntarily due to a lack of 
economic opportunities and their families still live there. By exercising political rights in 
their homeland they hope to influence Mexican emigration policies.  
 Broad agreement on this subject, however, does not translate into united action. 
Not all the organizations publicly promoted the incorporation of Mexicans into their 
homeland polity and, among those that did, there was considerable variation in the level 
of commitment. The leadership of civic organizations such as Asociación Tepeyac, 
Cecomex, Casa Mexico in the New York Metropolitan area and the Centro Comunitario 
Mexicano in Dallas belonged to the internet list created by the CDPME to promote the 
interests of Mexicans abroad; they even had signed petitions supporting votes from 
abroad; nevertheless, these leaders and their organizations were not really actively 
involved in these campaigns.  
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  What about organizations based on state of origin? Most of these certainly have 
concentrated their efforts on the homeland. HTAs and SFs, for example had as their 
original goal to boost economic vitality in their hometowns and states of origin. These 
activities led to the acquisition of political influence at home. For instance, it was not rare 
for presidents of HTAs to be nominated for political office in their places of origin since 
the financial resources they directed back home earned them the respect of the local 
population. This was the case of the president of the Federación de Zacatecanos del 
Norte de Texas, who as president of a HTA was nominated as a PRI pre-candidate for the 
municipal presidency of his hometown in the mid-1990s89. It was through their 
continuous contacts with Mexican administrative authorities and politicians that these 
organizations started to articulate demands of their states of origin. Their opinions and 
suggestions started to be incorporated into the political platforms of those candidates for 
political office who sought their endorsement. Thus, even before the right to vote was 
approved in 2005, they wielded a veto over potential candidates. Finally, the links that 
many of these organizations have established with other political organizations pushed 
them to adopt more explicit political goals and become involved in lobbying campaigns 
for political rights in Mexico. In addition, immigrants from Zacatecas and Michoacan 
also designed or endorsed laws that attempted to achieve their final incorporation in the 
polities of their states90.  
                                                 
89 This person did not win those elections at that time. However, in July 2004, thanks to the finally 
approved Migrant Law promoted by the Zacatecans in the United States (which allowed Zacatecans to 
compete for political office in their state of origin without the requirement of having to reside there for a 
specific time), he finally won the elections for the Municipal presidency of Apulco (his hometown), now as 
a PRD candidate see (Silver and Authers 2004).   
90 The Zacatecans promoted the Ley Migrante mentioned in the previous footnote, which was finally 
approved in 2003, while the Michoacanos endorsed an initiative promoted by the PRD governor Lázaro 
Cárdenas Batel to grant them the right to vote from abroad, and be elected for Congress through the local 
party list.  
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 Other organizations have been less active in the politics of their states. This has to 
do with the fact that they have not developed the institutional capacity that the Zacatecans 
and Michoacanos had built in the last few years, but also that the leadership of these 
organizations and their members may not be as interested, in some cases because they are 
drawn from a different demographic pool. For example, the leadership and members of 
Durango Unido are predominantly small businessmen and physicians who are well 
adapted to American society and have limited emotional connections to Durango. 
  In general, those organizations that have been more actively advancing the 
interests of expatriates towards their homeland have had a political profile from the 
beginning. Not all these organizations are effective, however. CIME, for example, was 
created with a lot of fanfare and expectations, but internal divisions caused it to lose 
much of the intermediation capacity it had won with Mexican authorities. Probably the 
most efficient group was the CDPME because its pragmatic and flexible structure 
diminished the chances for divisions.  
4.2.6.2 Incorporating into the Host Polity 
 Voting rights from abroad gave Mexican organizations in the United States a 
common theme around which to organize, but no similar issue has galvanized their stance 
vis-à-vis politics in the United States prior to the Sensenbrenner bill (see Chapter 2). 
Although most of the interviewees had little difficulty discussing strategies with regard to 
politics in Mexico, they had more difficulty talking about politics in the United States.  
 Despite this, most of them agreed that the main challenge for the Mexican 
immigrant community in the United States is to secure legal status for the undocumented 
both through adjusting the status of those already residing in the US and providing a legal 
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means for the entry of future migrants. If large numbers of Mexicans lack legal status, the 
community will have a hard time obtaining real political representation. As a former 
president of a federation from Guerrero put it,  
all the troubles we face in the United States: lack of access to driver’s licenses and 
to higher education for those undocumented, health problems, deaths at the border 
and more, are the result of a lack of a migratory agreement. Therefore, our first 
goal should be to address this issue. 
Although many Mexican immigrants are now legally settled in the United States, 
including most if not all of the leaders interviewed for this research, many more are not. 
Families are commonly divided between those members who have legal status and those 
who do not. For this reason, it is obvious why the immigration issue ranked first among 
the interviewees when they thought about politics in the United States. 
 Nevertheless, there was little agreement as to which was the best way to solve the 
immigration problem. Some preferred an incremental approach, starting with a 
regularization program that would grant resident immigrants legal status but not 
citizenship rights, which they thought Congress would reject. Others argued that a 
blanket amnesty similar to that adopted in 1986 was the only way to solve the problem.
 While most leaders had an opinion about this subject, not many of the 
organizations they led had participated in concrete actions in favor of an amnesty or a 
regularization program. Of the thirty-four organizations, only thirteen had been involved 
in demonstrations or lobbying campaigns in favor of an amnesty or a plan to regularize 
immigrants. Among those, only a few had been consistently involved in that respect. The 
most evident case was that of Asociación Tepeyac, which got the attention of the 
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Mexican and American press by running four years in a row (2002-2005) the Antorcha 
Guadalupana (Guadalupan Torch) race from Mexico City to Saint Patrick’s Cathedral in 
New York City. During the race, in which many young runners participated, immigrants 
ask the Virgin of Guadalupe to help them obtain permanent legal status in the United 
States.  
 Other organizations attempted to address the problems that undocumented 
workers confront by providing services to them and advocating in favor of more specific 
issues such as supporting the Dream Act, which if approved by Congress would put the 
non-American children of undocumented Mexicans on the same footing as American 
citizens in respect to college tuition and financial aid. The most active organizations in 
this respect were those with a civic profile, although some SFs and other organizations 
based on the state of origin also participated.   
 By 2006 conditions changed. The approval of the Sensenbrenner bill in the House 
and the possibility that the Senate could approve a similar bill (see Chapter 2) mobilized 
immigrants as never before.  In this context many of the organizations that I studied 
became active participants in the rallies that were held in many American cities.  Follow 
up interviews I conducted with leaders in Los Angeles showed that they were involved in 
organizing the rallies and in trying to put together a coalition to advance a pro-immigrant 
agenda.  This was the case of CFPLA. CONFEMEX played a similar role in Chicago.  
How successful their efforts will be is difficult to know.   It will certainly take a lot of 
work by immigrant organizations and they will have not only to design a common agenda 
but also control potential divisions. 
 177
 Meanwhile, first-generation organizations have been indirectly supporting the 
incorporation process by providing services primarily but not exclusively geared towards 
the undocumented. These services include English as a second language courses, 
activities for children, orientation about health services and others.  Furthermore, some 
organizations such as Fundación México and various state federations organize 
conferences, talks and discussion groups to foster greater political consciousness. 
  What about activities geared at helping in the adaptation and incorporation of the 
second generation? Organizations have started to direct attention toward the second 
generation. For example, various organizations have established scholarship programs to 
guarantee that successful high-school graduates can attend college. In addition, at least 
two organizations--the Zacatecan Federation from Southern California and the 
Zacatecans from Illinois--created youth programs aimed at helping the children of 
Zacatecans born in the United States develop leadership skills.  
 In summary, although first-generation Mexican organizations still have a long 
way to go, there are signs that they are gradually making meaningful contributions 
towards the adaptation of Mexicans in the United States. They do so either indirectly 
through the provision of services and activities for the first and second generation, or 
directly, by participating in political activities.           
4.3 The Consultative Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad: A Potential 
Transnational Front? 
 As part of its policy towards expatriates the Mexican government created the 
Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IMA) in 2002 with the goal of addressing the needs of 
Mexicans living in the United States and Canada. The Institute includes a consultative 
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body–the Consultative Council--whose charge is to give voice to emigrants and their 
offspring as to what the Mexican government should do to help Mexicans abroad better 
adapt in their country of residence as well as to participate in the economic and political 
life of their homeland.  This body is composed of 105 Mexican leaders from the United 
States selected through more or less democratic processes implemented in American and 
Canadian cities. In addition, it includes 10 councilors who belong to major Latino and 
Mexican-American organizations, 10 special advisors selected by the Mexican 
government, and 32 representatives from the different Mexican states.  
 The Consultative Council provides the first opportunity for many Mexican leaders 
from different American cities to interact and exchange ideas and experiences. It also 
signifies a unique chance for them to acquire an unified voice. Thanks to the Council, 
Mexican leaders in the United States are building, with more efficiency than ever, 
important links and networks. For all these reasons I include a brief analysis of the 
leadership of the council, specifically from the 105 selected in different cities. I believe 
that the information provided here complements the data about first-generation 
organizations provided in this chapter.   
 Information provided by the IMA on 101 of the 105 members selected by 
Mexican communities in the United States shows that 70% were born in Mexico. Thus 
the Council includes both Mexican and Mexican-American leaders. Despite this, a bi-
national study of the Council, whose preliminary results were presented in a meeting of 
the body in Atlanta, Georgia on May 21st 200491, shows that although many councilors 
                                                 
91 The study was conducted in November 2003 during the second general meeting of the Consejo in 
Mexico City by the International Relations Department of the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(ITAM), the Center for the Study of Los Angeles of Loyola Marymount University, The Center for 
 179
believe that Latinos should work together, many others (presumably born in Mexico 
although not clarified in the preliminary report) expressed strong criticisms of Mexican-
American leaders born in the United States. Their main objection is that they are not 
sufficiently interested in immigration matters and developments in Mexico. These 
criticisms against Mexican-American leaders also emerged during the meeting in Atlanta 
at the formal presentation of the report and in personal talks with different members. This 
is consistent with the information I presented that showed that the leaders of the first-
generation organizations generally dislike being labeled as Mexican-Americans. Despite 
this, I did not notice that criticisms against Mexican-Americans affected the working 
relationships between Mexican and Mexican-American leaders. The presence of 
Mexican-American councilors, for instance, seemed to be useful because their more 
extensive experience helped moderate the terms of discussion during the seminars in 
Atlanta. For example, one of the most important working committees of the council, that 
on political strategies, was led by a Mexican-American woman from California who 
supported voting rights from abroad, but also reminded members of the importance of 
participating in campaigns such as that in support of the Dream Act. 
 Those council members born in Mexico had lived in the USA an average of 21 
years. This means that they belong to a political and economic class of Mexican 
immigrants that emerged in the wake of the implementation of IRCA. Although the legal 
status of the councilors was not reported, it is obvious from talks with Mexican officials 
that the majority of them hold United States citizenship or at least permanent residency. I 
was able to identify only one member of the council that was undocumented. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mexican American Studies of the University of Texas at Arlington, and the Institute for Latino Studies of 
Notre Dame University   
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 Regarding their activities and working lives, 51% belong to an organization 
(including many from SFs and civic organizations). The rest reported that they were 
small businessmen or professionals, probably many of them active in their local 
communities. This further confirms that they constitute a group of immigrants that have 
settled in their host country and have the time and means to demand a voice in what 
happens in Mexico and the United States.  
With respect to their predominant concerns, observing their general meetings and 
those of the specialized committees (besides the political committee there are Economic 
and Business Issues, Education, Legal, and Health, Culture, and Border Committees) I 
noticed that their interests are geared towards both Mexico and the United States. 
Obtaining the right to vote in Mexican elections was an issue that emerged again and 
again in discussions during the meeting (a right that they finally obtained a year later), in 
great part because speakers in the general meetings organized by the Mexican 
government dealt with this issue. However, they were also highly interested in finding 
ways to finance community development projects and in proposing solutions to the illegal 
immigration problem. Their concerns about the future of the second generation were also 
evident, as well as about methods to address major health problems that afflict Mexicans 
in the United States. Openly political issues regarding the United States emerged in their 
discussions, particularly those of the political committee, although not as frequently as 
those about Mexico. However, we need to consider that the main interlocutor of their 
discussions was the Mexican government. It is likely that if the United States created a 
similar institution many of their demands would be geared towards their host country.  
From what I observed in the meetings, the councilors were vocal towards Mexico, in 
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great part because they were encouraged by the many Mexican officials who participated 
in the events, including very high-level officials such as the foreign minister and 








THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES OF DALLAS, 




 In the next two chapters I look at the process of political incorporation of 
Mexicans in the urban centers where they have settled, including Chicago, Dallas, Los 
Angeles and New York92.  I identify the specific characteristics of Mexican organization 
and mobilization in each locality. To what extent do local structures of opportunity affect 
the patterns of incorporation of Mexicans in each city? Are there distinctive patterns in 
the processes of political incorporation of Mexicans in those places that show that local 
structures and dynamics are as relevant as those at the national level in determining 
immigrant incorporation?  Are Mexicans mobilizing and organizing in the same ways in 
                                                 
92 When referring to the cities of Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas and New York, I am always considering 
their metropolitan areas since many Mexicans live in the outskirts of those cities or in suburban areas near 
by. In my analysis of the local political opportunity structures and how they affect the dynamics of the 
organizations, however, I will constrain my analysis mostly to the cities themselves for two reasons: first, 
due to the difficulty of analyzing the political dynamics that Mexicans may face in the different suburban 
entities where they have settled; and second, because in most cases, their daily lives (e.g. where they work) 
and organizational activities unfold around those cities.  The metropolitan area of Chicago includes: 
Chicago, Illinois-Gary, Indiana-Lake County, and Wisconsin. For New York: New York- Northern New 
Jersey, Long Island, and Connecticut. For Los Angeles it means a five county region including Los Angeles 
County, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside and Ventura. For Dallas it encompasses the counties of Collin, 




all these cities? If not, what are the differences and their causes?  What are the main 
challenges these organizations confront?  By posing these questions, I attempt to uncover 
the extent to which variations in local opportunity structures affect immigrant 
mobilization and organization.  
 I present a short review of each city’s opportunity structure including: (1) the 
political culture, which can be more or less inclusive; and (2) the institutional design 
which may encompass either a reform system or one dominated by political machines, 
the presence or absence of partisan elections, and at large or district elections.  I also 
consider the history and characteristics of its Mexican community.  I will show that 
Mexican immigrants have confronted major obstacles in all four localities that have 
deterred their political participation and that go beyond the obvious limitations created by 
their immigration and citizenship status. Because of this, their primary focus is Mexico. 
As Koopmans argues, “there is a strong and positive relation between the inclusiveness of 
local incorporation regimes and the degree to which immigrants participate proactively 
on public debates on issues concerning them” (Koopmans 2004). In localities in which 
immigrants have few channels of access to the decision-making process they tend to 
orient their political goals towards their country of origin. Yet, local opportunity 
structures also affect variations in predominant types, strengths and quality of 
associations. These involve specific opportunities available in each city including 
chances to be involved with institutions such as school boards, the police, and city 
councils. In addition, they include the resources spent on facilitating the adaptation and 
integration of newcomers (e.g. on education, public health and other social programs)93.  
                                                 
93 Although local level institutions cannot determine the legal status of new immigrants, which is a key 
determinant in their incorporation process, they certainly can have a great influence in facilitating or 
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Other elements that influence the organization of immigrants at the local level are 
homeland institutions that usually interact with immigrants in the localities where they 
have settled. These include consulates and state governments. For instance, operating 
with a considerable autonomy from the federal government in Mexico and from the 
Mexican embassy in Washington D.C., consulate officials, state governors, and 
municipal presidents play a key role in mobilizing and organizing immigrants in different 
American cities and in shaping the characteristics of their associations.  
Apart from local opportunity structures, I concentrate on two additional factors:  
1) The particular characteristics of the immigrants settling in each locality, 
including their history, place of origin, timing of migration, longevity, predominant 
immigration status, social capital, and leadership resources.   
2) The presence of other immigrant and ethnic groups and the relationships 
Mexicans establish with them. Successful organizations of other groups (e.g. Mexican-
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans) in a particular city may serve as a model for 
Mexican immigrants to emulate. Eventually, they may become important allies. These 
groups, however, may also perceive Mexican immigrants as a threat and may attempt to 
undermine their organizing efforts.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
inhibiting this process. For example, in the state of New York, George Pataki, interested in his reelection, 
facilitated the approval of a law, originally lobbied by a group of Mexican-American students, to allow 
undocumented Mexicans in the state to pay in-state tuition when they go to the University (Smith 2002). 
Decisions like this certainly will have an impact in the incorporation of Mexicans in New York and New 
York City, even if initially limited, since they promote better educational levels within this community and 
its social mobility. Another remarkable example, not studied in this work, is the decision taken by the 
educational authorities of Georgia, to send American school teachers to Mexico to learn Spanish and the 
history of Mexican immigration so that they can better help their Mexican origin students in Georgia 
(Zuniga and Rubén 2002).  
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5.2 The opportunity structures of Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles and New York and 
the Incorporation of Mexicans  
Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas offer important contrasts and 
similarities in their political development and institutional design that have triggered or 
inhibited different modes of mobilization and incorporation of Mexicans. The first two 
cities, Chicago and New York, have relatively more inclusive polities whereas Los 
Angeles and Dallas are more exclusive. Both Chicago and New York are old industrial-
era cities whose political systems were developed during a period in which large numbers 
of European immigrants were settling. These systems gradually integrated this influx, an 
experience that may account for their relative openness.  
Los Angeles and Dallas, in contrast, flourished since the beginning of the 20th 
century under the domination of a white elite that itself migrated out of the East and 
Midwest. Created during the Progressive Era, the political institutions of these cities were 
designed to isolate the policy process from politics in order to dismantle or inhibit the 
emergence of corrupt party organizations–political machines--that thrived on immigrant 
votes in the older cities.  For this purpose state legislatures took the budgeting and 
administration of some services “out of the hands of aldermen and city councils and put 
them under the control of boards dominated by a ‘better class’ of people” (Judd and 
Kantor 2006, p. 70).   In Los Angeles citizens’ commissions to manage city departments 
as well as a strong civil service system were established. In Dallas the Mayor-
Commission form of government, later replaced by the Council-Manager form, was 
adopted. In addition, in both places voters replaced the ward system typical of Chicago 
and New York with at large elections (later changed back to district elections in Los 
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Angeles in 1925). Although these reform measures were not highly successful in 
diminishing corruption, they clearly constrained the entrance of newcomers into the 
system. Due to them, and the fact that they were newly developing urban centers, the 
waves of European migrants that arrived at the end of the nineteenth century and the first 
part of the twentieth passed almost unnoticed in these two cities, which only became 
important immigration gateways after 1965. The contrasting institutional arrangements of 
the four cities can be seen in Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3.  
 
Table 5.1: Power Arrangements in Four Cities 
City Power Arrangement 
New York o Strong mayor system 
o Weak council 
Los Angeles o Weak mayor system  
o Mayor has little control over city budget and resources 
o Authority restricted to appointments of important city wide agencies 
Chicago o Weak mayor 
o Strong council 
o Mayor controls through political machine 









Table 5.2: Electoral Systems in Four Cities 
City Elections Party system 
New York District ward Robust party structure / 
partisan elections 
Los Angeles At large primaries for mayor / district Non-partisan runoff elections 
Dallas Non-partisan 
District / mayor at large 
Non-partisan 
Chicago District / wards Robust partisan 
 
 
Table 5.3: Political Development in Four Cities 
City Political Development 
New York Old industrial city / party machines 
Los Angeles Reform city 
Chicago Old industrial city / party machines 
Dallas Reform city 
 
  Because the political institutions of New York and Chicago evolved in a context 
in which greater collaboration among ethnic groups was needed, these cities appear to 
offer a better environment than Los Angeles and Dallas for the incorporation of Mexican 
immigrants. Before we jump to quick conclusions, however, it is important to undertake a 
broader analysis and review the characteristics of the four cities’ political systems as well 
as their historical interactions with their Mexican-origin populations. This review shows 
that in all four cities the political integration of Mexicans has been difficult and more 
arduous than that experienced by previous immigrant groups. This reflects not only less 
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welcoming political institutions, but also an unwelcoming economic environment (e.g. 
welfare state retrenchment and budgetary emphasis on suburbs where immigrants are less 
likely to settle (Keiser 2000). For instance, successful incorporation seems at times more 
likely in Los Angeles than in Chicago and in Dallas than in New York. This has to do not 
only with the greater numbers of the Mexican population in Los Angeles, but also with 
the tendency of the exclusiveness of California and Los Angeles to politicize the Mexican 
community more than in places like Chicago, where Mexicans have reached 
accommodation with the local political machine and thus accepted a more limited 
political agenda. In this regard, constraints may create incentives for mobilization and 
incorporation. Despite this fact, the different characteristics of the cities have influenced 
the qualities of immigrant associational life. In Chicago, for example, first-generation 
organizations seem to be more socially active than in Los Angeles, reflecting the extent 
to which immigrants have absorbed the socially activist environment of that city. Thus, 
variations on the political opportunity structures of each place have an effect on the 
political and social behavior of first-generation Mexicans. These variations are 
determining the different ways in which they will adapt to their host country.   
Before proceeding to the review of the experience of Mexicans in the four cities, 
we need to consider the demographic composition and electoral realities faced in all of 
them. As can be seen in Tables 5.4 to 5.7 and in Appendix B all four cities are becoming 
more diverse, probably more so than ever before. In all of them there is a growing 
percentage of Latinos and a shrinking proportion of African-Americans. These numbers 
also indicate that the growth of the Latino population has been determined by the large 
influx of Mexican immigrants in the last few years, which in all the four cities are the 
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immigrant group with the fastest rate of growth or with on of the fastest. In this respect, 
Latinos represent an immediate challenge not only to the non-Hispanic white elite which 
still is the largest voting block in each city but also to the recently empowered African-
Americans. In the particular case of New York, the fast growth of the Mexican 
population also constitutes a threat to the Puerto Rican community, which has struggled 
for years to gain representation within the city’s political system. Furthermore, it also 
may imply a major challenge for the Dominican community, which is the largest 
immigrant group in that city. These demographic data show that racial and ethnic 
polarization is, and will be, a regular factor in the political dynamics of the four cities. 
Inter- and intra-ethnic and racial conflict among subordinated groups may delay the 
chances of incorporation, but the emergence of ethnic coalitions is also a possibility. 
 
Table 5.4: Change in Major Groups in Chicago Metropolitan Area 
 1990 2000 % Change 
Total Population  7,261,176 8,091,720 11.4 % 
Latino 836,905 1,405,116 67.9% 
White non-Latino 4,757,986 4,638,582 -2.5% 
Black non-Latino 1,406,443 1,536,841 9.3% 
Asian non-Latino 242,432 375,514 54.9% 
Other non-Latino 17,410 135,667 679.2% 





Table 5.5: Change in Major Groups in New York 
 1990 2000 % Change 
Total Population  7,322,564 8,008,278 9.4% 
Latino 1,783,511 2,160,554 21.1% 
White non-Latino 3,163,125 2,801,267 -11.4% 
Black non-Latino 1,847,049 1,962,154 6.2% 
Asian non-Latino 489,851 783,058 59.9% 
Other non-Latino 21,157 58,775 177.8% 
Source: Census (1990) and Census (2000)  
 
 
Table 5.6: Change in Major Groups in Los Angeles County  
 
 1990 2000 % Change 
Total Population  8,863,164 9,519,338 7.4% 
Latino 3,351,242 4,242,213 26.6% 
White non-Latino 3,618,850 4,637,062 28.1% 
Black non-Latino 934,776 930,957 -0.4% 
Asian non-Latino 907,810 1,137,500 25.3 





Table 5.7: Change in Major Groups in Dallas 
 1990 2000 % Change 
Total Population  1,006,877 1,188,580 18% 
Latino 210,240 422,587 101.0% 
White non-Latino 566,780 604,209 8.5% 
Black non-Latino 296,944 307,957 3.7% 
Asian non-Latino 21,952 32,118 46.3% 
Source: Census (1990) and Census (2000) 
 
 
5.3 Chicago: The Price of Accommodating 
Chicago is an old industrial city that predates the Progressive era and that has for 
years been dominated by an entrenched Democratic Party political machine (Ferman 
1996).  As shown above, the city’s political system is characterized by a strong city 
council and weak mayor. Despite this fact, its mayors have managed to have a strong 
hold on its political life thanks to an effective system of patronage exercised by the 
machine. Particularly remarkable in this regard was the administration of Richard J. 
Daley, who dominated the city’s politics from 1955 until 1976 when he died in office. 
His son, Richard Daley Jr., became mayor in 1989 after a short period in which the 
machine lost city hall and since then has rarely been challenged by the city council (Judd 
and Kantor 2006, p.57).     
For the first half of the twentieth century, political conflict in Chicago centered on 
class issues, and the distribution of power among the different European ethnic groups 
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that settled there, and to a lesser extent between Protestants and Catholics. By the mid-
1960s, however, race had become the major political cleavage. Political debates of the 
time centered on fair access to housing and education and greater participation in the 
city’s power structure for African-Americans. The emergence of this cleavage took place 
in the context of affirmative action programs and the civil rights movements. It was, 
nonetheless, the culmination of a massive in-migration of blacks from the South that had 
been in process for decades and the high fertility rates of this group, a phenomenon that 
corresponded with the rapid out-migration of whites. This dramatic demographic change 
was reflected in census data. During the 1960s, the city’s population was 3,550,404. By 
the 1990s, it had declined to 2,783,726.  At the same time, the African American share of 
the population increased from 22.8% in 1960 to 39% in 1990 (Ferman 1996, p. 20). 
The growing size and high geographic concentration of blacks in specific areas 
started to have a political impact. As Ferman reports, between 1960 and 1980 the 
percentage of the voting age population that was African-American almost doubled from 
20.2 to 38.7%, while the percentage of the voting age population that was white dipped 
from 71.7 to 48.3% (Ferman 1996, p. 23). The number of black ward committeemen 
appointed by the machine increased accordingly, but this was not enough to appease the 
demands for greater representation and political participation emerging from the African-
American community.  
 Although blacks had been important supporters of the Democratic Party machine 
since the 1920s, they were consistently marginalized, receiving few economic, social and 
political benefits. As Kemp and Lineberry have argued, the political machine tightly 
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controlled the black vote until the 1950s. Thereafter, this situation changed as blacks 
increased their independent political activism and acquired greater political experience.  
By the 1980s, blacks were able to elect Harold Washington as the first African-
American mayor in the city’s history, thanks to a coalition that included liberal whites 
and Latinos. With his death in office in 1987, however, the coalition fell into disarray and 
since then the political machine has returned to control the city’s political life, although 
not with the same effectiveness and discipline that it displayed during Richard J. Daley, 
Sr.’s times. 
 Mexicans played almost no role in the city’s political dynamics. Their presence in 
Chicago, although relatively large at certain times, passed mostly unnoticed (Longoria 
2000). This situation started to change by the 1990s when it became evident to local 
politicians that Mexicans were the fastest growing ethnic group in the city.  
5.3.1 The Mexican Community 
Chicago has one of the oldest and largest Mexican communities in the United States. 
The Mexican presence can be traced to the First World War era when Mexicans started to 
settle predominantly in three neighborhoods: South Chicago, where they worked in the 
steel mills, Back of the Yards, where they labored in the packing houses, and the Near 
West Side, where they worked for the railroad companies. The Mexican presence in the 
first two of these neighborhoods persisted over the years, but those that lived in the Near 
West Side were pressed to move a few blocks South in the 1960s due to urban renewal 
projects (Taylor 1932; Año Nuevo de Kerr 1976; Padilla 1985). As a result, they settled 
in Pilsen, which had originally been the first Mexican settlement in Chicago composed of 
former farm-worker families seeking new occupations in an urban market (Belenchia 
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1982, p. 118). Today, Pilsen along with Little Village (better know as “La Villita”), Back 
of the Yards and South Chicago have large and vibrant Mexican communities. Although 
Mexicans are much more segregated in Chicago than in other urban centers, many have 
settled in other parts of the city, in the suburbs, and in satellite cities including Cicero, 
Melrose Park, Stone Park, Waukegan, Elgin and Aurora (McCarron 2003; Paral, et al. 
2004).  
 The early Mexican settlers in Chicago arrived with a certain amount of experience in 
the United States. Many had already worked on the railroad lines connecting Northern 
Mexico to the American Southwest. Others did farm work in the Midwest or worked for 
the packinghouses of Kansas City (Año Nuevo de Kerr 1976, p. 20).   
After the restrictive immigration laws of 1921 and 1924 shut down European 
migration but left Western hemisphere migration unregulated, many Mexicans were hired 
by labor recruiting agencies to work in Chicago and other cities of the region. In Chicago, 
Mexicans lived among other immigrant groups already established in the city including 
Italians, Russians, Greeks and Poles in the Near West Side; Poles, Slovaks, and Germans 
in South Chicago; and Poles and Irishmen in Back of the Yards (Año Nuevo de Kerr 
1976, p. 28). Even if limited, their interaction with other immigrants, and the fact that 
they worked mostly in the industrial sector rather than for growers and ranchers, gave 
Mexicans in Chicago a unique experience the effects of which persist today. As Fuchs 
points out, in the East and Midwest there was the possibility of joining strong labor 
unions and Mexicans did not confront the brutal conditions to which they were exposed 
in other places, especially in Texas (Fuchs 1990, p. 121).  Under these more favorable 
conditions, some Mexicans managed to become part of the labor force of major 
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industries, although not on an equal basis with other immigrant workers, since they 
earned the lowest salaries of all ethnic groups settled in the city.  
 Although they had better opportunities in the Midwest than in the Southwest, the 
living conditions of most Mexicans in Chicago were difficult and complex. In the labor 
market, they were hired generally as strike breakers and very rarely for permanent and 
steady employment (Padilla 1985, p. 23). This not only put Mexicans at odds with 
unionized workers, it also aggravated and accelerated the hostility of European ethnic 
laborers against them.  
 All newcomers faced a harsh reality in Chicago. A major difference between 
Mexicans and other newcomers, however, was that the former lacked access to 
citizenship until the second generation and, in many cases, a legal immigration status. 
Since they were not considered voters or potential voters, Mexicans were not attractive to 
the political machines that assisted the incorporation of other immigrant groups into the 
city’s political system. As has been widely documented, in Chicago as well as in New 
York, the system of patronage played an important role in fostering the assimilation and 
political incorporation of immigrants. The machine offered them material goods and 
services in exchange for their votes. In many cases, for instance, the machines helped 
immigrants to naturalize and to register to vote. Although the obvious goal of the 
machine was to obtain and control the votes of newcomers, they also facilitated their 
integration if only passively (Merton 1957; Sterne 2001). Eventually, some ethnic groups 
gained relative autonomy and managed not only to penetrate but also to dominate the 
machine’s power structure, as was the case of the Irish in Chicago, who even today have 
substantial control over the city’s political life.     
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  Mexicans never benefited from a similar situation. For instance, their murky 
immigration status made them vulnerable to deportation. During the Great Depression, in 
collaboration with American immigration officials, welfare agencies from the state of 
Illinois and the city of Chicago rounded up and repatriated Mexican workers and their 
families, regardless of their citizenship status (Padilla 1985). The main goal was to 
remove them from the welfare rolls since the city was close to bankruptcy, even though 
few of them actually depended on the system. The repatriation process had a tremendous 
impact on the Mexican community in Chicago. As Padilla explains: “Welfare 
repatriations became one of the most traumatic experiences of Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans in their contacts with American government authorities” (Padilla 1985, p. 27).      
It would take at least three more decades before the size of the Mexican 
population in Chicago attained that of the 1930s. The few who remained in the city94, 
many of them young and predominantly American-born, decided to adopt a Mexican-
American identity to improve their prospects of being accepted into the mainstream (Año 
Nuevo de Kerr 1976, p. 116). This strategy, however, ultimately failed because they 
represented such small numbers and because they were poorly organized.  
In contrast to African-Americans, Mexicans, and Hispanics in general, were not 
considered a politically salient minority by the city’s Democratic political machine until 
probably the 1980s and more clearly in the 1990s when their exploding numbers could 
not be ignored. For this reason, few programs and concessions were geared towards this 
group. In addition, the patronage structure of the city did not grant Latinos (either 
                                                 
94 According to data provided by Belenchia (1982), based on original information from Taylor (1932), in 
1930 22,000 Mexicans from Illinois were repatriated (some of them having a legal status but not entitled to 
citizenship, and others being illegally in the United States) while, many others left voluntarily due to the 
hardships of the Depression (no numbers available). Only 7,000 Mexicans remained in the whole state of 
Illinois.    
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Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cubans) political appointments since there was no need to 
control or co-opt their political support95.   
During the Second World War, a new generation of Mexicans arrived in Chicago. 
As Padilla points out, the bulk of the newcomers “were those who immigrated as part of 
the braceros (workers) program” (Padilla 1985, p. 31). The second bracero agreement 
signed between Mexico and the United States in 1942 had the original goal of solving the 
agricultural labor shortage in the Southwest created by the war. A year later, however, it 
was modified to allow for the recruitment of industrial labor. As a result, Chicago became 
a major destination point for Mexican workers. During a period of two years, from May 
1943 to September 1945, “more than 15, 000 Mexican braceros were brought to work in 
Chicago” (Padilla 1985, p. 32). Although workers were usually expected to return to their 
homeland after a six-month period, many stayed longer, and others came back illegally. 
  Between the 1950s and 1960s, in the context of the third bracero program, 
(1951-1964) illegal immigration from Mexico reached historic highs. As concern with 
undocumented immigration increased, the status of Mexicans in the city became tenuous. 
Repatriation operations took place at different times in the city, the most recognized 
being the 1954 Operation Wetback. Again, the Mexican community in the city was in 
disarray. The institutional message they received was not encouraging: their labor was 
                                                 
95 Until the 1980s politics in Chicago were defined predominantly by the dynamics between whites (a 
category that included all the ethnic European minorities that arrived into the city until the first quarter of 
the twentieth century, although the Irish had the greatest control of the political life) and blacks and to a 
lesser extent by the dynamics between Catholics and Protestants. Describing the political life in the early 
1980s Kemp and Lineberry (1982) write: “The recent history of Chicago politics is in large part a history of 
changing racial patterns. In the 1950s blacks accommodated to Chicago politics; in the 1970s Chicago 
politics has had to accommodate to blacks.” This happen in great part because the African American 
population in the city had the largest growth rate. It is not yet clear to what extent Chicago politics has to 
accommodate to Mexicans and more generally to Latinos, which are now the population with the fastest 
growth rate. This is in great part because an important segment of this population is still ineligible to vote. 
Still, it is clear that they have become an important part on the equation for many politicians seeking 
elective office.  
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needed, but no roads would be opened for them to regularize their situation and acquire 
legal status.  
In contrast to other immigrant groups, then, Mexicans faced an institutional 
structure in which formal participation in the city’s political life was not possible because 
the majority could not become legal residents. For those who could acquire citizenship 
(mostly the offspring born in the United States), the continuous threat of deportation 
affected their predisposition to participate in politics for decades. One of the first effects 
was the elimination of the sense of confidence that Mexican-Americans had built around 
the goal of being accepted into the city’s mainstream society. As Padilla points out: “Any 
hopes and thoughts of assimilation on the part of Mexican-Americans were cast in doubt 
after the actions of American officials during Operation Wetback” (Padilla 1985, p. 36). 
In organizational terms, an important consequence of their long-term residence in 
Chicago being at risk was that Mexicans had few incentives to mobilize and establish 
political groups. With respect to voting, there are signs that citizens chose to avoid any 
open participation in the local political processes. This was reflected in low registration 
and voting turnout rates for Mexican-Americans as reported by Belenchia (1982, p. 129; 
Browning, et al. 1990b). It is probable consequently that when Harold Washington was 
elected mayor first in 1983 and in 1987 his coalition included African-Americans, liberal 
whites and Latinos, but few Mexican-Americans since as Starks and Preston reported the 
Latino vote for Washington was mostly Puerto Rican96(Starks and Preston 1990).  
 This can be seen in the data for the 1987 mayoral primary election within the 
Democratic Party in which Washington defeated Jane Byrne, the Democratic Party 
                                                 
96 The Latino population of Chicago includes predominantly, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, 
although new national groups have also arrived into the city since the 1980s.  
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machine’s candidate. Byrne got 30.6% of the Puerto Rican vote, whereas Washington got 
62.2%. In contrast, Mexican voters gave Byrne 59.9%, while only 36.5%supported 
Washington (Starks and Preston 1990, p. 98).   
Another institutional obstacle to the political participation of the Mexican-origin 
population in Chicago is the way political representation is structured.  Chicago is 
divided into fifty wards from each of which an alderman is elected to the city council.  
While some ethnic or racial groups are concentrated in specific wards--thus increasing 
the potential that the aldermen they favor gets elected--“no single community area in 
which Latinos predominate falls wholly within one ward (Belenchia 1982).” Because of 
this, it has been difficult for Latinos in general and for Mexicans in particular to elect 
members to the city council and until the 1990s97 Hispanic aldermen were rare.  
Despite these limitations Mexicans have been able to participate in neighborhood 
organizations, which tend to be stronger in Chicago than in most American cities. Since 
Mexicans have been inclined to concentrate in specific areas within the city and share 
similar characteristics in terms of income and lifestyle it is easy for them to become part 
of groups linked to local centers of worship, schools or police.  This became particularly 
viable after the implementation of IRCA when many Mexican immigrants acquired legal 
immigration status in the United States. Many of the leaders of HTAs and SFs first 
acquired their leadership skills by getting involved in community organizations at the 
local level. 
Community participation has barely translated into political action, however. 
Although Chicago offers favorable conditions for neighborhood organizations with a 
                                                 
97 In 1980, only two Latinos held elected office in Chicago, not including judges. Redistricting after the 
1980s census, however, created the first Latino state legislative district, and facilitated the gradual election 
of more of them. By 2001, 22 Latinos held elected office (Hernández Gómez 2001). 
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social character, the political machine generally represses groups that take independent 
political stances. This, along with the fact that Mexicans either have tended to avoid 
politics or have passively supported the machine, explains why the mobilization and 
organization of Mexicans has not been very effective.         
5.3.2 Mexican Participation Today 
During the 1980s there was a period of activism and progressivism among various 
ethnic and racial groups in Chicago, in great part inspired by or related to the election of 
Harold Washington. A new political class of Latino leaders emerged, especially Puerto 
Rican but also Mexican-American. Many were part of a first generation of college 
graduates from local academic institutions, including Northeastern Illinois University, 
and the University of Illinois at Chicago. 
  Within the Mexican-American community, there were at least two important 
leaders. Rudy Lozano was born in Arlington, Texas and resided for a long time in Pilsen 
and then in La Villita. Lozano was a student leader, social worker and community activist 
who defended the rights of undocumented workers and directed the International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union. His greatest political contribution, however, was helping to 
build the coalition that elected Washington. Among other things, he assisted Washington 
mobilize the vote of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Lozano was murdered in 1983 for 
unknown reasons.  
The second leader that emerged at the time was Jesús G. García, who became an 
alderman in 1986 and later on a state senator. García worked along with other Puerto 
Rican leaders, and was part of the Mayor’s Advisory Commission on Latino Affairs. This 
agency became an incubator for future Latino leaders. With Washington’s death, 
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however, the Commission lost its steam and was finally folded into the Commission on 
Human Relations in 1989, when Richard M. Daley, Jr. was elected mayor. Today, García 
is executive director of the Little Village Community Development Corporation and is an 
active member of Durango Unido, one of the organizations based on the state of origin 
that have emerged among the first-generation Mexican community in the last few 
decades.  
 By the 1990s progressivism within the Latino community had diminished, as 
leaders were more moderate or conservative, many of them having acquired their 
experience in the business or non-profit sectors rather than at university campuses or 
through community organizing. Although more Hispanics were elected to office, they 
were less effective advocates of community interests, as some of them aligned with the 
political machine and/or defended policies that in practice adversely affected their own 
community such as neighborhood gentrification. Collaboration between Mexican-
Americans and Puerto Ricans that was at its peak during Washington’s administration 
also became rare as each group focused on tending its own garden.    
Today, the Mexican and Latino communities confront important barriers to 
political mobilization. Although the number of people of Mexican and Latino origin has 
dramatically increased in the last two decades (see table 5.4 and Appendix B), they still 
have limited social and leadership capital. These limitations become more evident when 
focusing on the particular case of the Mexican community (see Appendix B), which 
makes up 75% of the Latino community in the Chicago metropolitan area (Paral, et al. 
2004).  In this region, the number of foreign born Latinos increased by 92.6% during the 
1990s and it is estimated that of the total Latino population only 65% have United States 
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citizenship (Paral, et al. 2004). This problem is not faced by Puerto Ricans, all of whom 
hold American citizenship. To this we have to add that the number of undocumented 
Mexicans is still large (although there is no reliable data available, the Mexican consulate 
adds 30% to the number of Mexicans living in the city identified by the census, assuming 
that undocumented are undercounted).   
Although the Mexican community has grown rapidly and many Mexicans are 
now prosperous businessmen or professionals, the majority of the Mexican population is 
still poor. In Pilsen, for example, the largest Latino neighborhood in the city (88.9% of 
the population are Latinos) (Paral, et al. 2004) and where the majority of residents are 
Mexican born or of Mexican origin, 36% of the community’s children lived below the 
federal poverty level according to data produced in 1998 (UIC 2006).        
Social spending in the city has declined in the last decades and the non-Hispanic 
whites who still dominate the political life of Chicago have been generally unwilling to 
invest more resources in improving public education and health services.  In addition, a 
decline in affordable housing in the city, a direct consequence of policies of demolition 
and gentrification, worsens the already difficult conditions in which Mexican newcomers 
live.   
Despite these problems, there are positive factors that may facilitate the 
incorporation of Mexicans in Chicago more quickly than in other urban centers. These 
include the multiethnic character of the city, its long-standing tradition of receiving and 
accommodating newcomers, and the greater interest that local politicians have recently 
shown in reaching this community. Writing in the early 1980s, Kemp and Lineberry 
argued that the “the dominating concern of the Chicago machine has been to maintain its 
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white and largely ethnic power base, while accommodating the city’s growing black 
middle-class” (Kemp and Lineberrry 1982, p. 7). In the first decade of the twentieth 
century it seems that the dominating concern of the local political class has become how 
to accommodate the city’s growing Latino population while maintaining its political 
control (McCarron 2003). 
Furthermore, the city’s “native” whites have not shown anti-immigrant stances 
common in places such as Los Angeles.  For instance, support for immigration reform 
that would legalize undocumented workers appears to be much higher in this city than in 
many others. A report issued in June 2004 by a regional task force assembled by the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations was highly critical of current American 
immigration policies and its recommendations included creating an earned legalization 
program for the undocumented with a path towards citizenship and the development of a 
“national integration policy” (Edgar, et al. 2004).   
The business and financial classes in Chicago may also become supporters of 
Mexican incorporation. Remittances to Mexico represented $13.4 billion in 2003, 16.6 
billion in 2004, and 20 billion in 2005 (BDM 2006). The processing of at least part of this 
money is certainly an interest of local banks. For instance, “thirty three of the 48 
American banks that offer international remittances services are in the Midwest” 
(Economist 2004, p. 28).  
The support of Chicago’s economic elites has been translated into greater 
opportunities for Mexicans to assimilate into the city’s social and political life. For 
example, local financial institutions have been active in promoting the acceptance of the 
Matricula Consular, the identification card provided by the Mexican consulate, which 
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has direct benefits for undocumented immigrants, including the possibility of accessing 
basic services previously denied to them. In addition, since 2003 these institutions have 
been participating with the Mexican consulate, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) in a pilot program that provides immigrants access to mortgages, 
financial education courses and scholarships (Economist 2004, p. 28).      
5.4 New York: Inter-ethnic Conflict as a Major Obstacle for Incorporation? 
 New York is one of the oldest industrial cities in the United States. As in 
Chicago, machine politics within the Democratic Party dominated the city’s political 
dynamics for a great part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Probably the most 
famous and corrupt political machine in American history was controlled by William 
Marcy “Boss” Tweed from 1868 to 1871. The machine nevertheless played an important 
role in facilitating the social assimilation and political incorporation of immigrants who 
arrived in the period of its ascendancy.  
Because of their voting strength, naturalized citizens became a powerful force in 
the politics of New York City. Political parties deliberately cultivated the 
immigrants. During the movement for suffrage extension in the 1820’s, Tammany 
leaders, originally opposed to foreigners, saw the potential power of the 
immigrant vote. After manhood suffrage went into effect in 1827, the Democrats 
developed a system of recruiting aliens, which contrasted sharply with the usually 
hostile attitude of the Whig party. . . . Immigrants were met at the boat; a 
‘naturalization bureau’ was set up at the Wigman . . . and it was common 
knowledge that many of these adopted citizens voted before they had fulfilled the 
Federal residence requirement of five years (Ernst 1949).  
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Machines also created a sense of community and belonging for new impoverished 
immigrants (Judd and Kantor 2006, p. 58). They organized picnics, patriotic gatherings, 
baseball teams, choirs, youth Clubs, and other activities (Fuchs 1990). Machine leaders in 
New York City handed out goods and promoted the acceptance and recognition within 
the larger society of their cultural heritage. Despite these facts, there are doubts about the 
effectiveness of machines in helping immigrants achieve social mobility (Judd and 
Kantor 2006).  
Though with less intensity than in Chicago, machine style politics remains 
entrenched in New York City’s political culture. A strong mayor coupled with a vast 
municipal budget creates substantial opportunities for political patronage. However, it is 
not evident that these clientelistic structures will play their traditional role in the 
incorporation of the post-1965 immigrants. For instance, as in Chicago the machine can 
hinder the integration of newcomers since its main purpose today is to protect the 
interests of the city’s predominant political groups. In addition, it may be an obstacle for 
the emergence of autonomous political organizations and of independent minority and/or 
liberal coalitions.   
5.4.1 New York City’s Political Development 
For at least the first half of the twentieth century political conflict in New York 
City was centered on ethnic and religious cleavages, notably among Irish and Italian 
Catholics as well as Jews. For many decades these groups were able to establish a loose 
coalition that ran city politics without major challenges. Most political positions were 
allocated among Irish and Italians and to a lesser extent to Jews who sometimes aligned 
with black voters in support of more liberal candidates.  
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By the late 1960s, the city’s white ethnic voters became more united, as they felt 
challenged by the blacks and Puerto Ricans, who were settling in the city in greater 
numbers at the same time that many white Catholics were migrating to the suburbs. Since 
then, Jewish voters, “especially those living in the outer boroughs, began voting with 
their Irish and Italian counterparts” (Kauffman 2004, p. 120).   
For the following two decades, the interracial battles between non-Hispanic 
whites and other ethnic and racial minorities (that is Puerto Rican and Blacks) took place 
within the Democratic Party, a circumstance that created the idea that New York’s voters 
were highly liberal as compared to the rest of the country (particularly, because in the 
general elections non-Hispanic whites voted along with other minorities for the 
Democratic party). As Kauffman (2004) has suggested, however, non-Hispanic whites 
have generally tended to support conservative policies and politicians in detriment to 
liberal agendas and candidates that benefit the interest of African Americans and Puerto 
Ricans.  
This became clear in 1989 when David Dinkins, a black politician, defeated Ed 
Koch to become the Democratic Party nominee. As Kaufman explains, Dinkins’ 
campaign produced many defections within the Democratic party, and although he won 
the mayoral election of 1989 with the support of African-American, Latino and liberal 
non-Hispanic whites, he “was never able to rally a sufficient base of white voter support 
to sustain his mayoralty” (Kauffman 2004, p. 121).  In 1993 he was defeated by the 
Republican candidate Rudolph Guiliani, who was able to capture a sizable part of the 
non-Hispanic white electorate(Kauffman 2003), despite the fact that New York City was 
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and still remains a city where most of its voters, regardless of their ethnic or racial 
origins, identify themselves as predominantly Democratic.         
It is within the Democratic Party, for instance, that most ethnic and political 
conflict has taken place. As Kauffman puts it, historically,  
waves of new ethnic and racial immigration to the city –such as the Jews, Italians, 
blacks, and Puerto Ricans—were incorporated into the party machinery as a way 
of derailing reform challenges and maintaining the strength of the single party 
structure. Participating in the regular Democratic party organizations guaranteed 
access to significant political rewards, and thus the material interests of each 
group were tied to the success of regular Democratic candidates (Kauffman 2004, 
p. 122). 
 Therefore, although minority penetration of the political system below the level of 
the mayoralty became viable, independent minority political activism and coalitions were 
almost impossible. This contrasts with the case of Los Angeles where Jews, Black and 
Latinos shared an outsider status within the local political system, allowing them to 
assemble a multiracial coalition in 1973 to successfully challenge the conservative 
regime that had dominated that city for most of the twentieth century. 
Today, with a new immigration era in place, interethnic and racial conflict 
remains the most important cleavage in New York, with the major groups competing for 
the main political positions and with non-Hispanic whites still controlling City Hall. The 
constantly growing numbers of Latinos, however, have converted this group into a key 
electorate. Although many political scientists and activists expected this group to become 
a natural coalition partner with African-Americans, Latinos have tended to vote in 
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increasingly larger numbers for Republican candidates while African-American voters 
remain as one of the most loyal constituencies of the Democratic party (Kauffman 2004, 
p. 205).  The mayoral race of 2005, where the Democratic candidate Fernando Ferrer 
received more than 60% of the Latino vote, was an exception (Trichter and Paige 2005). 
New immigration, nonetheless, is also changing the nature of this Latino electorate. For a 
long time this group was monolithically Puerto Rican. Now Dominicans, the city’s 
largest immigrant group, and to a lesser extent Mexicans are claiming a share of the 
power originally enjoyed by Puerto Ricans (Porter 2001). This means that ethnic conflict 
within the Latino block may become a characteristic aspect of the city’s political life, 
especially as new immigrants and their children become citizens. Nonetheless, at the 
neighborhood and community level this intra-ethnic conflict is already apparent. Conflict 
is more evident between Puerto Ricans and Mexicans than between Puerto Ricans and 
Dominicans, probably because the last two groups have more in common than the first 
two. Puerto Rican and Mexican contestation has become more acute as the latter have 
been settling in areas traditionally dominated by Puerto Ricans such as East Harlem.    
5.4.2 Origins and Problems of the Mexican Community 
In contrast to other areas of the United States, particularly the Southwest where 
immigration is disproportionately Mexican, the Latino community in New York is not 
homogenous. The largest immigrant group is from the Dominican Republic and Puerto 
Ricans also have a large and longstanding presence in the city (see Appendix B). This not 
only means that the identity formation of Mexicans in the city is different from that 
developed in other more homogenous localities or in places where they are the largest 
Hispanic group (Solís 2001), it also implies that the incorporation process of Mexicans 
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into city politics is and will be very much determined by the relationships and dynamics 
they establish with these groups.  
5.4.3 The History of the Mexican Community 
 There are various accounts of the origins of Mexican immigration to New York 
City. A Mexican consular official who worked with the Mexican community from 1982 
to 200198 argued that the first Mexican immigrants arrived in the 1920s when retailers 
from the Yucatán Peninsula made regular trips from Progreso and Havana to New York 
and eventually settled. The first Mexican immigrant he identified was Salvador Sánchez 
who established a Mutualist society to help in the repatriation of Mexicans for economic 
reasons. In 1928 these immigrants also created the Centro Mexicano de Nueva York (New 
York Mexican Center), which supported a folkloric dance group. With the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959, however, this immigration was for the most part suspended. In the 
late 1950s, however, a few Mexicans from Jalisco and Michoacán arrived in New 
Rochelle after Antonio Valencia, a native of Jalisco, was hired by the mayor and brought 
his family, establishing an initial immigration network that later expanded to Mount 
Vernon and White Plains in Westchester county.     
 Smith (1996a) and Creuheras (2003), for their part, have documented the arrival 
of Mexican immigrants from the Mixteca Baja region in the early 1940s and 1950s. This 
region, which includes “the southernmost part of the state of Puebla, the northernmost 
part of the state of Oaxaca, and the easternmost part of the state of Guerrero” (Smith 
1996b, p. 60) has produced the most Mexican immigrants to the New York Metropolitan 
Area. According to the Mexican Consulate in New York (2000), more than 50% of the 
Mexican population comes from Puebla, while the rest comes predominantly from the 
                                                 
98 Interview with Consular official in New York City. June 4th, 2001.  
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Federal District (12%), Oaxaca (7%), and Guerrero (6%). Although the first immigration 
networks were established in the 1940s and 1950s, it is safe to say that mass Mexican 
immigration to the city did not take place until the 1980s. This was the result of an 
economic crisis in the Mixteca region in the 1980s and the fact that new immigration 
laws in that decade (IRCA in 1986) facilitated not only the arrival of new immigrants 
from other parts of the United States and other regions from Mexico but also the 
expansion of the limited immigration networks first established in the 1940s (Smith 
1996a).  
Given this, it is possible to argue that, in contrast to Chicago and Los Angeles, 
Mexican immigration to the New York Metropolitan area is fairly new, producing only 
the fifth largest immigrant group in the city and accounting only for 4.2% of the total 
immigrant population (New York City Department of City Planning 2004)99. Despite 
this, Mexicans were the immigrant group with the second fastest rate of growth in the city 
between 1990 and 2000 (274.9%) behind only Bangladeshis (393%) and this number 
could be larger according to some city demographers (Bernstein 2005).    
 As a result of its recent arrival, Mexicans in New York may face more complex 
problems incorporating than in other American localities. The first problem is that they 
do not have the strong support networks that Mexicans established in more traditional 
immigration areas. Whereas in Los Angeles and Chicago large numbers of Mexicans 
were able to legalize their status after the 1980s, in New York only around 9,000 were 
able to do so (Smith 1996a, p. 61). As argued in Chapter 4, a legal immigration status is 
correlated with the emergence of new leaders and new organizations within the Mexican 
                                                 
99 It should be said, however, that in 1990 Mexicans ranked as the 17th largest immigrant group to the city 
(New York City Department of City Planning 2004). This attests to the fast rate of growth of this 
community in the city as it is mentioned afterwards.  
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community. This means that it may take longer for the New York community to develop 
a strong leadership to advance their interests than in other localities, even if the 
opportunity structure is more favorable for them in New York than in other places. For 
instance a sizable number of the Mexican community is undocumented and much more 
so than in places such as Chicago or Los Angeles. As Jeffrey Passel, a demographer with 
the Pew Hispanic Center told the The New York Times, 80 to 85% of all Mexican 
immigration to the United States since 1990 has been undocumented. Because New York 
is getting a many new immigrants from Mexico it could be argued that “virtually all of it 
is undocumented” (Bernstein 2005, p. B3). This puts Mexicans in a weaker position there 
than other immigrant and minority communities.  
 Because Mexican immigration is fairly new Mexican-Americans and Mexican-
American organizations in the city are almost invisible. Whereas in Chicago and Los 
Angeles newcomers can depend on the assistance of Mexican-Americans leaders, in New 
York they cannot receive similar support. Their most natural ally would be Puerto 
Ricans, but so far there are signs that they have tended to view Mexicans with suspicion 
(Porter 2001).   
5.4.4 Residential Patterns and Economic Conditions 
In contrast to places like Chicago, where the Mexican community is segregated, 
Mexicans in New York are scattered as far as Passaic and New Brunswick in New Jersey, 
New Rochelle in New York and some areas of Fairfield County in Connecticut. Within 
the city limits, some large numerical concentrations are emerging, including Sunset Park-
Industry City in Brooklyn, Corona in Queens, and East Harlem in Manhattan. As The 
Newest New Yorkers, 2000 report shows, Mexicans are the immigrant group with the 
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largest percentage of people living in overcrowded spaces (66.1%) (New York City 
Department of City Planning 2004, p. 30). This number is high compared to other Latino 
groups, which also live in very poor conditions (Dominicans 38 %, Ecuadorians 41.7 %, 
and Colombians 34.9 %).  For instance, Mexicans are the immigrant group with the 
lowest rate of property ownership in the city (only 5.7% own the places where they live). 
With respect to their educational levels, the The Newest New Yorkers, 2000 shows that 
only one third had completed high school(New York City Department of City Planning 
2004). For instance, 29% of the adult population older than 25 had not finished 6th grade, 
23% had not finished middle school and only 14% had gone to college (Velazquez de 
León 2001). Mexicans have the lowest educational levels of any community in the city. 
In addition, although the large number of workers in Mexican households gives them a 
median income higher than for other populations ($32,000), their mean earnings are the 
lowest for any immigrant group ($21,284 for males and $16,737 for women) (New York 
City Department of City Planning 2004) making them the poorest population group in the 
city. This becomes particularly problematic because Mexicans are having more children 
than any other immigrant group except Dominicans (Bernstein 2005).  
 Mexicans in New York have not been able to develop a professional and 
entrepreneurial class large enough to provide the community with leaders to advance 
their interests. This is true even though there are some successful businessmen who have 
profited, for example, from the increased demand for Mexican products.  
5.4.5 The Incorporation of Mexicans Today 
The human and social capital levels of the Mexican community in New York are 
meager. Despite this, the multiethnic character of the city may serve as a positive context, 
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at least because this diminishes their chances of becoming the target of anti-immigrant 
sentiment and laws as has happened in California. Furthermore, the fact that New York 
City has more points of entrance into the political system than other places (Mollenkopf 
1999) implies that their incorporation process may be faster than expected. This, 
however, will depend very much on the kind of relationship the Mexican community 
establishes with Puerto-Ricans, who today dominate the highest positions of power 
within the Latino/Hispanic community, and other ethnic and racial groups (Smith 2002). 
It is not clear yet how the opportunity structure of the city, which has been deemed more 
favorable for the incorporation of newcomers than that of other American cities 
(Mollenkopf 1999; Mollenkopf, et al. 2001; Smith, et al. 2001; Smith 2002) will affect 
the integration of Mexicans. Whether Mexicans will successfully incorporate as past 
immigrant groups or become an underclass is an open question.     
5.5 Los Angeles: Building a Coalition of Outsiders  
In contrast to Chicago and New York, in Los Angeles political and social activism 
of minorities and newcomers has been generally seen with distrust. As a result, there is 
less encouragement for new immigrants to organize and less mobilization of newcomers 
by local institutions such as political parties, which have been historically weak anyway. 
Mollenkopf argues that while New York’s political system promotes political 
participation of newcomers because it is centralized, politicized and organized, Los 
Angeles discourages it because it “is decentralized, depoliticized, and fragmented, if not 
disorganized” (Mollenkopf, et al. 2001, p. 63).  Suspicion of political activism has a long 
history and is linked to the formation of its current political institutions, which were 
designed at the beginning of the twentieth century by a business-oriented elite governing 
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in the name of white, protestant, and religiously conservative mid-western immigrants. 
The latter arrived in the city in the last part of the nineteenth century and took almost 
complete control of its political life by the beginning of the twentieth, to the extent that 
“no African-American, Latino or Jewish person held elected office in the city between 
1900 and 1949 when Edward Roybal was elected to the city council” (Sonenshein 2004, 
p. 30).   
Los Angeles’ conservative elite wanted to avoid the social and political unrest 
characteristic of the East and the Mid-West. They also were uninviting to European 
immigrants and other ethnic and racial groups, which they linked to the origins of this 
strife. They designed local institutions to isolate the administrative process from politics 
and to create a homogeneous community, free of the corruption of big-city machine 
politics. Los Angeles, therefore, is a reform city. Two prominent features of the reform 
movement were at-large and non-partisan elections.  As Sonenshein has explained, at-
large elections tend to diminish minority political power because they make it extremely 
difficult for minority candidates to win seats on city councils (Sonenshein 2004, p. 16). 
Nonpartisanship further reduces participation because it diminishes the capacities for 
political parties to build strong and loyal constituencies, and thus to bring new groups 
into the political process.  
In addition to these features, Los Angeles’ non-Hispanic white elite created a 
strong civil service system and established direct democracy through the recall, 
referendum and initiative, all mechanisms that were uncommon in the rest of the country 
at the time and which weakened local political parties. All of these elements, except the 
system of at-large elections that was rejected in 1925, survive today. Non-Hispanic 
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whites make up the majority of the electorate despite the fact that they lost their plurality 
in the city population in the 1990s. They have had few incentives to bargain with other 
groups. As Mollenkopf has argued, Los Angeles’ political system creates little motivation 
for dominant white elites “to recognize, incorporate or co-opt claims from subordinate 
groups (including new immigrant groups) and for leaders of subordinate groups to 
accommodate one another” (Mollenkopf 1999, p. 413).  In contrast, Mollenkopf explains, 
New York City “provides points of access for all groups, even new immigrants” 
(Mollenkopf 1999, p. 413) making it more likely that they can have substantial 
representation in the city’s political system.    
Despite this, the conservative white establishment has been successfully 
challenged on two occasions. The first took place in 1973 when in a historic contest the 
city elected its first black mayor, Tom Bradley, despite the fact that African-Americans 
constituted only 17% of the population and were far outnumbered by Latinos who 
accounted for 28% of the population. This triumph seemed improbable just a few years 
before, when Bradley, a liberal Democrat, lost the race against Sam Yorty, a conservative 
Republican. Four years later, Bradley was not only able to defeat Yorty but he kept 
control of City Hall for almost 20 years, being reelected four times.  The second occasion 
took place in 2005 when Antonio Villaraigosa, a liberal Democrat, became the first 
Latino mayor of the city since the 1870s after defeating the incumbent conservative 
James K. Hahn, the son of a well-known politician in the city. As in the case of Bradley, 
his triumph had seemed unlikely just a few years before when he lost the mayor’s race to 
Hahn. What wrought these changes about in a city whose non-partisan electoral system 
has widely discouraged the political mobilization and incorporation of minorities? What 
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does that mean about the process of political integration of the city’s large Mexican 
immigrant population?   
5.5.1 Bradley’s election and the “Politics of Black and White.”    
From the 1960s to the 1990s the city of Los Angeles was divided between blacks 
and whites and liberals and conservatives. These political cleavages reappeared 
constantly during electoral periods and determined campaign issues. Even with a large 
presence in the city, Latinos played only bit parts.  
For many years, the African American community was excluded from the 
political system and the policy process. In 1965, however, black Angelenos felt 
particularly aggravated by the administration of Sam Yorty who had seemed 
unresponsive after the Watts riots in the same year. (Sonenshein 1990, p. 37). The riots 
planted the seeds for black political mobilization and also provided a new agenda for 
blacks and white liberals. Tom Bradley’s emergence as an important leader within the 
African-American community gave the new awakening traction. A former Los Angeles 
police lieutenant with a soft-spoken tone, Bradley was elected to represent the 10th 
Council District in 1963. From that position he built a strong black voting base, and 
established links with middle-class blacks, Jews, Asian Americans and even Latinos. 
When the riots took place, Bradley used his council forum to attack the Yorty 
administration for failing to seek federal grant funds. In his opposition against the Yorty 
administration he got the support of liberal whites who were out of power at the time of 
the riots.  
In 1969, Bradley ran for mayor against Yorty with the support of a biracial 
coalition that included white liberals, many of them Jews, and African-Americans. 
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Capitalizing on fears of black militancy and anti-war student protests, Yorty was able to 
prevail. In 1973, in a less polarized climate, Bradley ran again and this time he was able 
to win election after liberal whites, particularly Jews, turned out in greater numbers than 
in previous elections. Latino turnout was also important. One interesting aspect that 
emerged from this process, however, was that the Latino vote was apparently divided 
along class lines. As Shonenshein explains, Bradley did better in low-income Latino 
neighborhoods, which was the opposite of the class relationship among Jews (Sonenshein 
1990, p. 39). As will be seen later, this class cleavage within the Latino community 
would characterize its political behavior in the future.    
  The interracial support that Bradley was able to obtain became “an important 
confirmation of the minority incorporation thesis at the big city level” (Sonenshein and 
Susan 2002, p. 68). This thesis held that minority political incorporation in American 
cities was tightly related to their capacities of building alliances with white liberals and/or 
other minorities (Browning, et al. 1990c). Bradley’s election, however, was striking for 
other reason: in a city in which minority incorporation was deemed to be difficult because 
of its conservative institutional structure, a black mayor was not only elected, but he was 
reelected four times. Sonenshein explains it this way: “In nonpartisan Los Angeles there 
are no party machines to stand in the way of a liberal coalition” (Sonenshein 1990, p. 33). 
This means that although minority political incorporation is more difficult in reform cities 
like Los Angeles than in the old industrial cities of the East and Midwest, once it 
becomes possible it takes place with greater force. Because incremental accommodation 
with the local power structure is almost impossible, the stakes become higher, creating 
more incentives for the integration of stronger dominant coalitions than in other places.  
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5.5.2 The in-Between Governments’ of Riordan  
During the 1980s and 1990s Los Angeles underwent major demographic changes. 
By 1980 non-Latino whites made up almost half the city population (48%), while 
African-Americans represented 17% of the population and Latinos 28%. Due to mass 
immigration from Latin America, the 1990 census showed that there was a 70% increase 
of Latino residents while non-Latino White and black populations declined by 8 and 2% 
respectively. Latinos, thus, became the largest ethnic group in the city, constituting 40% 
of the city’s population (Kauffman 2004, p. 93). As Kaufman observes, this rapid 
demographic growth might normally have led to an increase in inter-racial conflict. 
However, because the local economy was growing, the racial fears of the non-Hispanic 
white elite were apparently mitigated. This situation was reflected in the high approval 
levels of the Bradley administration from all ethnic groups including non-liberal whites. 
The political environment changed, however, after the Californian economy fell into 
recession and as a result of new riots in 1992. 
The history of these riots is well known. Sparked by the acquittal of LAPD 
officers in the beating of a black motorist, the riots resulted in 52 fatalities, 16,000 
arrests, and a property damage close to $1 billion dollars (Kaufmann 2004). The public 
response to these events divided along racial lines (Kaufmann 2004, p. 95). The 
polarizing effect these events had on Angelenos’ political views became clearer a year 
later during the election of 1993, when Republican businessman Richard Riordan was 
elected mayor.  
During that election, not only racial conflict intensified as a result of the riots, but 
also anti-immigration sentiment became an issue. As Sonenshein and Susan point out, 
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Riordan, who conducted a law and order anti-immigrant campaign, “did not win the 
support of African Americans, but he won a significant minority of Latinos and broke 
even with Jews, who had been pillars of the Bradley coalition” (Sonenshein and Susan 
2002, p. 68).  
Although the Latino vote was not crucial to the outcome of the election, it is 
striking that they voted predominantly in favor of a mayor running on an anti-Latino 
(Mexican) immigrant agenda. A general answer is that the Latino community in Los 
Angeles, as in other parts of the United States, is divided to a great extent between those 
who have a higher status and have been subject to longer periods of cultural socialization 
in the United States (typically native-born Mexican-Americans but also those naturalized 
long ago) and those who have a lower status and are more identified with the working 
class (Desipio 1996; Kaufmann 2004). As Kaufmann explains:  
The negative publicity regarding illegal (and principally Latino) immigrants 
threatens the relative standing of middle-class Latinos in Los Angeles. The 
perceived lawlessness and poverty of illegal immigrants potentially damages the 
standing of all Latinos, and those middle-class Latinos with the most to lose are 
substantially more intolerant of illegal immigration than are their poorer 
counterparts (Kaufmann 2004, p. 114).  
Evidently the class cleavage within the Latino community that was already 
manifest during Bradleys’ 1973 election became magnified as a result of the large 
immigration flows arriving to the city. Would the Latino community overcome these 
cleavages or remain divided and depoliticized? 
 
 220
5.5.3 From Hahn’s Election to Villaraigosa’s Colorful Coalition 
 During the 1990s politics in California and Los Angeles were deeply affected by 
anti-immigrant sentiment. In 1994, Governor Pete Wilson ran a reelection campaign with 
a strong anti-illegal immigration message. He also supported an initiative on the ballot 
called Proposition 187 whose main goal was to ban illegal immigrants from public social 
services and education, and non-emergency healthcare. This initiative also called on state 
and local agencies to report any one suspected of being illegally in the United States.  
 As is well known, California’s electorate approved Proposition 187, but its 
implementation was blocked by the federal courts. Two years after the passage of this 
proposition, a new “anti-affirmative action initiative (209) seeking to repeal most such 
programs in the areas of public contracting, jobs and education, passed the California 
electorate” (Barreto and Woods 2005, p. 148). Again, Governor Wilson and California’s 
Republicans strongly backed it. In 1998, Latin-American immigrants were the targets of 
another conservative initiative (227), which proposed, unsuccessfully, to end bilingual 
education in public schools.  
 All of these initiatives, along with the 1996 changes in national welfare and 
immigration legislation, quickly galvanized Latinos in opposition and marked a turning 
point in their political behavior. Some changes in that behavior were noticed immediately 
and others, intriguingly enough, were not.    
 Among immigrant groups, especially Mexicans, these events spurred applications 
for citizenship which peaked in 1996 (David and Guerra 2002, p. 6). Voting registration 
and turnout among Latinos also increased although this was not clear in all instances. For 
example, during the 1994 general elections, when proposition 187 was on the ballot, it is 
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not evident that significantly more Latinos voted than in previous elections. As Barreto et 
al. have pointed out: “In part, this stems from the procedural reality of California’s then 
29-day registration period” (Barreto and Woods 2005, p. 150).   
 In Los Angeles, Latino registration and turnout rates did increase after 1993 faster 
than Latino population growth would have predicted (Sonenshein and Susan 2002; 
Barreto and Woods 2005). In addition, identification with the Democratic Party within 
the Latino population became more prominent as Republican candidates were linked to 
an anti-immigrant/Latino stand (Barreto and Woods 2005). However, it was not evident 
that these events had stimulated “new broad-based, grassroots movements or propelled 
new leaders to prominence” (Mollenkopf, et al. 2001, p. 44), an outcome Mollenkopf 
attributed to the decentralized and depoliticized character of the city’s political system.  
 By the 2001 elections, however, the political environment in Los Angeles had 
changed even if the political participation of Latinos was still proportionally smaller than 
their share of the population (47% by 2000) due to its youth and non-citizen status100. 
From a pack of six candidates two became the favorites: Antonio Villaraigosa, who was a 
former state assembly speaker, and James Hahn who was the city attorney and the son of 
former County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn who was among the most admired politicians 
within the African American community.  
With an effective campaign that resonated within white neighborhoods, especially 
in those predominantly Jewish, Villaraigosa emerged as the leading contender with 30% 
of the vote, while Hahn who had the support of conservative whites and African-
                                                 
100 According to 2004 data, Latinos represent 34% of California’s population but only 18% of the voters. In 
contrast, non-Hispanic whites make up only 45% of the population but 69 of the voters. This disproportion 
between the electorate of the state and the total resident population shows why there is still a long road for 
Latinos to become a major political force in the stat and in the city of Los Angeles(Katia 2004).  
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Americans was second with 25%. In the runoff campaign, however, Hahn successfully 
portrayed Villaraigosa as a “drug-ring kingpin” (Meyerson 2001) after linking him to a 
cocaine trafficker, Carlos Vignali, whose sentence was commuted by President Bill 
Clinton upon Villarraigosa’s request.  
The 2001 mayor’s race illuminated the new divisions between white and black 
versus Latino and white liberals. Villarraigosa, for instance, compared his campaign to 
Bradley’s in 1969 and scholars’ pondered if Latino participation resembled the patterns 
of African-Americans in the 1960s and 1970s in which minorities allied themselves with 
ideological liberals (Sonenshein and Susan 2002).  The Latino electorate voted as a block 
for Villarraigosa despite the fact that there were still clear divisions within the 
community as in the past, particularly on the subject of immigration (Sonenshein and 
Susan 2002). Finally, a major implication of this election was that African Americans and 
Latinos were both competitors and potential allies, and that this would depend less on 
race and ideology than on the characteristics of their leadership (Sonenshein and Susan 
2002). 
 In 2005 Villaraigosa ran again against Hahn. This time, however, he was able to 
put together, for the first time in Los Angeles history, a colorful coalition that included 
Latinos, whites and African Americans. Asians were the only minority ethnic group that 
voted in large numbers for Hahn. According to The New York Times, Hahn made two 
decisions that shattered his winning coalition: 1) he angered blacks by replacing the 
police chief Bernard Parks with William Bratton, the former New York police 
commissioner; and 2) he alienated white voters who had supported him in the previous 
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election by fighting back an effort by the San Fernando Valley to secede from the City of 
Los Angeles (Broder 2005).     
 Villaraigosa’s election was a watershed event in Los Angeles politics and a 
confirmation once again of the thesis that minority incorporation at the big city level 
required the establishment of coalitions that included moderate-liberal whites and one or 
more minority groups (Browning, et al. 1990c). What does his election mean for the 
incorporation process of the first generation Mexican community in Los Angeles? 
5.5.4 The Mexican Community   
 Villarraigosa’s triumph was the political culmination of a demographic 
phenomenon that had been taking place in Los Angeles for more than two decades. 
Although from the 1880s to the 1970s the city was predominantly non-Hispanic white, by 
the 1980s it was becoming clear that if immigration from Mexico and other Latin 
American countries continued at current levels, the city would become predominantly 
Latino. This situation became an uncontested reality in the 2000 census (for Los Angeles 
County, Latinos represented 44.6% of the population (see Table 5.6).  
 Because it was originally a Mexican city, Los Angeles has had, historically, a 
relatively large Mexican-origin population and been a leading center of Mexican-
American life. Despite this, Mexican-Americans had a hard time gaining political 
representation in the city. When Bradley took power Latinos were an important 
component of his coalition, but his government did little for the political careers of 
Mexican-American leaders. In the first ten years of his administration no Latino leader 
was elected to local political office. Finally, in 1983 Richard Alatorre won a seat on the 
city council. It took a voting rights lawsuit to create a second Latino city council district 
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after 1990 (Mollenkopf, et al. 2001). Finally, in 1993 a third Mexican-American was 
elected to the council and since then Mexican-Americans have been gradually winning 
political positions at different levels of government.  
 The electoral triumphs of Mexican origin leaders certainly can be considered an 
important step in the political incorporation of the Mexican immigrant community. As 
Mollenkopf puts it, in Los Angeles “Mexican-American political elites are divided over 
their long-term strategy and often distance themselves from immigrants’ concerns” 
(Mollenkopf, et al. 2001).  
Antonio Villaraigosa has shown a strong inclination to support the Mexican 
immigrant community and it is probable that he will attempt to devise policies that 
benefit this community. However, he will be hampered by the fact that he depends on a 
broad-based coalition and that the mayor’s office in Los Angeles has few real powers.  
Attending the needs of this community, however, is key for the future of the city. 
As a recent report explained: “Census data show that nearly two thirds of children in Los 
Angeles County were in Latino families” (David and Guerra 2002, p. 5)101  Many of them 
are born in immigrant households, since 78% of adult Latinos in California, the majority 
of whom are concentrated in the Los Angeles region, are immigrant Latinos (David and 
Guerra 2002, p. 7).  The characteristics of this community and their possibilities of 
improving their living conditions will determine to a great extent the social and political 
future of Los Angeles. 
As in the other cities considered in this study, the Mexican immigrant community 
in Los Angeles has a low level of human and social capital. The majority performs 
                                                 
101 In some cases, the information I gathered refers to Los Angeles County, in others to the City of Los 
Angeles. I clarify in each instance to which unit it is referring. 
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menial labor in the city’s service industry (16%), or work as operators in the industrial 
sector, or in the technical/clerical/sales industry (23%). Only 10% of this population 
performs managerial or professional work (Larios 2001). Although it is difficult to know 
the exact numbers, a large portion of this population is undocumented, particularly those 
who arrived after the 1990s. Despite this fact, Los Angeles has a proportionately larger 
population with legal status than cities such as New York, as many Mexicans were able 
to regularize their immigration situation as a result of IRCA and family reunification 
policies102.   
 As in the case of New York, Mexicans are scattered all over the Los Angeles 
Metropolitan area.  Although the most well known Mexican community in the city is East 
Los Angeles, Mexicans have also settled in South Central and the San Fernando and San 
Gabriel valleys. Thirty-five percent of Mexicans live in households with five or more 
adults (Larios 2001).  
Mexicans in Los Angeles have very low educational levels, although better than 
those arriving in New York. Data provided by the Mexican consulate show that within 
the Latino population of Los Angeles County, Mexicans have the lowest probability of 
finishing high school (51.5%). At the same time, only 17% of immigrant adults had that 
level of education, 44% finished only middle school and 19% elementary. Although 15% 
have some college education, only 5% have obtained a bachelor’s or higher degree. 
 Despite low educational levels, an entrepreneurial and professional class is 
emerging to provide the first generation community with new leadership. This was 
facilitated by the 1986-immigration amnesty. In addition, many California immigrants 
                                                 
102 As Waldinger and Bozorgmehr point out: “The Los Angeles accounted for a third of all the 
undocumented immigrants estimated during the 1980 census and roughly the same proportion of the 
population who obtained amnesty under IRCA” (1996, p. 14). 
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come from the central region of Mexico, which tends to be more developed than the 
Mixteca Baja that provides more immigrants to New York.  This leadership has 
differentiated itself from the American-born Mexican-origin elite and is more prone to 
have a bilateral agenda rather than one based only on the city of residence. At the same 
time, however, it has also been learning from the Mexican-American community, which 
provides the majority of the Latino leaders in the city103.   
In summary, the Mexican immigrant community of Los Angeles still faces many 
challenges for its incorporation in the city. Historically, the political opportunity structure 
of the city functioned to limit the incorporation of minorities. Because minorities usually 
remained as outsiders, interest in winning the mayoralty grew. The non-partisan 
environment of the city functioned as a constraint but also as an opportunity to build 
coalitions that could advance the interest of newcomers. This is what happened in 2005 
when Villaraigosa was elected mayor. Villarraigosa’s election is certainly an important 
step in the political incorporation of the Mexican origin community both foreign and 
America born. Further political integration of the first generation Mexican community 
and their offspring depends on their capacity to develop strong leadership that can 
establish a working relationship with the better established Mexican-American 
community and with other ethnic groups as well.  
5.6 Dallas: Incorporation Business Style  
As in the case of Los Angeles, the distrust towards political and social activism 
has also had a long history in Dallas.  Since the beginning of the twentieth century this 
city was dominated by a business and financial class that controlled not only major credit 
and financial decisions, but also the electoral processes for local political offices. It also 
                                                 
103 “The vast majority of Latino Leaders 80% are U.S born” (David and Guerra 2002). 
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dominated the mass media, the work of charitable organizations, and even the leadership 
designation in minority communities (Hanson 2003). Early in its history Dallas 
experienced political competition and conflict and even developed a labor movement. 
This situation changed by the beginning of the twentieth century when business leaders 
stopped competing for control of the city’s government and unified to better advance 
their interests. One of their first steps was to replace the mayor-alderman form of 
government, which was prominent in the mid-West and the East, with the mayor-
commission system in 1906. As Morgan (2004) explains, the main goal of installing a 
commission was to make government more efficient and less prone to corruption and 
political unrest. The idea was to decentralize the administration into different departments 
presided by commissioners (e.g. fire and police, water and sewage, streets and public 
property, and finance and revenue) while the mayor would play the role of supervisor.  
This system was part of a first wave of Progressive reform of municipal government after 
the turn of the century. With the installation of the commission system, ward elections 
were also replaced with citywide elections despite major opposition by local labor 
organizations. Along with the existence of a poll tax introduced in Texas in 1902, and the 
acceptance of whites only primaries through the Terrell Election Law (Morgan 2004), 
minorities and the working class were effectively disenfranchised. Candidates 
representing these groups were unable to win any elected office in Dallas until 1969 
when George Allen became the first African-American councilman in the city’s 
history104.  The commission system not only failed to eliminate political patronage, but it 
made governing the city more difficult because the commissioners engaged in internecine 
                                                 
104 C.A. Galloway became the first non-white councilman in 1967, but he was appointed to fill an 
unexpired term 
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struggles over power and resources. The city’s political life became radicalized as the Ku 
Klux Klan took control of many of the city’s offices and county government (Hanson 
2003).  Dallas harbored the largest klavern in the United States. Many of the city notables 
were members of the Klan, including the most prominent banker, R.L. Thornton. 
 Eventually, however, the presence of the Klan became a problem for the local 
business elite as it challenged the city’s image as a progressive and cosmopolitan place. 
By 1931 local businessmen and financiers pushed for the replacement of the commission 
system and the creation of a council-manager form of government through a new 
organization created for that purpose called the Citizens Charter Association (CCA). The 
goal was to run the city as a corporation. The city council would be an equivalent of a 
board made up of men “of widely recognized business judgment and broad experience,” 
while the city manager would be a professional who would free such notable citizens 
“from direct responsibility of day-to-day management of operating departments of the 
city government, but could still control it” (Hanson 2003). Ideologically the goal was to 
separate “policy from administration and government from politics” (Hanson 2003).  
 When the new form of government was approved, the business community 
decided to institutionalize the CCA. Until 1975, when it was dissolved, the CCA (and its 
institutional successor, the DCC) dominated the selection of mayors, city councilors, 
school supervisors and other authorities in the city. The councilors, and many of the other 
authorities, were generally civic and business leaders with non-partisan ties selected by 
the CCA and promoted by the Dallas Morning News. In addition, with the goal of 
preventing them from building any independent political base, they were constrained to 
serve no more than three terms. 
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In 1937 the CCA was transformed into the political arm of the Dallas Citizens 
Council (DCC), which was created with the purpose of controlling the city’s civic agenda 
and policy process. The DCC was a very tight group that included only CEOs or 
presidents of the top firms in the city. This non-profit organization was by invitation only 
and had two hundred members. None of them, however, were representatives of the 
society at large; lawyers, ministers, labor leaders, physicians and public officials were not 
welcomed. Since the business members of the DCC depended upon the growth and 
prosperity of Dallas, they would take steps to ensure that city services were efficient. 
Furthermore, “the city’s economic elite would take actions that benefited minorities if 
convinced Dallas as an orderly, progressive city, hospitable to business, was at risk” 
(Hanson 2003).    
In this non-political, business-like environment, right wing extremism flourished, 
particularly in the persons of Rev. W. A. Criswell, pastor of the First Baptist Church, and 
Republican Congressman Bruce Alger. Criswell denounced racial integration. Alger was 
a foe of Federal programs, the United Nations and the Kennedy administration. For many 
years the DCC was not interested in their activities as long as they did not interfere with 
the good image of the city. After the assassination of President Kennedy on November 
22, 1963 during a visit to Dallas, the business community concentrated on eliminating the 
city’s radical image. They blocked Alger’s reelection to Congress and ensured the 
election of Erik Jonsson, CEO of Texas Instruments, as the Mayor. Jonsson brought 
major change to the city’s economic and social landscape. Using both public and 
corporate resources he promoted the construction of the Dallas Forth-Worth airport as 
 230
well as the creation of the University of Texas at Dallas in a space that formerly belonged 
to Texas Instruments (Hanson 2003).       
Jonsson’s tenure, however, represented the last time the DCC held a complete 
monopoly of power in the city. By the 1970s, the city’s environment had changed. The 
business class had become more pluralistic. In addition, in 1975 the courts mandated the 
election of eight of the eleven city councilors via the single-member district rather than 
the at-large formula. Unable any longer to control the selection of candidates, the DCC 
disbanded in the same year. Although the business community would continue to have 
significant influence in civic affairs and the selection of mayors, it would never again be 
able to exercise the political control that it did for much of the twentieth century (Hanson 
2003). 
Nevertheless, the long domination of city politics by the DCC left its imprint on 
the city. In Dallas, minimal government became the motto. The local authorities would 
provide only those services that could not be provided more efficiently by the market and 
charitable organizations. The city never developed strong political parties that could 
complement or counterbalance the interests of the business class. Neighborhood 
organizations were uncommon and support for disadvantaged communities was minimal. 
Under these conditions, the incorporation of minorities and new immigrants came at a 
snail’s pace and usually without the willing collaboration of the non-Hispanic white 
population. Furthermore, since interactions between different ethnic groups were 
minimal, ethnic tension rather than negotiation became the norm. 
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5.6.1 The Politics of Exclusion: Blacks and Hispanics 
In a political context in which the Ku Klux Klan and right-wing radicalism 
flourished it is not surprising that the norm was segregation of blacks and Latinos. For 
much of its history, the black community in Dallas was confined to wholly segregated 
neighborhoods that were poor and isolated. In contrast to cities with large African-
American populations such as Washington, Baltimore or Atlanta, the black community in 
Dallas had a hard time developing a vibrant and educated middle-class that could 
“provide community leadership and function as peers of the white elite” (Hanson 2003). 
In the few instances when the black community provided credible candidates for the city 
council or school board, they were effectively intimidated and discouraged from running. 
Participation in labor unions, common in other parts of the country, was also unavailable, 
as attempts to organize industrial labor unions during the 1930s were brutally repressed.  
In summary, there were almost no mainstream avenues for African-American political 
participation.  
  Hispanics were also largely excluded, although with less intensity. Their presence 
in the city, however, was less visible. Although Texas historically attracted large numbers 
of Mexican migrants, Dallas was never a major center of Mexican-American life. Early 
in the twentieth century there was an area called “little Mexico” populated by refugees 
from the Mexican revolution, but it never contained more than 10,000 people. After 
World War Two the Hispanic population in the city increased and by 1970, when the 
census asked Hispanics to identify themselves, there were 68,000 (Hanson 2003). By the 
1990s the city had a tri-racial population with blacks representing 29.5% of the 
population, Latino or Hispanic 20.9%, and non-Hispanic whites or Anglos 55.3%. By 
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2000, however, the numbers had changed with Hispanics becoming the largest ethnic 
group at 35.6%, while Anglos were 34.6% and African-Americans 25.6% (Morgan 
2004). Despite their increasing numbers, Hispanics were, like blacks, excluded from 
grand juries until the 1960s, and they did not have access to the organized bar “until the 
1960s, when the first three Mexican-American lawyers were admitted to practice” 
(Hanson 2003).  
5.6.2 Incorporation Through Litigation 
The inclusion of African-Americans and Hispanics into the city’s political, civic 
and social institutions would be achieved only through the persistent intervention of the 
federal courts. Key events in this regard were the 1954 (Brown v Board of Education) and 
1955 Supreme Court school desegregation decisions, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 
1965 Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court’s decisions of the 1950s set the stage for the 
desegregation of the Dallas School Board. Constant opposition and obstacles imposed by 
local judges, however, delayed this process until in 1964 the Civil Rights Act forced local 
authorities to take more serious steps toward desegregation. Opposition from the non-
Hispanic white elite still persisted, however, and from the 1970s until the beginning of 
the twenty-first century the Dallas School Board was under the court’s supervision first 
for the protection of African-American students and then of Latinos, which by the 1990s 
were the largest group in the school system. The effects of these policies in improving the 
quality of education have been mixed, nonetheless, because the response of non-Hispanic 
white families was to move to the suburbs and send their children to predominantly white 
schools. 
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 The Civil Rights Act also forced the integration of minorities in professional 
associations and public institutions. This, however, also occurred at a slow pace and 
under intense opposition from the conservative elite. For example, by 1990, the city 
police department, which was forced in the 1970s to hire more minority officers, was still 
“disproportionately Anglo”, even when “all minority groups combined exceeded 50% of 
the city’s population” (Hanson 2003).    
 Of far more effect was the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It “gave federal judges the 
power to strike down voting systems when they found that they systematically reduced 
minority representation” (Judd and Kantor 2006). Dallas was forced to modify its at-large 
system by adopting wards that would maximize representation for blacks and later on, 
with a 1975 Act extension of the Act, Latinos.  The defense of the at-large system 
entangled the city in voting rights litigation from 1967 to 1991 (Morgan 2004). There 
were two conflicting interests--those of blacks who had a concentrated residential pattern 
and Hispanics, who were more dispersed. As a result, the legal battle for minority 
representation was driven by discussions as to the best combinations to represent these 
groups. Redistricting battles were also an issue after the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses. 
 Overall, changes in electoral law facilitated the election of more minority 
candidates to the city council and the mayor’s offices. In 1995, Dallas voters elected the 
city’s first black mayor (Morgan 2004). In 2000, the city manager and the school 
superintendent were Hispanic (Hanson 2003). Despite these advances, major questions 
remained as to the extent to which minorities had been incorporated into the city’s 
politics. In his detailed book about the effects of the Voting Rights Act, Morgan (Morgan 
2004) points out that the creation of electoral districts does not seem to have stimulated 
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electoral competitiveness and voter turnout. Furthermore, “even though the 
representatives elected from single member districts altered the dynamics of the struggles 
for power between the mayor, council and city manager, the informal relationships 
between public and private interests were not altered in any fundamental way by single 
member districts” (Morgan 2004).   
5.6.3 Dallas as a New Gateway City and the Mexican Immigrant Community   
 Because Dallas was a relative newcomer to the urban scene, the city missed most 
of the early waves of European immigration to the United States. No specific immigrant 
group had ever attempted to press its interests onto the local political system (Morgan 
2004). Nor did it develop an institutional infrastructure and political culture to 
accommodate the demands of a variety of white ethnic groups as other cities in the East 
and Midwest had. After the implementation of the 1965 Hartz-Cellar Act, however, the 
city became an immigration gateway attracting people from Asia, the Middle East and 
Latin America. This was facilitated by an economic boom during the 1970s and the first 
part of the 1980s, stimulated by the creation of the Dallas-Forth Worth airport, the 
presence of strong financial sector and a pattern of corporate relocation promoted by the 
city. Although the city suffered a financial setback in the mid 1980s, it was already an 
important center for major corporations. As the city expanded, so did job opportunities 
for new immigrants. 
 From 1990 to 2000 the number of immigrants residing in the city more than 
doubled. By 2000 the city had become highly diverse. According to census data, in the 
county of Dallas 64.4% of all immigrants were from Mexico (Sanchez and Weiss-
Armush 2003). The Mexican population, however, was scattered all across the region.  In 
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the North Texas region (which includes the counties of Collin, Dallas, Denton, and 
Tarrant where Forth Worth is situated), the immigrant population was 752,667 and 59% 
of those were of Mexican origin, followed by Vietnamese (5%), Indians (4%), 
Salvadorans (3%) and Chinese (2%) (Sanchez and Weiss-Armush 2003). The growth of 
the Latino population in the region has been so substantial that Dallas County alone ranks 
fifth in the nation in numbers of Hispanic residents. Overall, the Latino population in the 
Dallas-Forth Worth region, known also as the Metroplex, grew from 519,000 to 1.1 
million. Therefore, Latinos now make up 35% of the population of the City of Dallas, 
30% of Dallas County and 22% of the Metroplex (Sanchez and Weiss-Armush 2003).  
According to estimates from the Mexican consulate in 1994 the Mexican state that 
provides the largest number of immigrants to the region is Guanajuato (19%), followed 
by San Luis Potosí (12.9%), Zacatecas (8%), Durango (6%), Michoacán (5.6%), Distrito 
Federal (5.2%), and Nuevo León (4%). 
Some members of the Mexican community, particularly those from Zacatecas, 
arrived in Dallas from California. As the president of the Federación de Zacatecanos del 
Norte de Texas (Zacatecan Federation from North Texas) explained105, Texas was always 
a tough place to migrate to because the immigration authorities were stricter there than 
those in California. With legal status made possible after the 1986 amnesty, however, it 
became easier to move to Dallas, where not only real estate was cheaper than in 
California but jobs were more plentiful.  
The Mexican population in the area works predominantly in the construction 
industry, but they are also gardeners, landscapers, and restaurant employees (Sanchez and 
Weiss-Armush 2003).  As in the other cities, Mexicans are the poorest immigrant group 
                                                 
105 Interview with the President of the Zacatecan Federation on February 2, 2003. 
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in the area, many of them living in crowded households (34.9% of Latinos in the 
metropolitan area live in crowded households). It is estimated that 80% of all the 
Mexican immigrants who arrived during the 1990s are undocumented (Sanchez and 
Weiss-Armush 2003). 
The region has an important Mexican entrepreneurial class. This is because some 
of the owners of Mexico’s most important industries (specifically those from Nuevo 
León) have homes there. Their contacts with the local Mexican community, however, are 
minimal. Besides this group, there is also a small entrepreneurial and professional class 
highly dependent on the ethnic enclave that has become relatively active within the 
community. As will be seen in the next chapter, they are not generally interested in 
politics and they have little interaction with local authorities.   
Although Dallas has had a Mexican-American community for many years, the 
only Mexican-American organization with offices there is LULAC (League of 
United Latin American Citizens). This organization has done little for the 
community and in one recent instance in which members of the community had a 
confrontation with the police, Héctor Flores, LULAC’s president who resides in 
the city, took sides with the police rather than with the community106.  
In a city where minimal government is a religion new immigrants learn to expect 
little. Low-income Mexican immigrants receive limited assistance from the local, 
regional and state governments, or from the social service organizations in the area 
(Sanchez and Weiss-Armush 2003). For instance, a study conducted by the Tomás Rivera 
Policy Institute in the Oakcliff area of the city, which is predominantly Mexican, 
concluded that in general poor households there did not request welfare benefits even 
                                                 
106 Interview with Executive director of Lulac in Texas, September 1, 2004. 
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when they qualified for them (for example, because they had US-born children, or US 
citizens living with them). The main reason was that they believed that seeking benefits 
would threaten their ability to remain in the country if they were undocumented “or 
interfere with efforts to obtain legal status” (Freeman, et al. 2000). As a result, they 
tended to live completely off the incomes they earned in the private sector, “which leave 
all of them well below the poverty line” (Freeman, et al. 2000). This contrasted with the 
case of San Diego, where immigrants were also interviewed and were two to three times 
as likely to receive some form of benefits.. 
5.6.4 The Incorporation of the Mexican Community  
What are the prospects for Mexican incorporation in a city with minimal 
government, a pro-business environment and a political system that inhibits political 
mobilization? Surprisingly, incorporation of Mexicans may be faster in Dallas than in 
places such as New York where the Mexican populations are also predominantly new and 
there are no a strong Mexican-American communities.  
One reason is that competition for resources in Dallas is more limited than in New 
York, where there are numerous immigrant and ethnic groups. Since Mexicans are the 
largest immigrant group in Dallas, and Latinos have become the major ethnic group in 
the city, they have greater prospects of being taken into account in major political 
decisions. Political coalitions are not easy to build in a city like Dallas and non-Hispanic 
whites have not been eager to accommodate any minority group. Despite this, when 
Anglos have to negotiate, such as in the school district, they have been more willing to do 
so with Hispanics than with African-Americans (Hanson 2003). Furthermore, although 
the Dallas political system is conservative, there has been a lot of pressure from the 
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federal judiciary for it to open up. This pressure has to a certain extent counterbalanced 
the apolitical environment of the city.  In a way, more opportunity has opened up for 
Mexicans to integrate in the local political process than their level of mobilization would 
have predicted. A final factor is that in a city with a strong business environment, there 
may be more chances to develop an entrepreneurial class.  
5.7 Conclusions  
Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas display important contrasts and 
similarities in their political developments and institutional designs that create a variety 
of constraints and opportunities for the mobilization and incorporation of Mexican 
immigrants. With political systems that developed prior to the progressive era, Chicago 
and New York offer more positive opportunity structures for Mexican immigrants than 
Dallas and Los Angeles. In Chicago, the pattern of incorporation has been 
accommodation. As they have become a more relevant population group, the local 
political machine has been more willing to open up spaces for the representation of 
people of Mexican origin. The machine has spurred incorporation but also has been a 
major obstacle. It has created negative incentives for independent organization and 
political mobilization and, thus, for minority groups to build or become part of a 
dominant coalition that can better advance their interests. 
 In New York, Mexicans interact with political institutions more open to 
immigrants and minority groups than in other cities. However, Mexicans are the poorest 
and most disadvantaged group and face fierce competition from other ethnic minorities 
that seem to have been more suspicious than willing to join hands. In this light, their 
incorporation may take longer than expected. Furthermore, the Mexican population in 
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New York possesses less human and social capital than those in other cities. Since the 
community is new, they have not yet been able to develop a strong support network. 
Although the Los Angeles political system has been closed to minorities, it 
nonetheless has the highest levels of Mexican participation of the four cities.  While in 
New York and Chicago party organizations and strong governments have created 
numerous disincentives to coalition building, in more exclusionary Los Angeles there are 
few institutional obstacles to minority-group organization once they develop the 
necessary resources (Sonenshein 2004). Many Mexican immigrants had naturalized in the 
last two decades.  Mexican mobilization was, to a great extent, a reaction anti-immigrant 
policies and attitudes both in the state of California and the city. The result was the 
election of Antonio Villarraigosa mayor in 2005. Los Angeles shows that inhospitable 
environments may create incentives for minority organization and mobilization, 
perversely motivating their political incorporation.  
Not all exclusionary environments are equal, however. Although Los Angeles is a 
reform city like Dallas, it also has many features of pre-Progressive Era cities that have 
facilitated minority mobilization. For example, in 1925 LA abandoned its at-large 
election system. Furthermore, it has a more diverse population than Dallas, fostering the 
building of heterogeneous political coalitions. While in Los Angeles the non-Hispanic 
white community is divided between more liberal and more conservative groups, in 
Dallas the Anglo community has been rigidly conservative. In this regard, African-
Americans and Latinos have not been able to rely on the support of part of the non-
Hispanic white population.  On the contrary the system of exclusion has been so strong 
that the main element of support has been the federal judicial system. The incorporation 
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of Mexicans in Dallas, however, may turn out to be faster than in places like New York, 
because of the simple fact that Dallas immigrants face less political competition for 
resources. In New York, Mexicans will have to compete not only against non-Latino 








MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS IN DALLAS, CHICAGO, NEW 
YORK AND LOS ANGELES: EXPLAINING VARIATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter showed that Mexican immigrants have faced major obstacles to 
political incorporation in Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas many of which go 
beyond the obvious limitations created by their immigration status. For this reason it is 
not accidental that they have predominantly focused on Mexican politics. As Koopmans 
(2004) suggested, in places where there are few channels of access to the decision-
making process, immigrants have tended to focus their political goals towards their 
country of origin. In addition the Mexican government has been active in mobilizing and 
organizing immigrants in various American cities since the 1990s.  Nonetheless, these 
organizations have also begun to assert themselves in the American context, with those in 
each city displaying distinctive patterns of behavior. 
6.2 Chicago: A Laboratory for the Mexican Government? 
Chicago is surpassed only by Los Angeles as the American city with the largest 
number of first-generation Mexican organizations. Considering, however, that the size of 
the Mexican population in Chicago is smaller (approximately 1 million) than the Mexican 
community in Los Angeles (approximately 3 million), it may be that the former has the 
most vibrant and organized Mexican immigrant community in the United States. 
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As suggested elsewhere (Desipio, et al. 2003), most newcomers from Mexico–and 
generally from Latin America--do not join or identify with the various immigrant 
organizations that purportedly attempt to represent them. Mexicans in Chicago are no 
exception to this rule. Despite this, interest in establishing and joining immigrant 
organizations is on the rise and reflects the gradual empowerment of a community that 
has settled in the United States in the last three decades and that has already established 
strong migration networks. Mexicans in Chicago are probably more organized today than 
ever before. Their organizations have tended to concentrate on the home country.  As in 
many other places, the most common form of organization is HTAs. For every significant 
place of origin there is usually at least one HTA. Their steady increase is reflected in data 
provided by the Mexican consulate: in 1998, there were 90 HTAs. By July 2004 this 
number had grown to 255.  To these we need to add an unknown number of organizations 
based on place of origin that have not been identified by the consulate. The growth of 
HTAs known to the consulate in Chicago can be seen in Figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1: Growth of HTAs in Chicago107 
                                                 
























SFs, which in many cases are made up of HTAs in particular states, have also 
grown not only in quantity but also in size. In October 2001, when I originally visited 
Chicago, there were eight SFs. By July 2004 there were fourteen, and the number of 
people and organizations they represented had also augmented so dramatically that one of 
the main problems these organizations face today is that their leadership, still with limited 
political experience, has not been able to deal effectively with the challenge of 
accommodating the demands and political views of their growing membership. Tensions 
within the federations are common and some of them have not been able to manage them 
effectively. For instance, three organizations created in 2004 emerged from the divisions 
that occurred as a result of quarrels within the federations of Durango, Guanajuato, and 
Guerrero. Table 6.1 shows the Federations in Chicago.  
Political and service provider organizations are less prominent in number and 
have fewer members than the organizations based on the state of origin. They are also 
much less coherent since they do not have a formal structure and usually their existence 
depends upon the activism of a handful of people.  As explained in chapter four, political 
organizations established by Mexicans during the last decade have an interest in acting as 
national fronts and generally they cannot be identified with only one city.   However, 
many of the organizational efforts and the political activities that Mexicans in the United 
States have directed towards their homeland in the last few years started in Chicago or 
were planned and conducted from there. A Mexican political entrepreneur and analyst 
explains: behind every issue related to the agenda of Mexicans abroad there is at least one 
activist pursuing it from Chicago108. Although the  pro-democratic  political  mobilization 
 
                                                 
108 Interview with migrant leader in Chicago, October, 2001. 
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Table 6.1: State federations in the Chicago Metropolitan Area109 
State Federation 
Federación de Zacatecanos en Illinois 
Federación de Guerrenses en Chicago 
Federación de Jalisciences del Medio Oeste 
Casa Guanajuato 
Federación de Michoacanos en el medio Oeste 
Asociación de Clubes y Organizaciones Potosinas de Illinois 
Durango Unido en Chicago 
Federación Oaxaqueña del Medio Oeste 
Federación de Duranguenses en el Medio Oeste 
Federación de Chihuahua 
Federación de Hidalguenses Unidos 
Federación de Oaxaqueños 
of Mexicans abroad towards their homeland started possibly in Los Angeles and, more 
generally in California (Dresser 1993; Martinez Saldaña 2002), most of the recent 
political energy of Mexican expatriates, particularly that related to the right to vote from 
abroad, has been flowing out of Chicago. This was confirmed by a member of the 
Consultative Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, a long-time political activist 
from Los Angeles, who argued that  
In Chicago, the Mexican leadership is stronger than in Los Angeles. This has to 
do with the fact that most Mexican emigration to the latter city has come from 
                                                 
109 Data provided in 2004 by the Mexican Consulate in Chicago 
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rural areas, and thus, the leadership has been really poor… Even when the issue of 
the right to vote from abroad was first posed in Los Angeles, it is in Chicago 
where it was really landed into a specific and concrete agenda.110 
In Chicago there are various organizations claiming at different points to be the 
representatives of the Mexican community abroad including CDPME. It is also in 
Chicago where the more recent demands for creating a sixth political circumscription to 
represent Mexicans abroad in Mexico’s national elections emerged. The main goal of this 
proposition is to guarantee a representation quota for expatriates in Mexico’s Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate. In addition, all Mexican political parties have representatives in the 
city and some entrepreneurs have already been on the political parties' lists for Congress. 
That was true of Raúl Ross, who in 2000 ran unsuccessfully as a candidate for the 
Mexican congress with the PRD.  For the Mexican government the expatriate community 
in Chicago is so vibrant that it has become a reference point and a laboratory to 
experiment with different policies towards émigrés. Many programs adopted by Mexican 
authorities are initiated in Chicago, including pilot plans to facilitate the sending of 
remittances to Mexico and projects to improve the education levels of emigrants (Gómez 
2001). 
The participatory environment that exists among some sectors of the Mexican 
community in Chicago also facilitated the implementation of the most democratic process 
in the selection of those who would represent the city in the Consultative Council of the 
Institute of Mexicans Abroad in 2002. In contrast to other cities where the representatives 
were hand picked by area leaders with the help of the local consulate, or where bitter 
confrontations emerged between competing factions, Chicago had the cleanest and most 
                                                 
110 Interview with member from IME in Los Angeles, October 12, 2001. 
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democratic process. The election was organized by members of the community without 
the direct involvement of the local consulate and there was ample participation. 
Why are Mexicans more organized and more politically active towards Mexico in 
Chicago than in most of the other cities considered in this study?  To be sure, the political 
activism that prevails in Chicago within the first-generation Mexican community is 
related to the fact that this city has captured a group of relatively educated immigrants 
with previous political experience in their country of origin. Some people I identified, for 
example, were active participants in the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de Mexico or STUNAM (Workers Union of the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico) while they were in Mexico, a traditionally 
independent union with links to the Mexican left. Others had participated in the student 
movements that took place at different points in Mexico’s recent history (1968, 1971 and 
1987). This factor alone, however, cannot explain the political activism identified in 
Chicago, because it is also possible to find people with a similar background in 
California. Another factor is the larger concentration and segregation of Mexicans in 
particular areas of this city than in any other urban region considered for this study, even 
if they are now distributed all around Chicago’s Metropolitan region.  Although other 
cities have neighborhoods with large pockets of Mexicans concentrated in specific places, 
it is difficult to find an equivalent to Chicago’s Pilsen and La Villita where, except for the 
weather and the brownstone buildings characteristic of the Midwest, it is possible to feel 
as if one never left Mexico. The proximity in which people live and/or work facilitates 
constant interaction and exchange of ideas between political entrepreneurs and other 
leaders within the Mexican community. For example, leaders of HTAs and SFs that may 
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not have originally paid much attention to homeland politics may develop interests after 
meeting others who do, a process I witnessed during my research. 
Another factor that facilitates a mobilized immigrant community in Chicago is the 
character of the city. An official at the Mexican consulate in Chicago who has managed 
the relationships of the Mexican government with the expatriate community for more 
than ten years argued that Chicago offers favorable conditions for the mobilization of 
immigrants towards specific goals. These conditions include its multiethnic environment, 
the independent social activism that prevails in the city, and its relative progressivism, 
which was particularly evident during the 1980s when local voters elected Harold 
Washington mayor (1983-1987). In addition, in Chicago as in New York the non-
Hispanic white elite can relate to an immigrant past, limiting anti-immigrant sentiment. 
Furthermore, in Chicago immigrants can vote in school council elections, have regular 
and favorable interactions with local institutions such as the police, and are active 
participants in grass roots organizations that revolve around 120 Catholic congregations 
that conduct services in Spanish as well as in dozens of service provider organizations. 
In summary, the existence of a relatively educated population with previous 
political experience in Mexico, the high levels of concentration and segregation of the 
community in ethnic enclaves and the unique characteristics of the city are factors that 
have helped mobilize the Chicago Mexican community in the last couple of decades. 
However, why has most of the organization and mobilization been oriented towards the 
homeland? Why have Mexicans in Chicago been less interested or effective in 
articulating claims vis-à-vis the city’s political process?   
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One explanation has been the general political exclusion that the Mexican origin 
population faced in this city for so many years. Although Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans more generally have lived in Chicago for many decades, they did not have 
strong incentives to participate in the city’s political life. This situation contrasted with 
that of other immigrant groups that settled in the city at similar moments, and that were 
encouraged to become politically active by the city’s political institutions, if only to 
guarantee the election of the machine’s candidates.  
Historically, Mexicans in Chicago did not perceive themselves as potential 
members of the polis, and were not perceived in that way by the local opportunity 
structures either. Only in the 1980s with the election of Harold Washington, did the 
Mexican origin community start to become more politically active. After Washington 
died, however, this activism diminished and the leaders that had emerged within the 
Mexican-American community simply accommodated themselves to the local political 
machine   
In the 1980s a large number of Mexicans in the city were able to regularize their 
status in the United States and acquire citizenship. This created the opening for the 
emergence of a new leadership within the community. The fact that Chicago facilitated 
immigrant involvement in the city’s local institutions also created favorable conditions 
for the emergence of this leadership. Many of the leaders I identified (particularly those 
belonging to organizations based on the state of origin) first acquired their leadership 
skills by playing active roles in their local schools, or in initiatives launched by Chicago’s 
police force to involve the population in the solution of their own problems. They also 
were active participants in their religious communities and some of them in organizations 
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that support first generation immigrants. In interviews, most of them referred to these 
experiences as their first active involvement in their community, and as an experience 
that later on motivated them to organize around their places of origin.  
While the conditions were created for the emergence of a new leadership within 
the Mexican immigrant community, none of the local political institutions or national 
ethnic organizations profited from that. Since many Mexicans were illegally in the United 
States, and those that were able to regularize their status had yet to naturalize, they were 
not considered an important political constituency.  While many of the emerging leaders 
kept links to Mexican political parties or had been at some point politically active in 
Mexico, they were not establishing clear links with local political parties or with 
Mexican-American organizations. During my research only one organization, Concilio 
Hispano, claimed to have contacts with American political authorities, but these contacts 
were not regular and did not materialize in any benefits for the organization. Furthermore 
until very recently they did not have contacts with Mexican-American and other ethnic 
organizations. In summary, Mexicans became more involved in their local communities 
but they were not being politically mobilized or organized by host city institutions such 
as previous immigrant groups had been.     
At the same time, the Mexican immigrant leadership emerging in Chicago was 
suspicious of Mexican-Americans and Mexican-American organizations, which would 
have been natural allies, because Mexican-Americans were perceived as being ashamed 
of their Mexican heritage. In a context in which multiculturalism rather than the melting 
pot was becoming the paradigm, the new leaders within the Mexican community chose to 
celebrate and reestablish their connections with their places of origin rather than to claim 
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acceptance in their receiving society. This was reflected in the many activities they 
conducted to reaffirm their heritage such as beauty contests, the creation of folkloric 
dance groups from the state of origin, and the celebration of the culture of the state of 
origin one week per year. The Federation from Guerrero, for example established in 1998 
the Guerrerense cultural week, which has included performances of Acapulco’s 
Philharmonic Orchestra, and the state’s folkloric ballets, as well as artistic exhibitions.   
Because some of the immigrants to Chicago had political links with the Mexican 
left, and remained interested in Mexican politics for many years, it was only natural that 
when they saw signs that Mexico was democratizing they wished to participate in the 
democratization process. As a functionary of the Mexican consulate explained, the 
political campaign of Cuahutémoc Cárdenas had a strong impact on the established 
Mexican immigrant community in Chicago111. To a great extent, many of them saw the 
defeat of Cárdenas as proof that the Mexican state was still authoritarian. Since they 
linked the Mexican consulate with this authoritarian state, protest in front of this 
institution, particularly against the policies of specific consuls, became common during 
the 1990s.    
At the same time, in the late 1980s and 1990s the Mexican government changed 
its policies towards Mexicans abroad and there was a new effort to organize the emigrant 
community. Chicago and Los Angeles became the focal points of this policy. Both cities 
had large concentrations of Mexican expatriates and had a long history of receiving 
Mexican migration. Furthermore, many persons of Mexican origin in these cities had 
regularized their status, and thus had greater resources and possibilities of becoming 
                                                 
111 Interview with Consular official, August 10,2004 
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active in their places of origin.  In Chicago the Mexican consulate was extensively 
involved in organizing the community. 
At first Mexican consuls attempted to organize expatriates in a corporativist form, 
very much in the way politics were organized in Mexico. This however, produced major 
negative reactions within the community. This was, after all, a group of people that was 
being exposed to new patterns of social and political participation in their country of 
residence, even if they themselves were not politically active. They saw these efforts, 
then, as intrusive and against the community will. 
Within the consulate, however, there were some functionaries focused on 
attending to and establishing relationships with the local community. Less tied to the 
needs of specific political administrations than the consuls and more sensible to the needs 
of the community, they worked on developing strong leaders and organizations.112 This 
was not easy, however, because this was a community with low social and human capital. 
Although there were people with education and political experience, they were less 
interested in doing grass roots work and more in gaining a foothold in Mexico’s national 
politics. Furthermore, there was the constant intrusion of governors and other political 
officials in Mexico who had their own agendas with respect to organizing their expatriate 
community in Chicago. Although these functionaries were also useful in helping 
immigrants organize, they also created divisions, as emigrants were constantly 
encouraged to take sides on political disputes that were taking place in their homeland 
states. Despite this, the grass roots efforts at grouping them conducted from the consulate 
and with the help of Mexican local authorities were working as immigrants were actually 
                                                 
112 Although in other cities consular officials were involved in organizing the community, I did not see the 
same involvement and understanding that I saw in Chicago.  
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organizing around their places of origin and some leaders were even gaining the attention 
of the national authorities in Mexico.   
From the interviews I conducted it became clear that Mexican consular officials 
understood that organizing the community, even if originally only around their places and 
country of origin, would imply empowering it towards the United States. With very 
limited resources coming from Mexico to support the community, the first-generation 
organizations being established in Chicago represented useful channels to reach the 
emigrant community, especially the undocumented. It was understood that there was bi-
national work to do on subjects such as education, health, and immigration and that some 
of the best channels to do it included mobilizing the support of new leadership emerging 
within the community.  
As Mexican political parties realized that Mexicans abroad could become an 
important political constituency, as well as an important economic source for 
development programs in Mexico, they started to conduct more regular visits to that city. 
There were also the visits of national functionaries such as Juan Hernández, until 2002 
the presidential advisor for émigrés affairs, and of various members of Congress. 
President Fox himself also conducted major meetings in this city as well as in Los 
Angeles during various trips to the United States. Finally, there were the usual visits from 
governors and municipal presidents.  
All these issues certainly increased the political expectations of Mexican 
expatriates. The new leadership started to make declarations about numerous subjects. 
There were declarations about corruption of electoral processes in states of origin such as 
Zacatecas, about the need to obtain the political right to vote in Mexican elections, the 
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characteristics that a law allowing expatriate voting should have, and the need to create a 
sixth electoral circumscription in Mexico to facilitate their participation as candidates in 
Mexico’s political processes. There were also some declarations about the need to 
regularize the immigration status of Mexicans in the United States and for or against the 
plans of President Bush on that topic. Suddenly those leaders that were originally focused 
on raising money for development projects in their places of origin were also taking 
political positions, and visiting their state of origin to support political candidates or state 
authority’s economic and social programs. These organizations were also establishing 
links with political entrepreneurs within the community that had been active in obtaining 
the right to vote from abroad for more than a decade but that lacked the grassroots base to 
gain the attention of Mexican authorities. Links were also established with similar 
organizations, notably in California, and many leaders became active participants of 
internet discussion groups. The extent to which the political views and agendas’ followed 
by the leaders were in the interest of the members of their organizations or of the general 
Mexican immigrant community in the city is difficult to evaluate113. Nonetheless, as the 
leaders have been gaining the attention of Mexican national authorities they are also 
realizing that they could have some influence in their place of residence. By 2004, for 
example, various leaders of these organizations, especially those representing the 
Mexican states of Durango, Michoacán, Guerrero and Zacatecas were working together 
and had already established good relationships with local officials in Chicago, and even 
had gone to Washington to lobby federal authorities. 
                                                 
113 This will have to be the subject of a future survey, since the research I conducted for this dissertation 
was, due to limited resources, predominantly focused on the leadership. 
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New steps in attempting to develop more encompassing goals include the creation 
of two organizations that emerged mostly from the SFs in the area: the Coordinación de 
Federaciones Mexicanas del Medio Oeste or COMMO and the Consejo de Federaciones 
Mexicanas (Confemex).  COMMO grew out of groups that were created to support the 
political campaign of Vicente Fox from Chicago, including pro-PAN supporters and 
members of the National Action Party, and Mimexca, which was linked to Amigos de Fox 
(Fox’s Friends) the political group that conducted his campaign. After that, various SFs 
and other organizations joined their efforts and created COMMO. The organization had a 
bi-national agenda, which included improving the conditions of the Mexican community 
in Chicago, although its first priority was to obtain the right to vote from abroad.  
Because of its attempt to ally different groups with various political ties in Mexico along 
with the Federations, it was difficult for its leadership to achieve consensus on even the 
most basic issues.  For this reason, this organization was never able to represent the 
immigrant community in Chicago, and though it still exists, it has become almost 
irrelevant.  
The second organization, which seems to have a more promising future, the 
Council of Mexican Federations (CONFEMEX) is composed only of SFs. Created in 
2003, it has adopted the general agenda of the organizations based on place of origin, 
including the promotion of major investment projects in Mexico, but also has political 
and social goals focused on the host society. As its first president put it, “we realized that 
we live here and we need to focus on improving our living conditions here too.”114 On the 
social agenda this organization has promoted scholarship programs to help the children of 
immigrants in Chicago, particularly the undocumented, to go to university. This has been 
                                                 
114 Source: Personal interview with the president of CONFEMEX 
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done through finding donors among wealthy members of the Mexican community in the 
area.  On the political front they have established relationships with local officials and are 
considering supporting the campaigns of those politicians that are willing to work in 
favor of the Mexican community. Yet, this group is quite new and it is unclear how 
effective it will be.  
The main challenge Mexican immigrants face in Chicago is to become more 
cohesively organized to increase their political leverage vis-à-vis the local political 
machine and gain more access to the decision-making process, particularly on those 
topics that affect the immigrant community including education, health, housing and 
policing policies. The emergence of organizations that can maintain their independence 
from Mexican and local political parties is also important, however, because that will 
allow the Mexican-origin community to build alliances with other immigrant and ethnic 
groups in Chicago and thus increase its political influence on the city’s politics. A key 
thing that Mexicans need to do, and that I did not observe in my research, is to build more 
alliances with Mexican-American organizations, which have greater political experience. 
Mexican-Americans will also benefit from such relationships, because their political 
future in the city is highly dependent on the political fate of the immigrant community. 
Overall, the main question is whether the Mexican-origin population, and more generally 
the Latino community in Chicago, can become part of an effective coalition that can 
advance the interests of this community more than has happened so far.    
6.2.1 The Role of Organizations in Immigrant Incorporation 
First-generation Mexican immigrants have organized mostly around their 
homeland.  The sample of organizations I considered in Chicago represents no exception 
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to this rule.  I studied five organizations based on place of origin including one HTA, the 
Club Acapetlahuaya de Guerrero, and four SFs, including the Federación de Clubes 
Unidos de Zacatecanos en Illinois, the Federación de Clubes Michoacanos en Illinois 
(Fedecmi), the Federación de Guerrerenses en Chicago, and Durango Unido.  
Although their main interests are not focused on their host society, these 
organizations perform an important if still limited role in helping immigrants adapt and 
incorporate into the city’s polity. First, they allow immigrants to socialize and exchange 
general information about their experiences in their host country. By participating in 
them, members can adapt more easily to their new city and avoid the usual isolation that 
the immigration process implies.  
Second, these organizations function in many cases as discussion forums in which 
members develop notions about civic participation and involvement and about the social 
and political life of their city and country of residence.  For example, during my research 
I had the opportunity of attending one of the meetings of Durango Unido a few weeks 
after the September 11th attacks. During this meeting members of the organization chose 
to discuss how these attacks had affected their lives in the United States. Several of them 
expressed patriotic sentiments toward their adopted country and some explained that their 
children were in the American military and would participate in the war if there was one. 
They also spoke about how important it was for them to identify with and be part of 
American political life. An interesting aspect that emerged from this discussion is that 
many members spoke as Americans, even when the identity of the organization was 
clearly identified as “Mexican”.  
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Third, through these organizations Mexicans learn about democracy and 
democratic procedures. In all the organizations I studied in Chicago the leadership was 
democratically elected, with the exception of the Club Acapetlahuaya de Guerrero. This 
is obviously a basic and necessary skill for immigrants to become more active in various 
American institutions. The most visible organization in this regard is the Federación de 
Clubes Unidos de Zacatecanos en Illinois, which has had an elaborate democratic process 
for selecting its leaders every two years since 1995.  
This organization acquired a large building with the support of the government of 
Zacatecas. There it holds its meetings and other activities, including the provision of 
computing courses. Along with the Federation of Los Angeles, it has also focused on 
creating leadership cadres within the second generation so that they can become active 
participants in the political life of their city of residence. Other federations such as those 
from Michoacán, Jalisco, and Guerrero have been taking similar steps and becoming 
more active in the adaptation process of their communities in Chicago. In this regard, 
these organizations are also playing an important role in the adaptation process of the 
immigrant community and may play a role in helping accelerate the political integration 
of the second generation. 
Despite these positive developments, these organizations still face major 
challenges. The most serious is how to overcome the limitations imposed by their 
membership policies, determined as they are by the places of origin. They need to 
broaden their activities to reach the majority of the Mexican immigrant population in the 
city. A second challenge is to avoid polarization along Mexican party lines, a situation 
that is already undermining their success. Finally, they must become more 
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institutionalized and able to form larger leadership cadres that can better understand the 
political dynamics of both the home and host societies. So far, the leaders of these 
organizations have been relatively efficient, but have worked without any major 
directives. Among other things, they have yet to develop and articulate a political agenda 
relevant to the needs of the immigrant community they attempt to represent.           
In summary, the organizations based on place of origin in Chicago, represent a 
first step towards the eventual incorporation of an immigrant community that was 
historically poorly organized into the city’s political life, by facilitating their better 
adaptation, by allowing them to gain first-hand experience in civic and democratic 
participation, and by facilitating the development of leadership cadres. However, they are 
still short of becoming major actors because they have not yet designed a strategy to 
overcome the obstacles and take advantages of the structure of opportunity they confront 
in the city. New possibilities, however, are represented by organizations such as 
COMMO and Confemex. 
I also considered two organizations with a strictly political character. These 
organizations are not based only in Chicago, but they were either founded there or have 
some of their major leaders living there.  These include CIME and CDPME. Although 
these organizations have as among their membership some of the most well-known 
political entrepreneurs in the city, their gaze has mostly focused on Mexico.  
Finally, I studied a service provider organization, the Concilio Hispano.  This 
organization has been providing services to Mexican immigrants for small dues since 
1987. Its main accomplishment was to initiate and win the lawsuit against Money-Gram, 
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which charged prohibitive commissions for remittances sent to Mexico and other 
countries.  
6.3 New York 
 In contrast to Chicago, Dallas, and Los Angeles, Mexicans in New York do not 
represent the largest Hispanic group in the area nor are they the largest immigrant group. 
Because most Mexican immigrants to New York are of recent arrival, it can be 
considered a new labor migration area. Immigrants are predominantly male, without legal 
work permits, and work long hours. Although there are some successful businessmen, 
such as Jaime Lucero, owner with his brother of Gold and Silver Inc, a company that 
distributes clothes to America’s major chain stores, most newcomers are poor and 
uneducated. In contrast to Chicago and Los Angeles, upward mobility within the 
Mexican community is limited. Few benefited from IRCA and from the family 
reunification policies that in the Midwest and the Southwest facilitated the emergence of 
a small but vibrant Mexican middle class. Furthermore, most newcomers to this city 
come from the Mixteca Baja region, a poor and underdeveloped area, and some of them 
do not speak Spanish as a first language. As a result it is not surprising that this New 
York is where I found the weakest organizations and the most acute divisions within the 
community. 
As in the other cities, the Mexican consulate attempted to organize the community 
in the area. However, New York was never a priority because the community was 
relatively small and new. For years the official in charge of the relations with the local 
community organized soccer matches between different Mexican teams. His presence 
helped create strong soccer leagues in the region but the transition from being active in a 
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sport to being active in a community association as happened in other cities did not really 
take place. To a certain extent, the different Mexican consuls that passed through New 
York during the 1990s were not especially interested in organizing the community and 
did not especially support the activities of the officials in charge of developing relations 
with expatriates. Governors, and municipal presidents, were also never an important force 
in mobilizing the community as in other places. Most Mexicans in the region are from 
Puebla. Although governors of that state such as Melquiades Morales did visit the 
community occasionally, they never established a consistent program to institutionalize 
the links with the Poblano community.  Morales, however, did suggest the integration of 
the community around Casa Puebla, the only organization in New York that can be 
considered equivalent to the state federations predominant in other cities. The 
businessman Jaime Lucero, however, provides the major financial support, and thus its 
destiny largely depends on him. In my research I gathered that although Casa Puebla 
claimed to represent the Poblano organizations in the city, many do not seem to accept 
this claim. For instance, Casa Puebla seems to operate more as a service organization 
than as a state federation, since most of its activities have focused on supporting small 
Mexican businesses in New York City. They also claim to sponsor education, health and 
athletic programs, as well as tourism to the state of Puebla.  
Casa Puebla played, nonetheless, an important role in supporting the Mexican 
and Latino communities during the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers. 
Immigrants and their families affected by these events were encouraged to call or to visit 
its offices so that they could be helped or referred to the relevant city authorities. This 
was done with the help of Univision the Hispanic television company to which Lucero 
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had access. Casa Puebla’s role after September 11 allowed it to establish a relationship 
with other ethnic organizations such as Lulac and local non-governmental organizations 
in the city. Also it established a relationship with FEMA (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency). Although there were projects to expand the scope of Casa Puebla 
after these events, they failed to materialize. Casa Puebla did support undocumented 
Mexican university students in their lobbying efforts to obtain in-state tuition for children 
of illegal immigrants wishing to go to college in New York.   
Besides Casa Puebla, the Mexican consulate reports that there are close to 30 
HTAs in the city, most of which are organized by people from Puebla. However, not all 
of these organizations have a HTA profile or are really active as I discovered during my 
research.  Some of them operate as civic organizations oriented more towards the US 
than towards Mexico, as is the case of Mixteca Organization Inc., which has a service 
provider profile.  
 Some of these organizations, however, have been in place for a long time. The 
Club Solidaridad de Chinantla (Solidarity Club Chinantla), for example, has sent money 
to the hometown since 1970. This organization has a rather exceptional profile, because 
for all these years it has been predominantly in touch only with local authorities in 
Mexico. It is one of the few organizations that I identified that was not interested in 
Mexican politics at the national or state levels nor did it wish to establish links with other 
Mexican groups. When I asked them if they supported advancing political rights in their 
homeland, they said that they would be interested only in obtaining the franchise to 
participate at the local level.  
Civic and Service Provider Organizations 
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 Civic organizations seem to be one of the most widespread models of organizing 
for Mexican immigrants in NYC and surrounding areas. Data from the consulate in show 
that in 2004 there were 17 civic organizations in New York, four in New Jersey, and five 
in Connecticut.  A relatively few people control these organizations, which focus most of 
their work on cultural and social activities. Many of them work predominantly with local 
authorities to promote Mexican culture and civic events. They seem to represent the 
common pattern of organizing for immigrants besides the HTAs model (such as 
Solidarity Club Chinantla) when there is no serious intervention by the home country to 
mobilize them115. Although organizations like these exist in other cities, this 
organizational form seems to be more prominent in the area because of the more limited 
role the consulate and Mexican local authorities have played in organizing them. 
 Among service providers, I studied CECOMEX, and Asociación Tepeyac. 
CECOMEX emerged in East Harlem to provide services to Mexican and other 
immigrants for a fee. According to its president, its creators were inspired by Dominican 
and Puerto Rican organizations, though the organization itself has not established any 
links with them. This group, however, has sporadically worked with city councilors and 
even with Congressman Charles Rangel. I was not able to identify the extent to which 
CECOMEX’s work reaches the community. It seems to me that its leaders have been 
pragmatic and have accommodated with local politicians and with Mexican authorities in 
the consulate, arguing that they represent the Mexican community in the area.  
                                                 
115 In other words, if the Mexican state would not have been organizing the community most first 
generation organizations would have probably been small, isolated HTAs such as Club Solidaridad 
Chinantla, or civic organizations focus on celebrating Mexican heritage in the city of residence. Today, 
however, all of these organizations work around the consulate which contacts them sporadically for 
different events related with Mexico. 
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 Asociación Tepeyac is probably the most interesting organization in the city. Lead 
by a Jesuit priest, Fr.Joel Magallán, this association was originally created by New York 
City’s archdiocese with the hope of helping the Mexican community as it supported 
Dominicans and Puerto Ricans in the past116. To organize the community it relied on 
Mexicans’ fervor for the virgin of Guadalupe and organized around 40 independent 
committees, which provide various services and activities to Mexicans in different parts 
of the city. Tepeyac is the most vocal Mexican organization in the United States around 
the need to support the undocumented community. This organization has rejected the 
different regularization proposals of presidents Fox and Bush because it considers them 
to be only new versions of a guest worker program that does not guarantee access to 
citizenship and thus to political rights. It participates in the National Coalition for 
Amnesty and Dignity, which has as its main goal obtaining permanent residency for all 
the people without documents in the United States. For four years in a row Tepeyac has 
conducted the Guadalupan Torch march from Mexico City to New York, as a 
commemoration of the Guadalupe Virgin’s celebration on December 12. The goal of the 
march is to defend the dignity of undocumented immigrants and to promote an amnesty. 
This event has gained the attention of Mexican and American newspapers and has helped 
Tepeyac become a well-known organization.   
 Despite this, the organization has not extended its links with other organizations 
in the city. Except for the issue of domestic violence, it has done no work with 
Dominican and Puerto Rican organizations. The group claims to have received support 
from Maldef and La Raza, but this endorsement has not materialized in continuous 
contacts with these groups.   
                                                 
116 See the organization website: www.tepeyac.org/origen2ht  
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Overall, I did not identify in New York City and its metropolitan area any 
political organization focused predominantly on advancing the political rights of the 
Mexican diaspora in Mexico. This issue seems to be a preoccupation of those Mexicans 
able to formally settle in the United States as a result of IRCA and other immigration 
laws, a group that is not very large in New York. However, thanks to the links they 
established with other associations in the Midwest and Southwest, they had become 
active in the cause.  
In December 2003, for example, prior to the approval of the right to vote from 
abroad in presidential elections, the Mexican community in the area organized an event 
on the subject whose program included a strange mix of Mexican and American political 
figures including the Mexican consul of the city, the governor of New York, George 
Pataki, New York State Senators Olga Méndez and David Paterson, Councilors Iram 
Monserrat and Phillip Reed, US Congressman Charles Rangel, José Murat governor of 
Oaxaca, and Mario Marín Torres, PRI candidate for the governorship of Puebla.  Some 
but not all of the people invited attended the event (Pataki, for example, was absent). This 
situation shows that Mexicans in New York, even if not well organized, have been 
gaining the attention of Mexican and American authorities, like Mexicans in other cities. 
This attention clearly reflects the fact that the Mexican community is considered a 
potential political constituency on both sides of the border and politicians are willing to 
support their cause if that may bring a political profit.  
To what extent, however, does the participation of state and local officials in these 
kinds of events attest to the political incorporation of Mexicans in New York City itself? 
In a way this support of immigrant causes reflects a pattern reminiscent of Tammany 
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Hall’s attitude toward Jews and Italians. At that time, however, they also provided 
newcomers with other benefits (economic and material) that facilitated their adaptation in 
the USA.  Mexican immigrants to New York, in contrast, have not received any such 
benefits117, and their situation seems to be more vulnerable than that of previous 
immigrant groups if only because the majority of them are illegal.  
6.4 Los Angeles 
 In 1993 González Gutiérrez argued that because they tend to be poor and 
disenfranchised, Mexican immigrants are not likely to exercise political leadership on 
behalf of the Mexican community in California. “Almost no Latino leader of a national or 
even regional stature is foreign born,” González Gutiérrez argued, and then he added: “It 
has been the native born population, not the immigrants who have increased the political 
power of the community and made visible its purchasing power” (Gonzáles Gutiérrez 
1993).  
 A little more than a decade later, part but not all of González Gutierrez’s 
observations remain true. Despite the large numbers of Mexicans who have naturalized in 
California and in the Los Angeles region, there is still few if any first-generation Mexican 
immigrants with national, regional or local stature118.  Although more Mexicans have 
naturalized and are enfranchised than when he wrote his article, and they certainly 
represented an important element in Villaraigosa’s election as the first Latino mayor, the 
Mexican immigrant community in Los Angeles remains represented predominantly by 
                                                 
117 A big exception, probably, is the fact that George Pataki supported an initiative to grant in-state tuition 
to the children of undocumented immigrants that want to go to a university in the state. 
118 There are some exceptions. For example, José Huízar, originally from Zacatecas, who became the first 
Latino immigrant to be elected to the city council, after he run to fill the position left by Antonio 
Villaraigosa. Another exception is Carlos Olamendi, a businessman with connections to the Republican 
Party that participated in Schwarzenegger’s political campaign, and became a member of his Transition 
Committee. Olamendi was also appointed by President George W. Bush to the Advisory Committee on the 
Arts for the Kennedy Center. 
 266
American born Mexican-American leaders, who very often have interests that do not 
coincide with those of the first generation.  
The Mexican immigrant community of Los Angeles, however, has been 
developing in the last decade a large number of organizations and a strong leadership that 
has started, recently, to become a more significant voice. These leaders realized that to 
advance their interest in the USA they needed to join their efforts and develop a local and 
regional agenda that includes lobbying political authorities and mobilizing the immigrant 
vote. Toward that end they created the CPFMLA. However it is not yet clear how 
effective they will be because these efforts have just started.  
HTAs and State Federations 
When González Gutiérrez published his work in 1993, Mexican immigrants in 
Los Angeles were changing from sojourners into permanent settlers. Many Mexicans had 
just regularized their immigration status and very few had applied for citizenship. 
Furthermore, many were just moving up the economic ladder and obtaining the sort of 
stable socioeconomic status that would allow them to become more involved. 
 Certainly, at that time there were already some HTAs and even a few state 
federations composed of immigrant groups who had arrived in the late 1940s mainly 
through guest workers programs (the bracero programs). The most well-known of these 
were the Federación de Zacatecanos del Sur de California (Zacatecan Federation of 
Southern California), created in 1986, the Federación de Clubes Jalisciences (Federation 
of associations from Jalisco) created in 1991, and the Fraternidad Sinaloense (Fraternity 
from Sinaloa) also created in 1991. As was noted in Chapter 4, the Zacatecan Federation 
was the first state federation in the United States and was created with the support of 
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Governor Genaro Borrego, who perceived early on that the future of his state, which was 
the one that was sending the most emigrants per capita, was linked to the fate of the 
Zacatecan community in the United States. The other two federations were created under 
the auspices of José Angel Pescador Osuna, at the time the Mexican consul in Los 
Angeles.  
 González Gutiérrez, who at the time he wrote his paper worked as consul for 
community affairs at the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, reflects the changing attitude 
of the Mexican government toward expatriates in the city: 
Given the huge Mexican-origin population in the greater Los Angeles area, it 
makes sense to take advantage of their loyalty to their regions of origin, which is a 
much stronger link than their attachment to class or type of employment (let alone 
a political party). Sharing in a community of origin creates in the ‘paisanos’ a 
reinforced commitment to one another for mutual assistance in a hostile land and 
strengthens their self imposed duty to help the communities they left behind 
(Gonzáles Gutiérrez 1993).  
 Following this idea, the federal government, with the help of state and local 
authorities from Mexico, became the main organizing force of the Mexican community in 
Los Angeles as well as in other cities. This was done through the Program for Mexican 
Communities Abroad, which was implemented in 1990 by the Salinas administration. 
The goal was not only to increase their involvement in economic development projects in 
their places of origin, but also to strengthen the community in their place of residence so 
that they could better defend their rights and interests(Gonzáles Gutiérrez 1995). This 
was particularly urgent in California where anti-immigrant sentiment was high.  
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 It is revealing that no indigenous institution in Los Angeles made similar efforts 
to mobilize and organize this community despite the fact that a large number of the 
Mexican-origin had access to citizenship119. As a result, the most common form of 
organization for Mexican immigrants became the HTAs and the SFs. Although the HTAs 
had been historically a natural form for immigrants to organize, they could have also 
created or joined simultaneously other types of organizations more focused on the host 
society. That did not happen even in a political environment in which Mexicans were the 
constant target of anti-immigrant campaigns. This reflects the depoliticized character of 
the city and the incapacity of local political parties, unions and ethnic organizations to 
bring newcomers into the political process.  
 Once established, for instance, associations based on the state of origin had a hard 
time gaining attention, even if on an individual basis some of their members had 
participated or were members of unions or Hispanic organizations. In my research I 
learned that some federations had contact with Mexican-American leaders, particularly in 
1994 when they joined efforts to fight against Proposition 187. This was the case, for 
example, of the Federación Jalisicience, which donated money to oppose this initiative. 
These contacts, however, did not continue, even when other anti-immigrant initiatives 
were on the ballot over the 1990s. To a great extent this had to with the fact that 
Mexican-American leaders saw these organizations as parochial and incapable of 
becoming a political force (Zabin and Escala Rabada 1998). Local unions were also not 
focused on organizing immigrant workers, with or without documents, much less on 
establishing ties with their emerging organizations, despite the fact that they could have 
                                                 
119 NALEO, however, did play an active role in helping newcomers to naturalize (Zabin and Escala Rabada 
1998) 
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become an important grass-roots base. Except for a few occasions,  they did not commit 
resources to such efforts (Milkman and Wong 2001)120.  
  For the emerging leaders, limited involvement with local authorities of the host 
society had to do with their inexperience121 and widespread confusion about the rules for 
non-profit organizations participating in political activities. As they gained influence in 
Mexico, however, they also became more sophisticated in their political attitudes towards 
the USA. Informally they started to support the political campaigns of local officials, 
particularly those of Latino origin or people that supported the immigrant community. 
Participation consisted mostly of the encouragement of members possessing US 
citizenship to register and vote.   
 With the emergence of the Frente Cívico Zacatecano (Zacatecan Civic Front) as a 
result of divisions within the Zacatecan Federation over politics in the state of origin it 
became easier to get involved in politics. The Frente Cívico had explicit political 
purposes both towards Zacatecas and California and, more generally, towards Mexico 
and the United States. For this reason it did not seek a non-profit status and in time, when 
differences between differing groups were resolved, it became the political arm of the 
Zacatecan Federation. 
 In Zacatecas, the Frente became a key supporter of Andrés Bermudez 
Miramontes, the “Tomato King”, in his successful electoral campaign for the municipal 
                                                 
120 As Milkman and Wong explain, foreign- born workers especially from Mexico and Central America 
“are the core of the low-wage workforce” (Milkman and Wong 2001) in Southern California, and contrary 
to what many may think they can be organized by labor unions regardless of their legal status. This 
happened already successfully with Janitorial workers in 1990 and with drywall Hangers in 1992.    
121 Carlos González Gutierrez has pointed out that Mexican immigrants generally do not come with 
economic and social expectations from the American state, and are also remarkable unaware of the 
advantages they could draw from the political institutions establish as a result of the civil rights revolution 
in the United States. For this reason they need leaders that can not only mobilize them but also break their 
historical inhibitions to rely on the state or obtain political benefits through the political process (Gonzáles 
Gutiérrez 1995, p. 74) 
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presidency of Jeréz, thus becoming the first Mexican emigrant with American citizenship 
to be elected to office in Mexico. Bermúdez won the election, but due to residence 
requirements in Zacatecas he was not able to take office. After that, the Frente proposed a 
new law to allow Zacatecans to become political candidates in their state of origin 
without having previous residence there. The measure was finally approved by the 
Zacatecan Congress in 2003, and running again for office, Bermudez won election in 
Jérez (Cano 2004).  
In California, the Frente actively participated in the political campaigns of 
Democrat Lou Correa and Linda Sánchez for the House of Representatives; Miguel 
Polido, mayor of Santa Ana; Jesse Loera, mayor of Norwalk; Loreta Sánchez and Grace 
Napolitano, members of Congress; Gray Davis and Cruz Bustamante, former governor 
and lieutenant governor of California, respectively; and Lee Vaca, Los Angeles Sheriff, 
among others.  
 To a great extent, the Frente became a model for the creation of the CPFMLA, 
which was established in 2003 with a bilateral political agenda and has positioned itself 
as an organization that defends migrant rights both in Mexico and California. Other 
organizations such as the Frente Indigena Oaxaqueño Binacional, have also pursued 
binational goals in defense of immigrant rights, particularly of those of indigenous 
origin122.  
  In the last few years, these organizations have thus become political referents and 
intermediaries between the Mexican community in Los Angeles and Mexican and 
Californian authorities.   
                                                 
122 In 2003, for example, the FIOB actively opposed the election of Schwarzenegger as governor of the 
state and also Proposition 54, which attempted to revive in California the same measures included in 
Proposition 187.  
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The Organizations 
Because of the large Mexican community that lives in the area, as well as its 
historical roots, Mexican immigrants have joined more organizations based on their 
communities and state of origin in Los Angeles than probably anywhere else. In 2003 the 
Mexican consulate estimated the existence of 250 HTAs and eight federations. In 2006 it 
is estimated that there are 300 HTAs and 12 federations in the Los Angeles metropolitan 
area123.    
  Internal documents from the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles (CGMLA 2002) 
point out that the large and increasing number of these organizations, their constant 
communication with the consulate, as well as the influence they have acquired in their 
country of origin, make them salient to the Mexican government. For instance, the 
documents assert that the Mexican government cannot ignore them in its design and 
implementation of policies towards Mexicans abroad, if it wants these policies to be 
successful.   
For my research I interviewed the leadership of four state federations including 
those from Zacatecas, Michoacán, Jalisco and Sinaloa, and I attended a meeting of the 
Federación de Clubes de Michoacanos, which was at the time (2002) in its the formative 
stage. Politics was a major subject at the meeting.  Attendees discussed how they wanted 
to deal with Mexican politics, and the extent to which they wanted to be either political or 
apolitical. These discussions indicate how difficult it has been for Mexican organizations 
to decide what to do about their Mexican agenda. On the one hand, they want to influence 
                                                 
123 Federación de Clubes Jalisciences, Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California, 
Federación de Clubes Michoacanos, Federación Oaxaqueña de Comunidades y Organizaciones Indigenas 
en California, Frente Oaxaqueño de Organizaciones Indigenas, Federación de Clubes Duranguenses, 
Fraternidad Sinaloense de California, Asociación de Clubes Nayaritas, and Asociación de Clubes 
Zacatecas, Casa Guanajuato, Federación del Distrito Federal, Federación de Querétaro 
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the economic development of their places of origin by participating in development 
projects together with the state authorities. On the other hand, by doing so they have 
become influential in the political and policy processes of their states and, therefore, they 
are constantly pursued by local politicians who want to get their support for various 
political causes. Finding the right balance has been difficult and will probably be more 
difficult now that the right to vote from abroad has been granted.  
Political Organizations 
 A significant discovery in my research is that Los Angeles had political activists 
within the Mexican community involved in advancing the rights of laborers in the 
agricultural sector and also in some local unions in the manufacturing and service sectors.  
Some of these activists were members of the federations. Except for a few cases, 
however, they had not established any organizations devoted to advance the interests of 
Mexican immigrants that had gained the attention of either Mexican or American 
authorities. Clearly the main players in this city, as in Chicago, were the associations 
based on the state of origin, probably because the Mexican government had been active 
in both cities organizing them. These activists, however, probably had an influence in 
helping the federations become more politically active over the years both towards 
Mexico and California.   
 With respect to organizations with a clear political agenda towards Mexico, I 
identified MIMEXCA, which evolved from a temporary organization created to support 
the campaign of Vicente Fox from the US. As expressed in its founding documents, this 
organization operates mostly in California, Texas, Arizona and Illinois, and it supports 
political reform in Mexico. It also intends to perform civic activities by providing 
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services to Mexican immigrants in the United States.  However, these two organizations 
have not made much of a mark within the community.   
6.5 Dallas: Mexican Immigrants in a New Gateway City  
Mexicans have been in Texas for a long time, but Mexican immigration to Dallas 
is fairly recent. Most immigrants arrived in the last three decades, after the 
implementation of IRCA.  Mexicans represent the largest newcomer group in the city and 
display an amazing rate of growth: from 1990 to 2000 they grew 203% in the Dallas-
Forth Worth area (Sanchez and Weiss-Armush 2003). 
 Mexican immigrants to Dallas come from various places in Mexico, particularly 
from states in the center and north of the Country. The largest provider of emigrants is 
Guanajuato, followed by San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas. Because many immigrants to 
this city come from Guanajuato, a religiously conservative state, their attitudes and 
political behavior, particularly those towards their homeland, have been somewhat 
different from those observed in other cities. The emerging leadership within the Dallas 
Mexican community established a good relationship with the well-known PAN leader 
Carlos Medina Plascencia, but most importantly with Vicente Fox, since both were 
governors of the state in the 1990s124.  With his impressive stature and frank manners, 
Fox became enormously popular in Dallas, even among Mexican immigrants who were 
not from Guanajuato. According to testimony of local leaders and scholars, he was 
treated as a media celebrity, people wanting to get a short glimpse of him and get their 
picture taken with him.  It is not incidental, thus, that when he became a presidential 
candidate in 2000 there was a lot of enthusiasm among Dallas-Forth Worth expatriates 
                                                 
124 Until the early 1990s, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governed all Mexican states. In 1991 
the PAN was finally able to win the elections in Baja California Norte and then in 1992 in Guanajuato.   
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about his candidacy. In different interviews during my research, people acknowledged 
that they called their family members in Mexico to urge them to vote for him. Although 
immigrants in Dallas were not the only ones giving this type of support to Fox’s 
campaign, they held some of the most optimistic views I found about him and, certainly, 
the good experiences that Fox had while visiting the city when he was governor 
positively influenced his attitudes towards émigrés. The commitment of his presidency to 
those residing abroad was undoubtedly shaped during his trips to Dallas. In fact, the 
person he chose to head the presidential office for emigrant affairs, Juan Hernández, was 
a Mexican-American professor born in Forth Worth whom he met during a visit to 
Dallas. In a newspaper interview (Barbosa 2001) Hernández explained that he first met 
with Fox when he invited him to give a lecture at the University of Texas in Dallas. After 
that encounter, the then governor of Guanajuato named him special advisor on affairs 
with the United States and opened the Guanajuato Trade Office, a commercial center 
established in Dallas to promote Guanajuato’s products in American soil—mostly crafts, 
furniture, and shoes-- which was led by Hernández.   
The active role of the government of Guanajuato in contacting emigrants during 
the 1990s helped create what could be considered the strongest first-generation Mexican 
organization in Dallas: Casa Guanajuato. This organization, which was made up of some 
HTAs already existent in the city but is not properly a state federation because 
membership is individual, received substantial economic and institutional support from 
both the governments of Medina Placencia and Fox. This backing was certainly crucial 
for the organization’s emergence and survival125.   
                                                 
125 The administration of Medina Placencia, especially, gave the organization $10,000 that was used for the 
initial payment of a warehouse where it could hold its meetings and activities. This building has been 
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Despite the active participation of the government of Guanajuato in organizing 
emigrants from that state, and the apparent enthusiasm that Fox’s campaign produced 
among first generation Mexicans living in the area, the expatriate community in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth region has shown little political mobilization towards the homeland 
and almost none towards the host country at the local and/or national levels, particularly 
if compared with the expatriate communities of Chicago and Los Angeles. 
Although within the first-generation Mexican community there are some political 
organizations and entrepreneurs, their influence and leadership capacities are limited.  
Dallas, certainly, does not have the kind of political activists that can be found in Chicago 
or in Los Angeles and that have played a pivotal role in the campaign to obtain the right 
to vote from abroad. Although the leaders that have emerged within the Dallas Mexican 
community have turned their attention to political events in their homeland, and may 
even be supporters of Mexico’s major political parties, many activities performed by 
local organizations including by those organized around the state of origin are focused on 
the host society. For instance, it is in Dallas and to a lesser extent in New York where I 
encountered organizations with the greatest focus on the host country. This interest in the 
adopted society, however, has not turned into effective political action of any type. In 
consonance with the anti-political environment that predominates in the Dallas Fort-
Worth area, Mexican leaders I interviewed displayed a marked tendency to express a 
disdain for politics and political action and were suspicious of both Mexican and 
American political parties, even though some of them had supported Fox’s campaign. A 
Mexican-American leader who has worked with the community explained that Mexicans 
                                                                                                                                                 
gradually paid through the contributions of the members of Casa Guanajuato as well as through raise 
funding actions.     
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in this city do not feel comfortable taking part in local political institutions, in great part 
because they did not do that in Mexico, but also because local political institutions in 
Dallas are not very inviting126. In this business-oriented city in which partisan politics and 
unions are almost non-existent, newcomers are expected to provide for themselves 
without relying on public support. It is not an accident, therefore, that most of the 
activities that immigrant organizations perform around the host country in this city are 
social and cultural in nature.  
The organizations  
 The predominant type of organization that first-generation Mexicans have 
established in Dallas is that based on the place of origin. Although the Mexican consulate 
does not have precise numbers, it is estimated that there are between 30 and 40 HTAs in 
the area. Many of these, however, seem to work much more in isolation than the ones in 
Chicago and Los Angeles, not being integrated into strong state federations. The smaller 
number of organizations based on the place of origin, and their lesser levels of 
institutionalization, reflects the fact that the Mexican consulate in this city has not been 
very active in mobilizing and organizing them as in Chicago and Dallas. Functionaries in 
the Consulate in charge of the relationship with the Mexican community have been 
changed often and there has not been follow-up of the work that has been done. Therefore 
although these officials did play a role in helping organize the community around the 
place of origin and in the creation of some state federations, they have not given these 
organizations the kind of consistent support that has been crucial for the establishment 
and institutionalization of similar associations in other cities.   
                                                 
126 Interview with Executive director of LULAC in Texas on September 1st, 2004. 
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 State and local authorities from Mexico have not been very active in organizing 
this community either. This has to do on one hand with the fact that except for 
Guanajuato, many emigrants come from states that have not been very active in 
mobilizing and organizing expatriate communities such as San Luis Potosí, Durango and 
Nuevo León.  On the other hand, states that have been interested in mobilizing their 
émigrés such as Zacatecas and, more recently, Michoacán have not made Dallas a 
priority. Their expatriate communities are as a result much less organized than in other 
cities. 
I identified seven associations based on the state of origin (Casa Guanajuato, La 
Familia Nuevo León, Asociación Potosina del Norte de Texas, Federación Club de 
Zacatecanos de Dallas, El Despertar de Durango, La Federación de Michoacán and 
Asociación Guerrerense del Norte de Texas). I attended activities and conducted focus 
group meetings and or in-depth interviews with the leadership of Casa Guanajuato, La 
Familia Nuevo León, Asociación Potosina del Norte de Texas, and the Federación Club 
de Zacatecanos de Dallas. In addition, I interviewed the president of a HTA, the Grupo 
de Zacatecanos del Sombrerete, which has not joined the federation from Zacatecas. The 
Federations I studied are apparently the strongest in the city, although as I said before, 
they are not as institutionalized as their counterparts in other cities.  
Overall, most of these organizations follow the model of Casa Guanajuato which 
has not only counted on continuing institutional support from Mexico but had strong 
leadership that has made the organization stable and successful. An interesting aspect of 
this organization is that its activities focus as much on Mexico as the United States. For 
example, it has followed a strategy of diminishing the chances of the second generation 
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becoming members of street gangs and getting lost in the process of assimilation into 
American society. For instance, the house they bought for their headquarters was in an 
area dominated by Mexican gangs. The association painted murals on their outside walls.  
Initially, gang members vandalized the murals with graffiti. The members of Casa 
Guanajuato responded by painting murals again and again until finally the gangs 
stopped. Relying on the experience of some members and of others who have offered 
help, the organization has used its facilities to provide evening classes for children and 
youngsters, including karate, dance, and English lessons. Casa Guanajuato also 
organizes art exhibitions and other cultural activities that draw members of the Mexican 
community together.  It also has started to get in touch with non-profit grass-roots 
organizations that work with immigrant organizations such as Dallas International Group.  
 Since the beginning of 2000 Casa Guanajuato and the other Mexican 
organizations in the city collaborated to create the Centro Comunitario Mexicano 
(Mexican community Center), a service provider organization that targets the Mexican 
community. This organization has relied on the professional experience of highly-
educated members of the Mexican community. One of its major accomplishments was to 
integrate a health service directory and guide that was distributed within the immigrant 
population, so that low-income people and the undocumented can know what health 
services are accessible in the region. The organization also mounts programs that focus 
on improving the education levels of newcomers, as well as facilitating their social 
adaptation. This organization is part of a Latino network promoted by Dallas 
International and attempts to work with other organizations. However, its work is fairly 
new and it is not clear if it will be able to survive.  
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 Another recent service organization is Casa del Inmigrante (the House of the 
Immigrant). This organization, which was not directly studied in this research due to its 
novelty, has the support of people linked with Lulac.  Although it has made declarations 
in support of immigrants it is difficult to know the extent and effectiveness of its work. 
Political organizations 
My data show that there are few leaders with previous political experience in 
Mexico or that have acquired skills through their involvement in local institutions in 
Dallas. As a local consular official posed it, people with previous political experience in 
Mexico simply did not migrate to Dallas: “this type of network never took place.”  The 
limited political mobilization of Mexicans in the city is also explained, however, by the 
political environment that discourages the involvement of newcomers and minorities just 
as it does that of the general population. This contrasts with the experience of Mexicans 
in Chicago where partisan politics, strong labor unions, and a tradition of social activism 
have facilitated the emergence of more politicized leaders within the first-generation 
Mexican community.  
Despite this fact, some Mexican immigrants in Dallas have been politicized by 
events taking place in the homeland. These immigrants participated in the creation of 
CIME (Corchado 2000). The organization was founded by a Mexican business man 
involved with media, but it also has included smaller, pre-existing political groups, such 
as Mexicanos Unidos 2000, which was active in the campaign to get the right to vote for 
Mexicans abroad. These activists have not yet focused on their host society. Nonetheless, 
during the interviews I conducted they recognized the importance of increasing the 
political participation of Mexicans in their host country.  
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6.6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 In the last few decades a large number of Mexican organizations have emerged 
with explicit or implicit political agendas focused mostly on the homeland. This could be 
an obstacle to Mexican immigrant incorporation in the USA. My research suggests that 
this is not necessarily the case. As I have shown, organizations based on the state of 
origin became the predominant organizational form of this community because they were 
mobilized by the Mexican consulates and by other Mexican authorities. In none of the 
cities I studied did local institutions or ethnic organizations play an important initial role 
in helping to mobilize and organize this community. It is mostly after they were 
organized around strong state federations and similar organizations that host state 
authorities showed an interest in them and saw the emerging leaders as potential 
intermediaries with the rest of the immigrant community.  
 As they have become more sophisticated, Mexican associations have also tended 
to focus more on their host country and are starting to develop important activities that 
may allow them to facilitate the incorporation of Mexican immigrants into their adopted 
cities. This situation, however, will be affected by the type of interactions they establish 
with American authorities at different levels of government and by the opportunity 










THE POLITICS OF THE MEXICAN DIASPORA FOR THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 
 
This work has shown that with different degrees and intensities Mexicans have 
been incorporating into their home and host polities at the national and sub-national 
levels in the last two decades. Because of the long and continuing process of migration 
from Mexico to the United States, both countries are undergoing profound demographic, 
social and political changes. These factors alone, however, do not explain the 
acceleration of political participation that some sectors of this community are showing or 
appear likely to show in the future. Mexicans have been migrating to the United States 
for a long time, and they have seldom been politically active as an immigrant group. 
Since the 1990s, however, the ways they plug into politics have changed in response to 
their interactions with home and host states institutions and authorities.  
Each American city and institutional context has produced different and evolving 
patterns of political engagement as well as varied paths towards the political 
incorporation of Mexican newcomers. At the same time, the combination of the political 
opportunities and constraints created by both home and host states national and sub-
national policies and politics has created a unique configuration in their process of 
integration. 
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 What can the evidence I produced tell us about the present and future political 
behavior of Mexicans living in the United States? I posed a number of empirical 
questions at the outset: First, which is more important in shaping Mexican immigrants’ 
political behavior and incorporation, (1) characteristics of the immigrant community and  
migration flows or (2) the institutional frameworks they face when they come to 
America? Second, which policies are more significant for immigrants’ organization and 
mobilization, (1) the policies of the Mexican state toward their expatriates or (2) the 
policies adopted by the American government?  I have found that there is no direct 
answer to these questions. Mexican American politics differ significantly across 
American cities (as my four city study has shown) and over time. Although the Mexican 
government has played an important role in the mobilization and organization of Mexican 
expatriates, this is true only in the last two decades and in the absence of formal policies 
in the United States to incorporate immigrants. Political developments in the host 
country, however, also have the capacity to mobilize newcomers and engage them into 
the political life of their place of residence as the 2006 rallies in different American cities 
to oppose a House bill (H.R.4437) that criminalized undocumented immigrants and those 
who give them aid have shown. What are the major factors, then, that account for the 
dynamics of Mexican immigrants’ political behavior and their propensity to orient 
themselves to the Mexican and/or American political systems?   
Answers to the above empirical questions are relevant to a number of thorny 
normative issues as well. Is there evidence that Mexican immigrants and their offspring 
are gradually integrating into the US political system both nationally and locally or are 
they maintaining or invigorating their attachment to Mexico? Are Mexican Americans 
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developing divided or dual loyalties and does this threaten to undermine their role as 
American citizens? I seek to shed light on these questions by briefly summarizing the key 
findings of this study and then considering their implications for the future of Mexican 
American politics.  
7.1 Outlook on the Evolution of Immigrant Politics and Incorporation in Four 
American Cities and the United States 
The political incorporation of Mexicans in the United States has not followed a 
straightforward path. The roads they have taken have clearly been influenced by the 
opportunity structures they have faced in their places of residence. These include the 
political development and institutional arrangements of each locality which have created 
a variety of incentives and constraints for the participation of newcomers, as well as for 
the creation of political alliances (Browning, et al. 1990c). Homeland institutions that 
intervene in the places immigrants live, such as consulates and state of origin authorities 
can also be considered part of the opportunity structure because they affect the ways 
immigrants mobilize and organize as well as the qualities of their organizations.  
Of the four cities considered in this study, it is in Los Angeles that Mexicans have 
had the most success incorporating, not only because of their numbers but also because 
limited avenues towards accommodation with the local political system created greater 
incentives for minorities to participate and seek out political allies. Antonio 
Villaraigosa’s triumph was possible because he was able to build a coalition of Latinos, 
African Americans and liberal non-Hispanic whites. His successful quest for the city’s 
mayoral office in 2005 confirmed the political relevance that Latinos have acquired in 
this metropolis after more than a decade of naturalizations and greater electoral 
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participation was spurred in great part by the many initiatives and policies against 
immigrants introduced in California during the 1990s (Barreto and Woods 2005). Since 
the Latino population of the city is predominantly of Mexican origin, Villarraigosa’s 
victory represents an important milestone in the incorporation process of the community. 
Because the political system of Chicago evolved in a context in which greater 
collaboration among ethnic groups was necessary, it seems plausible that this city is 
better placed to incorporate its large Mexican population than a reform city like Los 
Angeles. Yet the incorporation of Mexicans in Chicago has occurred at a slower pace. 
Chicago’s power structure was more open to accommodating Mexicans, making the 
political stakes lower than in Los Angeles; for this reason minorities have had a hard time 
building coalitions that can defeat the long-standing political machine within the 
Democratic Party.  Except for a brief moment in the 1980s, ethnic and racial groups have 
been divided and unable to overcome their differences. These divisions create problems 
for the incorporation of new and disadvantaged immigrant groups such as Mexicans 
because their successful integration is linked to the capacities of ethnic and racial 
minorities to challenge and transform the local power structure. A major disadvantage for 
first-generation Mexicans in Chicago is that Mexican-Americans, to whom they are 
unavoidably linked, have not been able to articulate a political agenda independent of the 
machine. Thus, although the number of elected Hispanic officials has grown in the last 
few decades, this group has not been able to overcome the substantive political inequality 
that keeps reproducing its conditions of economic and social disadvantage.   
Like Los Angeles, Dallas is a reform city. However, minority integration there 
has been very difficult because of an institutional structure designed by narrow and well-
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organized conservative business elites that effectively blocked newcomers’ entrance to 
the system until the 1970s. Litigation in the federal courts turned out to be the only 
alternative by which excluded groups could open up the political process. Although 
various changes to the city’s political system, such as the adoption of district elections, 
have enlarged the political representation of African-Americans and Latinos, minority 
political participation is still low (Morgan 2004). On the one hand, the anti-politics and 
anti-government environment of the city creates few incentives for Mexican immigrants 
to participate in what local political life there is and, on the other, they have not been the 
direct targets of anti-immigrant initiatives that in Los Angeles increased the political 
awareness of local leaders and mobilized the community. For this reason, Mexican 
leaders do not show the same levels of political consciousness that they have shown in 
California and to a lesser extent in Chicago. For instance, Mexican leaders are more 
suspicious of partisan politics regardless of their orientation towards Mexico or the 
United States than in the other cities I studied. 
Although the peculiar characteristics of the Mexican community (including the 
scale and timing of migrations but also the predominant places of origin) affect their 
integration path in all the cities, they seem most relevant for explaining the difficulties 
Mexicans face in New York City. Although the Mexican population has been growing 
steadily since the mid 1980s, Mexicans are not the largest immigrant group and the 
presence of so many immigrants from other places diffuses the political effect that their 
numbers by themselves may be having in other cities.  Furthermore, while in the other 
cities the places of origin of Mexican immigrants are varied, Mexicans in New York 
come predominantly from the Mixteca Baja, a poor indigenous region historically 
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neglected by the Mexican government. People from this area, thus, possess even less 
human and social capital than Mexicans coming from more developed regions. Because 
of these reasons and because they do not represent the most important immigrant group to 
the region, class and ethnic variables seem to be more relevant in accounting for their 
incorporation experience in this locality than in the others I studied.  
The institutional context of the city, nonetheless, is also unfavorable for their 
incorporation. Although New York’s political system is often deemed more capable of 
incorporating the new immigrant waves that arrived in the United States after 1965 than 
other cities (Mollenkopf 1999; Mollenkopf, et al. 2001), minority incorporation has been 
much slower than expected as points of entrance into the system which grant some but 
not full representation diminish the incentives to assemble minority coalitions.  
To sum up, the institutional framework Mexicans face in the cities where they 
have arrived seems to be most important in shaping their political behavior, although the 
characteristics of the immigrant community and of migration flows also play an 
important role, particularly in cases in which these characteristics depart from the norm. 
7.2 The role of the Sending State in Shaping Immigrant Political Behavior  
The data I presented showed that a new policy of rapprochement with emigrants 
implemented by the Mexican government and the country’s more general 
democratization have been the most important factors stimulating the flourishing of 
organizations for first-generation immigrants in the four cities. In a few cases, host state-
generated conflict also contributed to the emergence of these organizations. This casts 
doubt, therefore, on the transnational literature that attributes the emergence of these 
organizations to technological developments or cultural factors and plays down the role 
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of state institutions. Although immigrants have historically established hometown 
associations, the proliferation among Mexican immigrants of this type of organization 
and of state federations in recent decades cannot be explained without considering the 
role of state institutions and institutional actors.  Homeland policies towards mobilizing 
and organizing immigrants also explain convergence in the types of organizations 
Mexicans have established since the 1990s. The effectiveness of these policies, however, 
has varied from city to city. In Los Angeles and Chicago, for example, Mexican 
consulates and state of origin authorities have played a more active role in organizing the 
Mexican community than in Dallas or New York. This explains why, organizations based 
on the state of origin are more prominent in the first two cities, although in the case of 
New York the fact that most Mexican immigrants come from a single state also explains 
why state federations have not proliferated there.     
The different characteristics and attitudes that Mexican groups and their leaders 
display in each city also demonstrate, nonetheless, the relevance of local opportunity 
structures to immigrants’ political behavior. Leaders of state federations in Los Angeles, 
for example, have tended to show greater interest in US politics than the leaders of 
similar organizations in other cities because they have been exposed to a more hostile 
political environment and, more recently, because their growing interactions with local 
authorities have opened up more spaces for their participation. In Dallas, in contrast, the 
non-partisan and non-political stances of most leaders reflect an institutional environment 
that privileges individual actions over political ones for the solution of daily problems.  
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By analyzing the opportunity structures in different American cities, then, I have 
been able to explain why Mexicans have made more progress in some than in others. In 
addition, I was able to explain variations in the political attitudes of their leaders. 
7.3 The Role of National Institutional Structures 
The political incorporation of immigrants, however, is not only determined at the 
local level. Because citizenship and immigration policies are the prerogatives of the 
national government, national institutional structures are central to the possibilities for 
immigrants’ collective action and strategic choices (interest group or electoral). Political 
incorporation can take various forms and degrees. A full process of incorporation ideally 
supposes that immigrants have substantive influence or control over the policy process on 
those issues that are particularly relevant for them (Browning, et al. 1990b).  Having 
citizenship rights in the host country obviously increases the prospects for immigrants to 
have a meaningful influence in the political system. With citizenship rights, they can 
choose to influence policy from the inside by following an electoral strategy or from the 
outside acting as an interest group. Without citizenship rights, lower levels of 
incorporation can still occur when immigrants participate in rallies and demonstrations. If 
there is not at least partial incorporation they become a potential source of social and 
political conflict.    
  During the first three quarters of the twentieth century Mexican immigrants were 
a highly vulnerable group, hardly incorporated at all.  On the one hand, the majority 
lacked access to citizenship so that an electoral strategy was not feasible; on the other, 
their status as sojourners diminished the chances that they would be able to mobilize the 
resources to organize to influence policy from the outside as an interest group. As Fuchs 
 289
(1990) argues, they were locked into the system of “sojourner pluralism”.  This situation 
changed in the last quarter of the century as a result of the expansive immigration policies 
adopted by the United States since 1965. The 1986 amnesty, in conjunction with the 
family reunification procedures already existent, granted a large number the right to pose 
claims in the polity and opened up new opportunities for their participation.  
Despite this fact, there are still many institutional constraints that may impede the 
possibilities of a fuller incorporation. At the discursive level, there is still strong 
disagreement about their capacity to incorporate and its desirability. On the one hand, 
some scholars have praised the extent to which Mexicans have absorbed the values of the 
American “civic culture” (Fuchs 1990; Shain 1999). On the other hand, Mexicans are 
frequently depicted as a threat to America’s cultural and political integrity (Renshon 
2001; Huntington 2004b; Huntington 2004a) precisely because they are deemed as 
incapable of adapting to the “American creed”.  
Although political parties, unions, and other gatekeeper institutions as well as 
administrative authorities have intensified their interactions with the Mexican community 
in the United States, a large number of Mexicans remain without legal status. For 
instance, the single most important obstacle this community confronts in becoming fully 
participant democratic actors is the fact that many of its members do not have access to 
citizenship.  Although Mexicans have been the dominant group coming to the United 
States in the last two decades, only a relatively few of them have been able to do it 
legally.  As can be seen in Figure 7.1 the number of Mexicans immigrants who are 
entering legally has been decreasing while the number of undocumented immigrants has 
significantly increased.   
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Figure 7.1: Average Annual Flows of Mexican-Born Migrants in the United States by 

















  The illegality of a large portion of Mexicans in the United States (from the 
estimated 10.3 million persons born in Mexico who now live in the United States about 
6.5 million do not have legal documents (Census 2006; Passel 2006)) increases the 
marginality of this community and makes their assimilation and adaptation into the 
American society more difficult. At the same time, this marginality feeds perceptions that 
Mexicans are incapable of assimilating into the American creed. The illegality which 
scholars like Huntington (2004a) identify as an obstacle to Mexican incorporation could 
be solved if American immigration policies recognized the reality that a large proportion 
of immigrants do and should come from Mexico for both historical and geographical 
reasons127. Instead, in recent decades, conservative interests in the immigration debate–
which are also the ones most concerned about the viability of assimilation--have pushed 
                                                 
127 This is recognized to some extent, nonetheless, in the bill that passed the Senate on May 25th, 2006 and 
in President Bush’s proposals in 2001, 2004 and 2006. 
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for enforcement measures that have failed to deter immigration but have transformed the 
historically circular patterns of Mexican migration to the United States into permanent 
settlement. At the same time they shove migrants deeply into the shadows of American 
society128. 
   If the illegality problem were successfully addressed, other issues that 
Huntington (2004a) identifies as problematic for the assimilation of Mexicans would also 
be resolved. Regional concentration, which he sees as threatening, for example, would 
probably diminish as immigrants would be more likely to disperse within their host 
country, once they were legal. By dispersing, they also would be encouraged to learn 
English.    
In sum, institutional actions may ameliorate many of the obstacles impeding the 
assimilation of Mexicans into the “American creed”, assuming, for the sake of argument, 
that they do not already imbibe many of the values of that creed as described by 
Huntington (Christianity, religious commitment, and work ethic). Institutional actions, 
furthermore, can also increase the stakes Mexicans perceive in the host country, 
accelerating the incorporation process. 
7.4 Incorporating in the Home Country 
As Brubaker (Brubaker 2005) has pointed out, the notion of diaspora is often 
characterized in substantialist terms. However, not all members of national groups 
residing outside their places of origin engage in diasporic politics. Rather than talking 
                                                 
128In a testimony to the US Congress Douglas Massey who has studied the immigration phenomenon for 
decades concluded the following:  
 In sum, the American attempt to stop the flow of Mexican workers within a rapidly integrating 
North American economy has reduced the rate of apprehension at the border, raised the rate of 
death among migrants, produced longer trip lengths, lowered rates of return migration, increased 
the pace of undocumented population growth, and transformed what had been a circular flow of 
workers affecting three states into a settled population of families scattered throughout 50 states, 
all at the cost of billions of taxpayer dollars (Massey 2005). 
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about diasporas as an entity, we should talk about them as a stance. At the same time, we 
should distinguish between an actively diasporan fraction and the majority who adopt no 
political positions towards their homeland. In the case of Mexicans residing in the United 
States, it is probable that the majority are not interested in mobilizing towards their 
country of origin. After all, if emigration is a political act, it is the act of defecting from a 
system rather than of attempting to change it (Hirschman 1970). Those who defect, or 
leave, have already made the individual choice of not being politically active in their 
homeland. Most emigrants are more interested in economic improvement than in political 
change. It is logical, therefore, to expect most emigrants “to display low levels of efficacy 
and loyalty, and thus low levels of political activity” (Ireland 1994) at least towards their 
homeland. As has been made clear in this work, Mexican expatriates did not engage in 
diasporic politics until recently. 
The process of democratization in Mexico, its new policy of rapprochement 
towards those residing abroad, as well as changes in its citizenship and nationality laws 
have gradually opened up new spaces for the participation of expatriates in its political 
life. In this context, some activist groups within the Mexican diaspora –the “Diaspora” 
diaspora (Brubaker 2005)-- followed an interest group strategy to push for even greater 
levels of incorporation, namely the right to vote from abroad and be elected to political 
office. As part of this strategy, Mexican émigrés have lobbied Mexican authorities with 
different levels of intensity and effectiveness since the early 1990s. Except for a few 
sectors within the opposition–particularly within the PRD--the Mexican political class 
generally opposed expanding political rights to those residing abroad because the costs of 
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doing so were perceived as both too high and unnecessary129. However, as political 
competition increased among Mexico’s three major political parties, and as emigrant 
influence over the country’s economic and political life increased, this consensus started 
to break down. The result was the 2005 law to allow expatriate voting. For all its 
limitations, which reflect lingering concerns among the political class over the 
consequences of giving expatriates voting rights, passage of the law was an event of 
historic proportions in Mexico’s political development whose full effects will unfold only 
in years to come. 
What does this new level of incorporation imply for Mexico? What will be the 
real levels of participation of Mexicans abroad in their country’s political life?  There are 
signs that the interest of the expatriate community as a whole to get involved in Mexico’s 
politics was overestimated –e.g. of an estimated universe of 4 million potential voters, 
only 56, 749 persons registered to participate in the 2006 election. But it is too early to 
know if participation rates may eventually rise. Meanwhile, it is important to remember 
that the participation of Mexicans in homeland politics is not limited to the electoral 
process:  through the organizations they have created in the United States many more 
than those registered to vote are already exercising their voice. 
7.5 Empirical and Theoretical Considerations and Implications 
Over the last few decades, social scientists have attempted to document the rapid 
demographic and social changes that the relentless process of Mexican migration to the 
United States has implied. Besides studying migration networks and the economic 
variables that motivate people to migrate, international migration scholars are now also 
                                                 
129 In addition, members of the PRI, which until 2000 dominated Mexico’s political life, were against 
expanding political rights to those residing abroad because they feared if they were allowed to vote they 
would vote against the government.  
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documenting the dynamics and consequences of the settlement process of Mexican 
immigrants in major American cities as well as in new destination areas. Sociologists and 
anthropologists seek to explain adaptation and assimilation and the ways immigrants are 
transforming the communities where they settle. Scholars studying transnationalism from 
various disciplines have focused on identifying the different cultural, social, economic 
and political links that immigrants have established with their places of origin and to 
analyze the hybrid or fluid identities that immigrants acquire by their simultaneous 
presence in two places (Appadurai 1996; Portes 1997a; Smith and Guranizo 1998; Smith 
1998b; Moctezuma Longoria 1999; Smith 1999b). Political scientists, in contrast, have 
produced far less work on this phenomenon130. Even though Mexicans are today the 
largest immigrant group to the United States, few analysts have developed frameworks to 
study their political behavior, or to compare their political incorporation to that of 
previous immigrant groups.  In general, studies of their political attitudes collapse first-
generation Mexican immigrants into wider categories such as Mexican-American, 
Hispanics or Latinos and treat them as a broadly similar ethnic group. Few 
differentiations are made between old and new populations or between citizens and non-
citizens131.  The limited study in the United States of the political behavior of post-1965 
immigrants—and particularly of Mexicans-- contrasts sharply with the case of Europe, 
where scholars have produced a large body of literature about the characteristics and 
patterns of incorporation of the predominant immigrant groups in the continent (Ireland 
1994; Bousetta 2000; Ireland 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000a; Koopmans and 
                                                 
130 There are some exceptions: For example Smith (1998a) who nonetheless has tended to use more 
sociological and anthropological perspectives, (Desipio, et al. 2003), (Itzigsohn 2000). 
131 An interesting study that does this differentiation is that by Jones-Correa (1998b), although he does not 
focus on the Mexican case.  
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Statham 2000b; Ireland 2003; Jacobs, et al. 2004; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Koopmans 
2004).  
To fill this gap this study has explored the process of political incorporation of 
Mexican immigrants in both the United States and Mexico through the examination of 
the origins, dynamics and patterns of action of first-generation Mexican-American 
organizations in the United States. Political incorporation in the host society has 
traditionally implied that immigrants relinquish their political interests in their country of 
origin. As was demonstrated here, contemporary migration suggests a different dynamic. 
Greater contacts with the homeland thanks to technological developments, along with 
sending country efforts to engage and mobilize their expatriates, have diminished the 
incentives for immigrants to abandon their political claims on their homeland. Because 
immigrant political incorporation is often tightly linked to and influenced by 
incorporation or reincorporation into the homeland, I have argued that the two processes 
should be studied together. In this final section, I turn to several larger questions about 
the effects of the simultaneous incorporation of Mexicans on the future of the United 
States. 
7.5.1 Mexicans in the United States: A Dual Loyalty? 
How will the American democracy deal with a large population group, more than 
half of which resides in the United States without a legal status, that historically has not 
been perceived as fit to belong to the polity? What space do Mexican immigrants and 
their offspring have in the USA? Will they remain as second-class people or will they 
become participatory and concerned citizens? Will they have dual loyalties?   
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 The analysis presented here directly challenges those who portray Mexican 
immigration as a threat to America’s national unity and question their capacity to 
assimilate into a static “American creed” (Renshon 2001; Huntington 2004b; Huntington 
2004a)132.  I should clarify that in this work I have explicitly chosen to talk about 
incorporation rather than assimilation. As Plotke has explained, assimilation suggests 
“less conflict and disagreement than is common in political entry—to be assimilated (…) 
in a polity seems almost to be absorbed in it” (Plotke 1999, p. 298).  Incorporation, in 
contrast  
indicates both inclusion and the formation of the group that is being incorporated. 
To say that a group has been incorporated into a polity signals the formation of 
that group as a new and distinctive part of the polity. This implies change in the 
polity, and the possibility of conflict between the new group and other political 
agents (Plotke 1999). 
  If Mexicans are expected to assimilate without any major problem into a pre-
1960s 133 non-inclusive creed derived from the Anglo-Protestant culture that Huntington 
idealizes, then he may have some reason to be concerned. Mexicans may not be able to 
do so first because they may not be accepted into a creed from which they were 
historically excluded.  As Waldinger (2004) suggests, today’s newcomers have 
encountered a society transformed by the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s 
which has expanded the notion of what it is to be American. For this reason, by becoming 
                                                 
132 The work of Tichenor and Smith had already shown that taking about one and unified American creed is 
problematic because historically there have been competing traditions about America’s national idea. As a 
result here I prefer to discuss the viability of their incorporation into the American political system, which 
includes their participation and representation in America’s political institutions as well as their capacity to 
influence the policy process. 
133 Huntington argues that this creed started to be eroded since the 1960s by “sub-national, dual national 
and transnational identities” (Huntington 2004b, p. XV).      
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part of this nation, they will certainly remake it in ways more fundamental than previous 
immigrant groups ever imagined. A better question is whether they will be able to 
successfully incorporate into the American polity.     
 Following Huntington’s line of argument the answer would be “probably not” 
because Mexican immigration displays special characteristics that make it different from 
previous flows and that might impede their political integration. These include, apart 
from their illegality discussed before, the contiguity of the homeland, its persistence, and 
the poor human and social capital resources of most immigrants in a period when the 
United States economy is more skill-based. However, it is important to consider that they 
also have many characteristics of previous immigrant groups, such as a culture of hard 
work and a desire to make it in the United States134. Even if many of them live segregated 
in ethnic enclaves and speak little English, this was the common experience of previous 
immigrant influxes. Cultural and linguistic assimilation came not with the first generation 
but with the second and there are no reasons to suppose that the children of Mexican 
immigrants do not want to assimilate. Data produced by The Harvard Immigration 
Project and presented by Suárez Orozco shows that the children of new immigrants not 
only value learning English but are more likely to agree with the statement “in life school 
is the most important thing” (Suárez-Orozco 2004). A very different concern, which will 
not be discussed here, is whether their children will be able to make it in America or 
become part of an under class (Portes and Zhou 1993).  
                                                 
134 As Gregory Rodriguez has explained, although Chicano political activists have tended to portray 
Mexican-Americans as a conquered people, highlighting their ancestral rights to the Southwest. they also 
have tended to present Mexican migration as a process determined by economic forces over which migrants 
have little or no control.  However, millions of Mexicans that have come to the United States did so 
voluntarily, hoping that one day they would be able to lift their families into the middle class(Rodriguez 
2004). 
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 Although their group characteristics may make their adaptation more difficult, the 
main obstacles to their political incorporation are not individual but institutional135. 
Mexican immigrants have faced an opportunity structure at the national, state and local 
levels that has tended to constrain rather than to encourage their incorporation. Although 
some important policy decisions have facilitated their entrance into the American polity, 
most importantly the 1986 amnesty, many other institutional obstacles actually block 
their successful integration.  
To a great extent, therefore, the degree of their incorporation will be determined 
by the spaces made available for their political participation and representation. As this 
work has shown, Mexican immigrants’ political behavior since the 1990s has focused 
predominantly on the homeland, not only because of the obvious attachments they retain 
with their country of origin, but because in the last two decades and a half they have 
enjoyed a more receptive posture from the Mexican government than from that of the 
United States.  
What about the issue of loyalty? As this work has demonstrated, Mexicans are 
becoming political actors both in Mexico and the United States and they are certainly, 
and unavoidably, developing dual loyalties. This phenomenon, however, is not 
uncommon for other immigrant and ethnic groups in the present or in the past (Morawska 
2001). The main question is whether having two loyalties will impede their successful 
                                                 
135 As Parrillo (2005) explains with great clarity, almost every immigrant group, including those that are 
considered now fully assimilated,  has been the victim  of racial, religious or cultural bias. Although new 
immigrants are perceived as too different from the American mainstream, so were perceived other 
immigrant groups in the past that ended up, nonetheless, successfully assimilating in the United States. In 
the same vein, there is no compelling reason to believe that new immigrants will not integrate in this 
country, as previous immigrants did, after various generations. Nonetheless, they will certainly enrich and 
expand the concept of “mainstream America.”   
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incorporation into their host society by detracting from their commitment to the 
American system.  
At first glance, it seems that immigrant focus on the homeland would deter the 
focus on their host country. However, their interest in their country of origin is not 
necessarily a zero-sum game.  Mobilization towards the homeland can also be seen in a 
positive light. First, not all Mexicans in the United States are focusing on their homeland, 
but only a relatively small group that has become actively involved in advancing an 
agenda there, mostly those that participate in organizations such as the ones identified for 
this study. Second, why are they focusing on Mexico? Obviously, as in the case of many 
other immigrant groups, the myth of return is common among Mexicans in the United 
States. Many immigrants, for example, build houses in Mexico which they dream they 
will one day occupy. The reality is that many sending towns are semi-deserted places 
with beautiful empty houses, because those who built them have already settled for good 
in the United States.   
More than that, what seems to guide the active Mexican diaspora is a collective 
commitment to help in the improvement and prosperity of their homeland (Brubaker 
2005). Although the Mexican government is behind the emergence of many hometown 
associations and state federations, these organizations would not have been as successful 
as many of them are if their members had not been committed to the idea of improving 
the material circumstances of their places of origin. As the data presented here showed, 
the main and so far most successful activity of these organizations has been to raise 
money to invest in infrastructure and social projects in sending regions. By doing so, 
emigrants are actively participating in what should be one of the main policies followed 
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by Mexico and the United States to deter emigration to the North: to invest vast resources 
in emigrant emitting places to expand opportunities of their inhabitants have fewer 
incentives to leave.  
Even political organizations that have demanded political rights in Mexico have 
as an underlying idea to support policies that affect emigrants.  In this regard, these 
organizations are attempting to bring better solutions to bear on the problem of Mexican 
migration to the United States. It is interesting to notice, for instance, that the CDPME, 
which was active in the campaign to obtain the right to vote from abroad, has since 
March 2006 shifted its attention to the United States by joining the debate on immigration 
reform.   
Third, many first-generation Mexican organizations, particularly home town 
associations and state federations, reproduce important American political values in their 
internal processes such as democracy and accountability and have also exported those 
values to their places of origin (Shain 1999; Leiken 2000). When they participate in the 
development of infrastructure projects in their hometowns, for example, these 
organizations make sure that local authorities do not take bribes by naming local 
committees to follow up on the use of the resources they send. This shows the extent to 
which immigrants have assimilated important values of the “American civic culture” 
(Fuchs 1990). 
In sum, although participation in first-generation Mexican organizations may help 
reinvigorate immigrants’ loyalty to their homeland, this does not seem to constitute a 
problem for the United States and does not raise questions about immigrants’ loyalty to 
their adopted country. On the contrary, these organizations are being helpful in creating 
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new bridges between Mexico and the United States and in finding innovative solutions to 
the problem of illegal immigration.  
At the same time, these associations bring important benefits for the adaptation 
and incorporation of Mexicans into the United States. By participating in them 
immigrants increase their social capital which in turn augments their feelings of political 
trust and participation (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). By becoming politically active towards 
their homeland they also gain political experience that they can use to participate in the 
political life of their host country as well. There are, for instance, clear signs that these 
organizations and their leaders are gradually turning their attention to their host society. 
Apart from the support that state federations have provided to local politicians in the last 
few years, an interesting political development that I captured at the end of my research is 
the active participation of these organizations in the 2005 political campaign of Antonio 
Villaraigosa for mayor of Los Angeles and in the 2006 pro-immigrant rallies. 
Furthermore, some state federation leaders in Los Angeles and Chicago are now engaged 
in creating broader organizations to advance immigrants’ rights in the United States.     
Finally, although the leaders of these organizations privileged a Mexican identity 
they did not see this identity as being inconsistent with also thinking of themselves as 
Americans but rather as setting themselves apart from Mexican-Americans. Their main 
complaint about a Mexican-American identity is that they identified Mexican-Americans 
as being ashamed of their Mexican heritage, while they felt proud of it. This may point to 
a different strategy towards their political incorporation in the United States from the one 
historically adopted by Mexican-Americans. While Mexican-Americans have always 
attempted to demonstrate that their loyalty belongs exclusively to the United States, post-
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IRCA Mexican immigrants recognize and assume as unproblematic the possibility of 
having a dual identity and loyalty. Their loyalty to Mexico, however, does not question 
their loyalty to the United States a country for which they show high levels of admiration 
and respect. It is also interesting to notice that none of these organizations have a 
separatist agenda or have shown an interest in asserting a historical claim to the American 
territory, an element that Huntington (Huntington 2004a; Huntington 2004b) identified as 
possibly impeding their successful assimilation into the American creed. 
To sum up, these organizations have the potential of playing an important role in 
motivating the political incorporation of Mexican immigrants into the American political 
system. For this reason, I believe that American policy makers in different cities should 
design programs focused on reaching out to Mexican organizations such as those 
identified in my research. So far, these organizations have had far fewer contacts with 
American authorities and politicians than with those from Mexico. A wider contact with 
these organizations on the part of American authorities and institutions will help channel 
their efforts and activities not only in benefit of the home country, but also towards the 
host.    
I also think that Latino organizations need to work more energetically to reach out 
to the newly organized Mexican community. Mexican immigrants, after all, represent an 
important grass-roots base for them.  The growing number of these organizations and 
their capacity to influence the political attitudes of first and second-generation Mexican 
immigrants make it unwise to ignore them if Mexican Americans want to increase their 
political clout in American cities.  
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7.5.2 Political Opportunity Structures and Trasnationalism 
 This study has suggested that it is useful to understand how opportunity structures 
affect immigrant political behavior and participation towards their home and host 
societies. Because many immigrant groups that arrived since 1965 have maintained or 
increased their ties with their homeland, many studies on the subject have been conducted 
by using a transnational approach. Since these studies focus on the individual variables 
rather than institutional ones (Portes 1997a; Portes, et al. 1999), they have missed the 
relevance of home and host state opportunity structures in affecting immigrants’ political 
behavior, or have treated them predominantly as intervening variables.  
To a great extent, transnational scholarship was a reaction to studies of immigrant 
assimilation that considered integration in the host society as a zero-sum game. 
Assimilation implied absorption of host society values and the abandonment of those 
brought from the homeland. Studies conducted using a transnational approach suggested 
otherwise: immigrants’ identities were not static but fluid and hybrid.  
These studies also represented a reaction to structural theories in international 
migration that were not able to explain why immigrants that appeared to be the victims of 
overwhelming structural forces where able to develop special links with their 
communities of origin that liberated them from their condition of subordination (Portes 
1997b).  
 In a somewhat celebratory mood, some scholars have stressed that state 
boundaries are being eroded or crossed--hence the use of the notion trans (referring to 
boundaries being crossed) rather than inter (referring to boundaries being maintained and 
negotiated) (Albrow 1998). However, they left aside the fact that states still have great 
 304
capacities to determine migrants’ activities and identities by defining who belongs and 
who cannot belong to the polity. 
 In a way, these studies were able to describe how immigrants have increased their 
ties with their countries of origin but not why. This study has attempted to fill this gap by 
showing that in the last few decades immigrants have mobilized and organized towards 
their country of origin because the opportunity structure changed in positive directions. 
However, they also have the potential of mobilizing towards the host society as 
opportunities for their mobilization increase and they learn to navigate their new polity.  
At the same time, it has brought back to the forefront of the debate the notion of 
political incorporation.  Although the notion of assimilation may be questionable, 
studying immigrant incorporation is still important. In the end, what matters the most is 
not so much whether immigrants’ identities are being transformed by interacting in two 
social settings, although this is still an interesting matter, but what are their chances of 
incorporating in their host societies. Only through their political incorporation will 
immigrant groups such as Mexican that arrive with limited resources be able to overcome 
their conditions of poverty and disadvantage.  
7.6 A Final Note 
 While I was in the last stages of writing this study, in early 2006, immigrants all 
over the United States, many of them Hispanic, marched in the streets to oppose the 
Sensenbrenner bill that attempted to criminalize immigrants without documents and the 
people who work with them. These unprecedented marches were a watershed event in the 
history of immigrants to the United States. Never before had they launched protests of 
such magnitude and in so many American cities. Preliminary data of a study conducted 
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by the Institute for Latino Studies at University of Notre Dame showed that between 
February and the first of May 2006 there were 259 protests and student walk-outs in 43 
states and 158 American cities and the total number of people that participated in those 
rallies was between 3,324,256 and 5,058,806136.     
 Mexicans are the largest immigrant group in the United States and they were the 
largest group participating in many of the marches, as reflected in the numerous Mexican 
flags that protesters were waving. In contrast to the march that took place in Los Angeles 
in October 1994 against proposition 187 in which participants carried mostly Mexican 
flags, many of the protesters displayed American flags as well. By doing so, they made 
the explicit statement that they cherished the USA and wanted to be Americans even if 
they also maintained a strong connection with their countries of origin.  Many of the 
immigrant organizations I included in this study actively participated in the recent 
demonstrations and many of their leaders were involved in their organization, even 
though the rallies themselves reflected not so much a calculated strategy as a spontaneous 
reaction to the bill (H. R. 4437). The active involvement of many of these organizations 
and their leaders reinforces my argument that these associations have the capacity of 
advancing the political interests of immigrants and Hispanics in the United States even 
though most of them were originally focused on the homeland. 
 Some commentators have likened the recent immigrant political activism to 
earlier social movements such as that for civil rights in the 1960s and 1970s. Is this 
accurate? Can such a movement be successful? Finally, how would a political 
opportunity structure approach such as the one applied here explain such developments?  
                                                 
136 Preliminary data presented by Bada, Xochitl, in an email discussion group on May 11, 2006 
 306
Although it is too early to answer these questions definitively, there are certainly 
some aspects that can be tentatively analyzed. The first issue is determining when a social 
group that has traditionally made few contentious claims on the political system start to 
do so.  At a minimum for mobilization to take place there must be not only a feeling of 
grievance but also the faith that by acting collectively they can achieve redress 
(McAdam, et al. 2001).  In the case of the recent rallies, what mobilized immigrants more 
than anything was a strong feeling of grievance provoked by the radical legislative 
proposals coming out of Washington. Although there were other anti-immigrant bills or 
policies before, none had been so extreme in content or potential consequences. The 
possibility that such a bill might become law mobilized not only immigrants but also 
important potential allies and supporters such as the Catholic Church, employers facing 
obstacles to cheap labor, and local and national unions that have flirted in recent years 
with unionizing undocumented workers.     
The Sensenbrenner bill thus contributed to increasing the resource mobilization 
capacities of immigrants and the emergence of what could be considered a nascent social 
movement. This factor by itself, however, was not sufficient for their mobilization. An 
antecedent was the 1986 immigration amnesty. As I have argued, it gave a stake in the 
polity to a large group of Mexican immigrants that previously had not been considered 
potential members of the American polity. IRCA was approved not as a response to 
immigrant political pressure, although certainly pro-immigration groups lobbied for the 
amnesty, but because of an attempt by the American political class to find a solution to 
the illegal immigration problem. The amnesty was, for instance, only a part of a more 
comprehensive immigration reform, which also attempted to increase the security of the 
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border and to control immigration influxes by penalizing employers, although this last 
feature has not been strictly enforced. When the amnesty was implemented, however, its 
impacts were enormous because it helped consolidate Mexican migration networks and at 
the same time became a reference point for future generations of undocumented 
immigrants.  
In 2006, immigrants marched in the streets because they assumed that there was a 
political solution to their problem: another amnesty was possible if they were able to 
mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance their collective interests. Because voting 
was not an option to a large number of them, they attempted to exercise pressure on the 
system from the outside by demonstrating and by organizing an economic boycott on 
May 1st.  
The opportunity structure was more receptive than it had been in previous decades 
because the influence of Hispanics in the political process is on the rise. For this reason, 
various initiatives contemplating some form of regularization or path to citizenship were 
being discussed in Congress—e.g. the Kennedy and McCain Bill in the Senate--while 
President Bush had already called two times–in 2001 and in 2004--for a comprehensive 
solution to the immigration problem. The receptiveness of the political system was also 
reflected at the local level. For example, the mayors of both Chicago and Los Angeles not 
only supported the immigrants’ cause but actually participated in their rallies.  
Using the four categories I developed in this study--national cleavage structures, 
institutional actors and legal arrangements, political culture and idioms and contingencies 
of time and place--what are the chances of success for this nascent social movement? As 
the bill approved in the House in December 2005 suggests, there is strong ideological 
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opposition within some sectors of American society to accepting new immigrants, and 
particularly low-skilled Mexicans, as members of the polity. In 1986, in a context in 
which the effects of the civil rights movement were still being felt, the political climate 
was favorable to inclusive solutions. A guest worker program was not even considered at 
the time because it was evident that the previous programs had not worked and if the 
United States wanted to avoid acquiring the characteristics of a sultanistic Arab emirate it 
needed to grant newcomers a real stake in the polity. In 2006, in a very different context, 
it has become difficult to pass any immigration reform that includes a path to citizenship, 
particularly when there is the generalized perception within the American public that the 
1986 was a failure.  Institutionally, immigrants have a more limited capacity to influence 
the system than those that are opposed to their presence in this country, because of their 
lack of legal rights.  To increase their political leverage they will certainly need not only 
to become better organized, but also have the continuous support of strong allies. As the 
immigration raids in May 2006 showed, there are still many mechanisms by which a pro-
immigrant social movement may be controlled and dismantled. The simple but rigorous 
enforcement of existing immigration law (employer sanctions and deportation and 
removal) might have a chilling effect on immigrant political activities or it might spark 
massive protests.  
The immigrants’ cause is aided by the instability of the current political alignment 
in the United States and the fact that neither political party can afford to lose the political 
support of the Hispanic community. Many Republican politicians still remember that 
California became a Democratic bastion in presidential elections after their party wasted 
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its political capital in that state by supporting anti-immigrant initiatives such as 
Proposition 187.  
In summary, although it is still too early to talk about the existence of a social 
movement with strength comparable to the civil rights movement, there are hints of a 
nascent movement.  Immigrants today do not enjoy the relatively open political context 
of the American sixties, which allowed the advancement of the African-American cause. 
Despite this, it is clear that the immigrant organization and capacity is growing year by 
year.  Time will tell the extent to which the voice of this community will be heard and 











I. The Organization  
 
1) When was your organization/group started? 
2) How did it get started?  
3) Was any governmental agency involved in the creation of the group? Or did any 
governmental agency motivate you to organize? 
4) What are the criteria for membership? 
5) Are there dues? 
6) How many members are there in your organization?  Are all of them immigrants, or 
are some born in the US? 
7) How is the leadership selected? 
8) When were you selected/elected? For how long were you selected? 
 
II. The organization explicit goals 
 
9) What are the main goals of the organization/group? 
10) What are its major activities? What are its regular activities? 
11) Does it engage in activities/provide services that attempt to assist the members with 
concerns in the US such as English classes, citizenship training, becoming a legal 
resident, establishing a business, getting jobs, getting legal advice? 
12) Does it provide services/sponsor activities related to the communities of origin such 
as fund raising for specific projects, supporting candidates in elections, etc? 
13) Which of these types of activities (assist members with concerns in the US or sponsor 
activities related to the communities of origin) is more important, or are they equally 
important? 
14) Does the Mexican government (at any level) assist or sponsor any of these types of 
activities (assist members with concerns in the US or sponsor activities related to the 
communities of origin)? If possible specify (Consulate, state government, municipal 
government etc). 
15) Does the American government (at any level) assist or sponsor any of these types of 
activities (assist members with concerns in the US or sponsor activities related to the 
communities of origin)? If possible specify. 
16) Does any American NGO (at any level) assist or sponsor any of these types of 
activities (assist members with concerns in the US or sponsor activities related to the 
communities of origin)? If possible specify. 
17) Have you received help from other organizations/businesses here in the US or in 
Mexico?  
18) Can you identify one or some projects  (e.g. the construction of a road etc) developed 
by your organization in Mexico that you consider successful? 
19) Can you identify one or some projects developed by your organization in the United 
States that you consider successful? 





III. Ties to Mexican-Americans 
 
20) Do you identify some of the major Mexican-American or other Hispanic/ Latino 
Organizations?  
21) Does your organization have any ties with Mexican American/Latino groups such as 
LULAC, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, MALDEF?  If so, with what 
organizations? 
22) Do you consider this to be a Mexican organization, or a Mexican American/Hispanic 
organization? 
 
IV. Perspectives on goals of the members  
 
23) What is more important to you: improve the life conditions of yourself, your family 
or your community here in the US or in Mexico? 
24) Do you consider yourself simply American? 
25) Do you consider yourself Mexican-American? 
26) Do you consider yourself Mexican?  
27) Are you a US citizen? 
28) Are you a US resident? 
29) Approximately, how many member of your organization have US citizenship/ 
residence? 
30) Do you have dual-nationality?  
31) Approximately, how many members of your organization have dual nationality? 
32) If you have US-born children? Have you applied for them to become dual-nationals? 
33) Are you an active member of your community here in the US (board of education, 
etc.), if so what has made you participate in your community 
 
V. Political aspects with respect to Mexico. 
 
34) Do you think that Mexicans living abroad should get the right to vote in Mexican 
elections? 
35) Do you think that Mexicans abroad should be represented in the Mexican Congress? 
36) Are you engaged in any activities that attempt to promote the right to vote in Mexican 
elections? 
37) Is your organization engaged in any activities that attempt to promote the right to vote 
in Mexican elections? 
38) Does your organization have a regular relationship with Mexican political parties? If 
so, with what parties? 
39) When you think about Mexico, are you more interested in what happens in your 
community of origin? Or are you more interested in what happens at the national 
level? Or both? 
40) What do you think are the major concerns of Mexicans living abroad with respect to 
Mexico? 
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41) Do you think Mexicans living abroad should lobby/pressure the  
42) Mexican government to get what they want in Mexico (e.g. the right to vote in 
Mexican elections, a safer trip to their communities of origin)?  
43) Do you think Mexicans living abroad should lobby/pressure the  
44) Mexican government to get what they want in the US? 
45) What instances in Mexico do you consider more effective to defend your interests 
with respect to Mexico (e.g. Congress, the executive branch/Foreign Affairs ministry/ 
a political party? 
46) Do you think that the policies of the Mexican government towards its nationals living 
abroad will change due to the arrival to power of a new political party? 
47) Do you think that they will stay the same? 
 
VI. Political aspects with respect to the US. 
 
48) Do you think that a major goal of Mexicans living abroad should be to incorporate 
themselves into the American society? 
49) Which do you think is the best strategy to do so? 
50) Do you vote in American elections? 
51) Does your organization attempt to promote the political empowerment of Mexicans in 
the US? If so, in what way? 
52) Is your organization committed to promote the vote in American elections? 
53) When you think about the US, are you more interested in what happens in the 
community you live or are you more interested in what happens at the national level, 
or both? 
54) What do you think are the major concerns of Mexicans living abroad with respect to 
the US? 
55) Do you think Mexicans living abroad should lobby/pressure the  
56) American government to get what they want in the US? 
57) Do you think Mexicans living abroad should lobby/pressure the American 
government to get what they want in Mexico? 
 
VII. Political aspects with respect to both Mexico and the US 
 
58) In your judgment, do members of your organization consider themselves members of 
US society?  Why? 
59) Of Mexican society? Why? 
60) Of both Mexican and American society?  Why? 
61) Do your members identify the Mexican government as their government? 
62) The American government as their government? 
63) If you identify both (US and Mexico) as your governments to which one do you owe 
greater allegiance? 
64) What is more important for you: (a) to vote and participate in Mexican politics or (b) 








Table B.1: Place of origin of Latinos in Chicago Metropolitan  
 1990 2000 % Change 
All Latinos 836,905 (100%) 1,405,116 (100%) 67.9% 
Mexicans 565,737 (67.6 %) 1,052,878 (74.9 %) 86.1% 
Puerto Ricans 142,745 (17.1 %) 151,351 (10.8 %) 6.0 % 
Cubans 16,624 (2.0 %) 16,891 (1.2 %) 1.6 % 
South Americans 25,714 (3.1 %) 37,211 (2.6 %) 44.7 % 
Central Americans 15,711 (1.9 %) 36,080 (2.6%) 129.6 % 
Other 70,314 (8.5 %) 111,042 (7.9 %) 57.9 % 
Source:  Paral, Ready et al. (2004) 
 
Table B.2: Change in Mexican Population in Chicago Metropolitan 
 1990 2000 
Mexican population  565,737 1,052,878 
Mexican population as a percentage 
of total Latino population 
67.6 % 74.9% 
Mexican population as a percentage 
of the total population in the 






Table B.3: Place of origin of Latinos in New York  
 1990 2000 % Change 
All Latinos 1,783,511 (100%) 2,160,554 (100%) 21.1% 
Mexicans 61,722 (3.5%) 186,872 (8.6%) 202.8% 
Puerto Ricans 896,763 (50.3 %) 789,172 (36.5 %) -12.0 % 
Cubans 56,041 (3.1 %) 41,124 (1.9 %) -26.6 % 
Dominican 332,713 (18.7 %) 406,806 (18.8 %) 22.3 % 
South Americans 219,509 (12.3 %) 236,374 (10.9 %) 7.7 % 
Central Americans 101,222 (5.7 %) 99,099 (4.6%) -2.1 % 
Other 70,792 (4.0 %) 401,108 (18.6 %) 466.6 % 
Source: Census (1990; 2000) 
 
Table B.4: Change in Mexican Population in New York 
 1990 2000 
Mexican population  61,722 186,872 
Mexican population as a percentage 
of total Latino population 
3.5 % 8.6% 
Mexican population as a percentage 








Table B.5: Place of origin of Latinos in Los Angeles County  
 1990 2000 % Change 
All Latinos 3,351,242 (100%) 4,242,213 (100%) 26.6% 
Mexicans 2,519,514 (76.2%) 3,041,974 (71.7%) 20.7% 
Central or South 
Americans 
548,435 (16.4%) 447,527 (10.5%) -18.4% 
Other 238,167 (11.4 %) 750,977 (17.7 %) 215.3% 
Source: Census (2000) and Hayes-Bautista and Nicholges (2000) 
 
 
Table B.6: Change in Mexican Population in Los Angeles County 
 1990 2000 
Mexican population 2,519,514 3,041,974 
Mexican population as a percentage 
of total Latino population 
76.2% 71.7% 
Mexican population as a percentage 












Table B.7: Place of origin of Latinos in Dallas 
 1990 2000 % Change 
All Latinos 210,240 (100%) 422,587 (100%) 101.0% 
Mexicans 185,096 (88.0%) 350,491 (82.9%) 89.4% 
Puerto Ricans 1,497 (0.7%) 2,369 (0.6%) 58.2% 
Cubans 1,535 (0.7%) 2,283 (0.5%) 48.7% 
Other 22,112 (10.5%) 67,444 (15.9%) 205.0% 
Source: Census (1990; 2000) 
 
Table B.8: Change in Mexican Population in Dallas 
 1990 2000 
Mexican population  185,096 350,491 
Mexican population as a percentage 
of total Latino population 
88.0% 82.9% 
Mexican population as a percentage 
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